Commonwealth v. Echevarria
| Docket Number | 22-P-700 |
| Decision Date | 05 July 2023 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. ANDRE ECHEVARRIA |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea by a judge of the Suffolk Superior Court (motion judge). The defendant was indicted on charges of carrying a firearm without a license, third offense (count one); possession of a firearm without a license (count two) and carrying a loaded firearm without a license (count three). With regard to count one, the defendant was also charged with being an armed career criminal on the basis that he had previously been convicted of two violent crimes and a serious drug offense. See G. L. c. 269, § 10G. A jury was empaneled on January 21, 2014, and trial was scheduled to continue on January 23. However, on January 23, following plea negotiations, the defendant participated in a plea colloquy and pleaded guilty to so much of count one as alleged carrying a firearm without a license, second offense, and being a level one armed career criminal, and count three. Count two was dismissed at the request of the Commonwealth, as were the remaining portions of count one. The defendant received the jointly recommended sentence of from six to seven years in State prison on count one and three years of probation on count three, to commence from and after the sentence imposed on count one. Seven years later, on October 25, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing, inter alia, that that he was pressured to complete the plea colloquy under the threat of having to begin trial.[1] That motion was treated as a motion for a new trial and denied without a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Resende, 475 Mass. 1, 12 (2016). On appeal, the defendant argues that his motion for a new trial should have been granted because his guilty plea was coerced as a result of the plea judge's statement that his case would proceed to trial if he could not confirm that he had received effective representation from his counsel. We affirm.
Discussion.
"A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)." Resende, 475 Mass. at 12. "[A] judge should only grant a postsentence motion to withdraw a plea if the defendant comes forward with a credible reason which outweighs the risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 486 (1982).
"For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be made voluntarily and intelligently." Commonwealth v. Hart, 467 Mass. 322, 325 (2014), citing Huot v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 91, 99 (1973). "To assess the intelligence and voluntariness of a defendant's plea, we necessarily rely on the defendant's sworn responses to the judge's informed questions made in the solemnity of a formal plea proceeding." Commonwealth v. Hiskin, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 633, 638 (2007). "While not solely determinative of the intelligence and voluntariness of a plea, the defendant's sworn statements at colloquy have undeniable bearing and heft in resolving a later claim to the contrary." Id. at 639, citing Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 631, 635-636 (2001).
"While '[t]he question whether a defendant was subject to undue pressure to plead guilty must be considered in some manner on the record . . . [n]o particular form of words need be used in the required inquiry of a defendant.'" Commonwealth v. Sherman, 451 Mass. 332, 338 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Quinones, 414 Mass. 423, 434 (1993). "Any defendant who pleads guilty does so under the weight of an assortment of pressures that are intrinsic to such a situation." Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 536 (1978). "The recognition of these pressures on the defendant is not enough, however, to render the plea involuntary in a constitutional sense." Id.
An appellate court "review[s] the allowance or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether the judge abused that discretion or committed a significant error of law." Commonwealth v. Henry, 488 Mass. 484, 490 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 Mass. 645, 648 (2019). The decision to deny such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the judge and will be reversed only if it appears manifestly unjust or where the proceeding was infected with prejudicial constitutional error. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 348, 353 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 708 (2006).
Here, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the motion judge in his denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. During the plea colloquy, the plea judge and defendant discussed the defendant's representation. We recite the relevant portion of the exchange.
That the defendant may have been unhappy with his attorney is evident. When the defendant expressed that unhappiness by stating that his counsel had not fully and fairly represented him at all times, the plea judge properly inquired more deeply into the meaning of his assertion. See Hiskin, 68 Mass.App.Ct. at 638-639. When...
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