Commonwealth v. Hoose

• Decision Date: 11 March 2014
• Citation: 5 N.E.3d 843,467 Mass. 395
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Robin Anthony HOOSE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

467 Mass. 395

5 N.E.3d 843

COMMONWEALTH

v.Robin Anthony HOOSE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Franklin.

Argued Nov. 8, 2013.

Decided March 11, 2014.

Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.

Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

SPINA, J.

In this case, the defendant, Robin Anthony Hoose, was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree, one for the death of Irene Pierce on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and one for the death of Frank Blanchard on the theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in (1) the judge's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police, (2) the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a change of venue, (3) the judge's denial of the admission of certain “third-party culprit” evidence and of the defendant's request for a third-party culprit instruction at trial, and (4) the judge's grant of the Commonwealth's motion to exclude expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions. The defendant also asks us to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to vacate his convictions or to reduce them to murder in the second degree. We affirm the defendant's convictions and decline to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

1. Background. We recite the facts the jury could have found at trial, reserving additional facts for our analysis of the issues raised on appeal. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on July 17, 2007, the defendant encountered Bill Goly and Goly's girl friend, Emma Oliver, outside a tavern. Oliver testified at trial that she and Goly then accompanied the defendant to his apartment and there encountered the eventual victims, Oliver's friend, Irene Pierce, and Pierce's boy friend, Frank Blanchard.

While at the defendant's apartment, a man in a red hat arrived to whom the defendant sold counterfeit drugs. The defendant, Goly, and Oliver then left Pierce and Blanchard at the defendant's apartment, drove to the home of another individual, and obtained two bags of “crack” cocaine, which they smoked together. The three then returned to the defendant's apartment sometime between 3 and 3:30 a.m., at which point Pierce and Blanchard informed the defendant that the man to whom he had sold the purported drugs earlier in the evening had returned to the apartment. The defendant became angry. He showed Blanchard where he kept a gun in the closet, and he showed the group a large knife, which he then placed on a dresser in the living room.

The defendant, Goly, and Oliver again left the defendant's apartment and purchased another bag of crack cocaine, which the three used together. Sometime later, the three returned to the defendant's apartment. Oliver went through the living room to use the bathroom. The lights were off in the living room, and she did not notice anything unusual in the apartment at that time. The three then spent some time on a porch outside the defendant's apartment before Goly and Oliver departed between 4 a.m. and 4:30 a.m.

Sometime after Goly and Oliver left, the defendant went back inside his apartment. Although the defendant believed he had asked Pierce and Blanchard to leave his apartment earlier that night, the defendant found Pierce and Blanchard inside his apartment watching television in the living room. Blanchard was on a bed, and Pierce was on a couch wrapped in what the defendant described as his “good blanket.” When the defendant then noticed that his watch and ring were missing from where he had left them in the apartment, the defendant became extremely angry and agitated. He began screaming and flew into a violent rage. He hit Blanchard, rendering him unconscious, and then picked up a knife and stabbed Pierce repeatedly in the abdomen. When Blanchard began to regain consciousness, the defendant stabbed him repeatedly as well. Pierce died from loss of blood, and Blanchard died from multiple blunt and sharp force injuries.

Subsequently, the defendant covered Pierce's body with a blanket and Blanchard's face with a pillow. The defendant wrote in a notebook the date, “7/17/07,” and the words, “Sorry mom ... Love yous. Wrong place, wrong time for them.” The defendant also cut himself on the neck and both arms with a box cutter. The defendant was later able to make his way to his mother's apartment in the same building, and she accompanied him to the emergency room. The defendant was then admitted to the psychiatric ward of the Franklin Medical Center as a result of his self-inflicted injuries.

The following day, the defendant, with the assistance of his mother, contacted Detective Leon Laster of the Montague police department. The defendant had a long-standing relationship with Laster. The defendant indicated on the telephone that he wished to speak with Laster in person, stating that he had something “very serious” and “very big” to tell him. Laster proceeded to the hospital, and when he arrived, he noted dried blood on the defendant's neck and bandages on his arm. Laster indicated that he was in a hurry and asked what the defendant needed to tell him. The defendant began to cry and, with his head in his hands, told Laster, “There are two dead bodies in my house.” Laster noted that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol although he was crying and at times sobbing during their conversation. Laster then asked if the defendant had killed the people, and the defendant stated that he had. The defendant told Laster, “Well, I know I didn't shoot them because I think I stabbed them.” The defendant also told the detective that the body of the female victim was in his living room where the defendant had covered the body with a sheet and the body of the male victim was on the bed. Later that day, the bodies of Pierce and Blanchard were discovered by police in the defendant's apartment as he had described.

Upon his discharge from the hospital on July 19, the defendant was met by three police officers, including Detective Lieutenant John Gibbons of the State police, who was leading the investigation. At their request, the defendant accompanied police to the Greenfield police station. After reading the defendant Miranda warnings and obtaining a written waiver, police conducted a series of interviews that began at approximately 10:30 a.m. and lasted until approximately 3:50 p.m. when the defendant was placed under arrest. Throughout these interviews the defendant professed to not remembering either the events of July 17 or the statement he had made to Detective Laster the previous day. However, following his arrest, during booking at the police station, the defendant recalled much of what had occurred on July 17 and requested to speak with police once more. The defendant was again apprised of his Miranda rights as well as his right to prompt presentment and a probable cause hearing within twenty-four hours. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56, 661 N.E.2d 71 (1996); Mass. R.Crim. P. 3.1(a)(3), 442 Mass. 1503 (2004). After waiving these rights, the defendant provided a detailed statement admitting to having killed both Pierce and Blanchard. All of the interviews of the defendant and his statements to police were recorded and admitted into evidence at trial.

2. Motion to suppress defendant's statements to police. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police on the grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant further argued that neither his multiple waivers of the Miranda rights nor his statements to police were voluntary and intelligent because he was experiencing extreme physical and emotional trauma stemming from his recent injuries and because he was under the influence of prescription medications that were not properly administered by the police. Following an evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion to suppress and issued written findings and rulings concluding that the defendant had voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights under Miranda and that his statements to police were made free from coercion and intimidation.

“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error,” and we defer to the judge's determination of the weight and credibility to be given to oral testimony presented at a motion hearing. Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 32, 754 N.E.2d 647 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Eckert, 431 Mass. 591, 592–593, 728 N.E.2d 312 (2000). Where a judge's findings are based on recorded evidence, we are in as good a position as the motion judge to evaluate that evidence. However, where, as here, the judge considered the recorded evidence in light of oral testimony at the motion to suppress hearing and made credibility determinations therefrom, we adhere to the normal standard of review. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340–341, 960 N.E.2d 306 (2012). We conduct an independent review of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. Commonwealth v. LeBeau, 451 Mass. 244, 254, 884 N.E.2d 956 (2008).

The judge concluded first that the defendant was not in custody at the police station until he gave his first written statement and was arrested, and therefore that the Miranda decision did not apply to the defendant's statement at the hospital or at the police station prior to his arrest. ¹ The judge further concluded that even if the defendant had been in custody at the police station prior to his arrest, the police did not undermine the defendant's right to counsel, the defendant voluntarily waived his rights under the Miranda decision, and his statements were not the product of coercion or...