Commonwealth v. Farmer, 2013–SC–000120–DGE.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013–SC–000120–DGE.,2013–SC–000120–DGE. |
| Citation | 423 S.W.3d 690 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellant v. Charles P. FARMER, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, Jason Bradley Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for Appellant.
R. Burl McCoy, Jr., Lexington, George Edward Nicholson, Ralph E. Meczyk, Robert J. White, Counsel for Appellee.
Appellee Charles Farmer moved the Russell Circuit Court to dismiss an indictment charging him with one count of murder. He contended that he was legally justified to act in self-defense and therefore immune from prosecution under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 503.085. Following the denial of that motion, Farmer filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals which subsequently held that it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal despite it being interlocutory. The Commonwealth sought discretionary review, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Farmer's appeal from an interlocutory order denying him immunity in a criminal prosecution. We agree and reverse. The Court of Appeals is not authorized by our Constitution or statute to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order denying immunity pursuant to KRS 503.085, and furthermore, the collateral order exception to the finality doctrine does not apply in this circumstance.
On April 27, 2012, Charles Farmer shot and killed Daniel Popplewell who had entered Farmer's property wielding two large tobacco sticks. A Russell County grand jury indicted Farmer for one count of murder pursuant to KRS 507.020. Upon arraignment, Farmer entered a plea of not guilty and then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he was immune from prosecution under KRS 503–085(1) 1 because he had justifiably acted in self-defense. The Commonwealth filed a response to Farmer's motion to dismiss as well as discovery materials for the trial court to consider in ruling on the motion. The trial court denied Farmer's motion to dismiss, finding that there was probable cause to believe that the use of force against Popplewell was unlawful, and thus Farmer was not entitled to immunity from prosecution based on self-defense.
When Farmer appealed the order denying his motion to dismiss to the Court of Appeals, that court ordered Farmer to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as interlocutory because a final and appealable judgment had not yet been entered by the trial court. After considering Farmer's response, the Court of Appeals rendered a 2–1 decision finding that Farmer had demonstrated sufficient cause to proceed with his interlocutory appeal. Addressing a question of first impression, specifically, whether an order denying immunity from prosecution pursuant to KRS 503.085 is immediately appealable, the Court of Appeals analogized Farmer's appeal to the civil context where this Court has recognized the right of a party to immediately appeal an order denying a motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity. See Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Ky.2009). The Court of Appeals reasoned that denying a criminal defendant the right to immediately appeal a denial of immunity would undermine the intent of KRS 503.085.
Jurisdiction is a threshold consideration for any court at any level of the Kentucky court system. “It is fundamental that a court must have jurisdiction before it has authority to decide a case.” Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky.2005). Our state Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the Commonwealth's trial and appellate courts. SeeKy. Const. §§ 109–113. In considering the jurisdiction granted to the Court of Appeals, we begin with Section 111(2) of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides the following:
The Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except that it may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth, and it may issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause within its appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.
The “as provided by law” language in the second sentence of Section 111(2) authorizes the legislature to prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 71 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Ky.2002); see also Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132, 138 (Ky.2006), Ballard v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69, 72–73 (Ky.2010). The General Assembly exercised this authority when it enacted KRS 22A.020, providing:
(1) Except as provided in Section 110 of the Constitution, an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the Court of Appeals from any conviction, final judgment, order, or decree in any case in Circuit Court, including a family court division of Circuit Court, unless such conviction, final judgment, order, or decreewas rendered on an appeal from a court inferior to Circuit Court.
(2) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the Circuit Court in civil cases, but only as authorized by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, there shall be no review by appeal or by writ of certiorari from that portion of a final judgment, order or decree of a Circuit Court dissolving a marriage.
(4) An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals by the state in criminal cases from an adverse decision or ruling of the Circuit Court, but only under the following conditions:
(a) Such appeal shall not suspend the proceedings in the case.
(b) Such appeal shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of the Supreme Court, except that the record on appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Circuit Court to the Attorney General; and if the Attorney General is satisfied that review by the Court of Appeals is important to the correct and uniform administration of the law, he may deliver the record to the clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by the above-mentioned rules.
(c) When an appeal is taken pursuant to this subsection, the Court of Appeals, if the record so warrants, may reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and order a new trial in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy or otherwise violate any constitutional rights of the defendant.
(5) Any party aggrieved by the judgment of the Circuit Court in a case appealed from a court inferior thereto may petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari.
Subsection (1), pertaining to appeals from convictions and final judgments, orders and decrees, embodies the bulk of the Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction. However, particularly relevant to our discussion are KRS 22A.020 (2) and (4). In those subsections, the General Assembly has limited the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders of a circuit court. In “civil cases,” KRS 22A.020(2) allows appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders but only as provided for in rules promulgated by this Court. In “criminal cases,” the Commonwealth can appeal from an interlocutory “adverse decision or ruling” by the circuit court under certain conditions and in the manner provided for by court rules. KRS 22A.020(4). As for subsection (4), this Court has previously held that “KRS 22A.020(4) is uniquely for the benefit of the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Nichols, 280 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky.2009). Simply stated “there is no comparable provision for an [interlocutory] appeal by the [criminal] defendant.” Evans v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d 346–47 (Ky.1982).
Thus, looking at the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction as “authorized by law” in KRS 22A.020, it is apparent that in civil cases the General Assembly has granted this Court the authority to adopt rules governing the appeal of interlocutory orders. In short, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in those civil matters as determined by this Court.2 By contrast, there is no such authority in criminal matters. The Court of Appeals is not granted jurisdiction generally over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, subject to this Court's rules or otherwise. Instead, the statute states the Commonwealth may appeal from an “adverse decision or ruling” of the circuit court and proceed “in the manner” provided for by this Court in our criminal rules or Supreme Court rules. As explained more fully below, we find this distinction in the treatment of interlocutory matters in civil and criminal cases significant but, for now, the most logical consideration is whether there is a basis elsewhere in the Kentucky Revised Statutes for the Court of Appeals exercising appellate jurisdiction in this matter.
Turning to the self-defense statute under which Farmer claims immunity, it is clear that the General Assembly did not include a provision allowing for the interlocutory appeal of a denial of the claim to immunity provided in KRS 503.085. In Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky.2009), this Court had the difficult task of determining how the legislature intended the courts to implement the immunity provided for in KRS 503.085. Although appellate review of the trial court's immunity determination was not addressed, it is helpful to consider what we inferred from the immunity statute regarding its implementation in the trial courts.
Indeed, the only express indication of legislative intent is in KRS 503.085(2) which provides that immunity must be granted pre-arrest by the law enforcement agency investigating the crime unless there is “probable cause that the force used was unlawful.” Because the statute defines the “criminal...
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