Commonwealth v. Douglas

Decision Date30 September 2014
Docket NumberNo. 12–P–1992.,12–P–1992.
Citation17 N.E.3d 427,86 Mass.App.Ct. 404
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Jason DOUGLAS (and five companion cases).
CourtAppeals Court of Massachusetts

Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph Janezic, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Michael Tumposky, Boston, for Jason Douglas.

Daniel R. Katz for Wayne Steed.

Present: CYPHER, RUBIN, & HINES, JJ.2

Opinion

CYPHER

, J.

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth after a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the Commonwealth's petition under Mass.R.Crim.P. 15

, as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). In ruling on the defendants' motions to suppress, a judge in the Superior Court held that the seizure by police officers of a firearm found under a passenger's seat during a “patfrisk” of the interior of a motor vehicle was impermissible because, although the stop of the vehicle was justified, the police had exceeded the permissible scope of the search when they looked under the passenger's seat before the occupants returned to the vehicle. Specifically, the judge reasoned that [a]ny suspicion which might have been prompted by any movement (or lack thereof) by the car's occupants was dispelled by the removal and pat frisk of each individual's person.”3 We reverse the order allowing the motions to suppress.

1. Standard of review. [W]e accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error.” Commonwealth

v. Sinforoso,

434 Mass. 320, 321, 749 N.E.2d 128 (2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 97, 674 N.E.2d 1067 (1997). We review de novo the judge's application of constitutional principles.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 301, 4 N.E.3d 1236 (2014). We must assess the reasonableness of a police officer's actions based upon the “circumstances confronting the officer in the field, not those facing the judge in the tranquility of the courtroom.” Commonwealth v. Dedomenicis, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 76, 79, 674 N.E.2d 1099 (1997) (citations omitted).

2. Facts. The following facts are taken from the judge's findings, supplemented by the uncontested and uncontroverted testimony

of the only witness at the hearing, Boston police Officer Liam Hawkins, who was implicitly credited by the judge. See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337, 861 N.E.2d 404 (2007)

, S.C., 450 Mass. 818, 882 N.E.2d 328 (2008). On the evening of April 7, 2011, a party was held at the Felt Night Club (Felt) in downtown Boston to celebrate the success of a video posted to the video sharing Web site YouTube and produced by a group whose members lived on Annunciation Road in Boston. Members of this group were engaged in a long-standing and sometimes violent rivalry with a group centered in the Orchard Park housing development, and YouTube videos produced by the two groups had at times been a source of some of the violence. The Boston police department's youth violence strike force conducted surveillance at the event, to be present in case members of a rival group showed up, to see which other groups' members might have attended to get a sense of the current status of shifting alliances among groups in the city of Boston, and in case “anything sticks out.” The police on the night in question also followed and stopped some departing attendees.

Boston police Officers Liam Hawkins and his partner, Mathew Wosny, were stationed in the vicinity of Felt that night as part of the surveillance operation in a “take down” vehicle, one that was designated to be available to assist should the officers conducting surveillance require it. At about 3:12 a.m. , they received a radio dispatch from Sergeant Detective Joseph Sullivan, who was conducting surveillance at a restaurant in the Chinatown section of Boston, where some of the party attendees had gone, reporting that the defendant Jason Douglas had left the restaurant accompanied by two men. The three men had been followed by the police to the restaurant from the party at Felt. Sergeant Sullivan informed the other officers that Douglas appeared agitated and was punching his own hand and expressing a desire to leave the area. Sergeant Sullivan also reported that one of the two men with Douglas—this turns out to have been defendant Wayne Steed—was wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt and had one hand held tightly to his body in the front pocket of the sweatshirt. The men entered a Toyota Camry automobile driven by a woman who had pulled up at the curb. The driver had failed to use her turn signal as she turned out of the parking lot. After the men got in, the vehicle departed. At approximately the same time, a fight broke out in the parking lot of the restaurant.

Officer Hawkins, who was stationed close by, caught up with the vehicle in his unmarked cruiser and noticed that the driver

again failed to signal when turning. He pulled over the vehicle based on this civil infraction. Officers Hawkins and Wosny approached the vehicle and saw four people inside. The driver was a woman later identified as Rheanna Reese. The defendant Douglas was seated in the front passenger seat, while the defendant Steed was seated in the back with an individual identified as Shakeem Johnson. Johnson was seated behind the driver, while Steed was behind the front passenger.

Officer Hawkins was familiar with both Johnson and Douglas. He testified that he had previously encountered Douglas upwards of fifty times both in the course of his ordinary duties in his assigned district and through his work on the youth violence strike force. He knew that Johnson had a criminal record that included both crimes of violence and drug offenses. He also knew that Douglas had a previous criminal record, including specifically at least one firearms conviction. He testified that both Douglas and Johnson had been under specific surveillance when they went from Felt to the restaurant. While Officer Hawkins was “loosely familiar” with Steed, he did not know him well enough to recognize him by name.

As Officer Wosny approached the vehicle, and before he reached the driver's window, he observed that Johnson had one arm stretched across the front of his torso near his waist. Officer Hawkins observed that “Johnson was kind of pivoted to the right and leaning in towards the middle of the vehicle.” Officer Wosny ordered Johnson out of the vehicle and conducted a patfrisk. Johnson was heavily intoxicated, to the point where he was “unsteady on his feet.” The officer found nothing during the patfrisk, and the officers thought that the movements in the vehicle may have been caused by Johnson trying to remove his seatbelt to exit the vehicle or to make it appear that his seatbelt had been fastened.

Officer Hawkins observed that Steed had his hands resting on the outside of the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt, rather than inside them, that he appeared to be clutching something in the pocket, that he was staring straight ahead, not looking around, and that he was avoiding eye contact. Concerned that, based on his training and experience, this behavior might indicate that Steed possessed a weapon, Officer Hawkins ordered him out of the vehicle. Steed continued to avoid eye contact with the officers, questioned why the officers wanted him to get out, and had to be asked three times before he got out of the vehicle. On

Steed's exit, the officer could see an open bottle of an alcoholic beverage on the floorboard sticking out from under the front passenger seat. A patfrisk of Steed revealed nothing.

As Officer Hawkins performed the patfrisk of Steed, Douglas opened the front passenger door and got out of the vehicle without being asked to do so. Officer Hawkins testified based on his previous encounters with Douglas that [n]ormally he's very casual, he's calm, we talk normally,” but that on the night of the stop Douglas seemed [d]ifferent.” Douglas is large and muscular, and in the circumstances, Officer Hawkins wanted to make sure Douglas was contained. Officer Hawkins explained that in his experience when individuals at traffic stops have exited vehicles unbidden they have, in some instances, been armed.

Because both officers were already occupied, Officer Hawkins ordered Douglas to get back in the vehicle, addressing him by his first name, and Douglas complied. However, once Douglas was back in the vehicle, Officer Hawkins saw him shift the vehicle from park into drive and say something to the driver, Reese. Officer Hawkins was worried that Douglas might try to flee, and was also concerned for his own safety, because he was positioned between the vehicle and a jersey barrier by the side of the road. He ordered Douglas to shift the vehicle back into park and told him not to move. Douglas complied. Officer Wosny immediately removed Reese from the vehicle to prevent her from driving away, while Officer Hawkins asked Douglas to exit and performed a patfrisk of him. The patfrisk of Douglas revealed nothing.

Following the patfrisk of Douglas, all four occupants had been removed from the vehicle and were either sitting or leaning on the jersey barrier by the road. Officer Hawkins approached the front passenger door of the vehicle, which was still open. He shined a flashlight under the front passenger seat where Douglas had been seated, crouched down to look under the seat, and observed a revolver.4 All four occupants of the vehicle were then handcuffed and detained. Defendants Douglas and Steed were both charged with possession of the firearm.

3. Discussion. “Where the police have observed a traffic violation, they are warranted in stopping a vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Bacon, 381 Mass. 642, 644, 411 N.E.2d 772 (1980)

. The subjective motivation of the police does not limit their power to make an authorized

motor vehicle stop. Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 207, 649 N.E.2d 717 (1995)

. The stop in this case was permissible.

The exit order and patfrisk of the occupants were also permissible. During a motor...

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9 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Darosa
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • January 8, 2019
    ...or passenger returning to the vehicle may gain access to a weapon that may be used against the police." Commonwealth v. Douglas, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 411, 17 N.E.3d 427 (2014), S.C., 472 Mass. 439, 35 N.E.3d 349 (2015). And, of course, in upholding the protective sweep, the judge explicit......
  • Commonwealth v. Douglas
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • August 14, 2015
    ...appeal to the Appeals Court, and the Appeals Court reversed the allowance of the motions to suppress. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 86 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 405, 17 N.E.3d 427 (2014). We granted the defendants' applications for further appellate review.We conclude that, even if the patfrisks of ......
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    • Massachusetts Superior Court
    • December 27, 2016
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    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • August 5, 2015
    ...the police, even though the driver and any passengers are permitted to reenter the vehicle and go on their way.” Commonwealth v. Douglas, 86 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 411 (2014). Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Graham, 78 Mass.App.C......
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