Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams

Decision Date11 August 2020
Docket NumberNo. 1428 MDA 2017,1428 MDA 2017
Citation237 A.3d 528
Parties COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Akim Sharif JONES-WILLIAMS Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Superior Court

Shawn M. Dorward, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Timothy J. Barker, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, Akim Sharif Jones-Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on April 5, 2017, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on September 11, 2017, following his jury and bench trial convictions for various crimes arising from a motor vehicle accident. After careful review, we vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence, reverse the order denying suppression, and remand for a new trial.

The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On July 5, 2014, Appellant was driving a red 2014 Mitsubishi Outlander accompanied by his fiancé, Cori Sisti, and their daughter, S.J. At approximately 4:42 p.m., Appellant's vehicle collided with a train at Slonnekers Landing, near the 1100 block of Cly Road, York Haven, Pennsylvania.

Officer Michael Briar and two paramedics, Leslie Garner and Lisa Gottschall, were first to arrive at the scene. Upon arrival, they found Appellant outside of the vehicle, but Sisti and S.J. still inside. Garner and Gottschall immediately began treating Appellant, while Officer Briar attempted to assist Sisti and S.J. Ultimately, emergency personnel declared Sisti dead at the scene, but transported Appellant and S.J. to the hospital for medical treatment.1 Subsequently, various individuals informed the officer in charge, Lieutenant Steven Lutz, that they detected an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Appellant. Therefore, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Lieutenant Lutz directed Sergeant Keith Farren to go to the hospital to interview Appellant and obtain a blood sample.

When Sergeant Farren arrived at York Hospital, he discovered Appellant lying in a hospital bed, restrained, and fading in and out of consciousness. As such, Sergeant Farren could not interview Appellant or request that he consent to a blood draw. Later, however, Sergeant Farren learned that hospital personnel drew Appellant's blood at 5:56 p.m., before his arrival.2 This prompted Sergeant Farren to request that the hospital's laboratory transfer Appellant's blood sample to National Medical Services ("NMS") laboratory for testing to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled substances. Sergeant Farren filled out the requisite forms at 7:30 p.m. He did not obtain a warrant prior to submitting the request to test Appellant's blood sample. The hospital laboratory transferred Appellant's blood sample on July 8, 2014 (three days after the collision) and NMS laboratory issued its toxicology report analyzing Appellant's blood sample on July 15, 2014. The results revealed that Appellant's blood contained Delta-9 THC, the active ingredient in marijuana, at a concentration of 1.8 ng/ml and Delta-9 Carboxy THC, a marijuana metabolite, at 15 ng/ml.

Thereafter, on June 9, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a bill of information against Appellant. Specifically, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each of the following offenses: homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence ("DUI"); homicide by vehicle; endangering the welfare of a child ("EWOC"); recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"); DUI: controlled substance – schedule I; DUI: controlled substance - schedule I, II, or III; DUI: general impairment; careless driving; careless driving – unintentional death; aggravated assault while DUI; and aggravated assault by vehicle. Bill of Information, 6/9/15, at *1-3 (un-paginated).

On October 26, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion. In his motion, Appellant moved to suppress the blood test results obtained by police. Appellant's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 10/26/15, at *1-14 (un-paginated). Appellant argued that the police violated his constitutional rights by requesting to test his blood sample without a warrant. Id . at *9-14 (un-paginated); see also Appellant's Brief in Support of Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 1/29/16, at 29-39. Appellant also asserted that, notwithstanding the statutory provisions set forth at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a) (Reports by Emergency Room Personnel), if the police "can obtain a warrant ... without affecting the efficacy of the investigation," the Fourth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of Pennsylvania's Constitution require them to do so. Appellant's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 10/26/15, at *11 (un-paginated).

The trial court held a suppression hearing on December 21, 2015, and subsequently denied Appellant's motion to suppress on April 27, 2016. Trial Court Order, 4/27/16, at 1. In doing so, the trial court held that Appellant's blood test results were admissible because exigent circumstances existed and, as such, the warrantless search did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights. Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/16, at 7-11.

Appellant's jury trial commenced January 9, 2017. The Commonwealth admitted at trial the report documenting the presence of Delta-9 THC and Delta-9 Carboxy THC in Appellant's bloodstream. N.T. Trial, 1/10/17, at 261. On January 13, 2017, Appellant was found guilty of homicide by vehicle while DUI,3 homicide by vehicle,4 EWOC,5 REAP,6 DUI: controlled substance - schedule 1,7 DUI: controlled substance – metabolite,8 aggravated assault while DUI,9 aggravated assault by vehicle,10 and careless driving.11 On April 5, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four to eight years’ imprisonment followed by 12 months’ probation.

"On April 17, 2017, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion alleging that the trial court erred in denying suppression of Appellant's blood test results and that the trial court erred in finding that the weight of the evidence was met in [five] of the [nine] counts. [Through oversight, the trial court] granted the motion on May 10, 2017. On May 19, 2017, the trial court vacated its [May 10, 2017] order [ ] and ordered the parties to schedule a hearing [on] the post-sentence motion. [Thereafter, t]he trial court allowed Appellant to file a supplemental post-sentence motion on June 21, 2017[, and] held a hearing on the post-sentence motion on July 25, 2017. The trial court then denied [Appellant's] post-sentence motion [by] operation of [ ] law on September 11, 2017." Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/18, at 3.

On September 14, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Appellant's Notice of Appeal, 9/14/17, at 1-2. On October 5, 2017, the trial court entered an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Trial Court Order, 10/5/17, at 1. Appellant timely complied.

The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 13, 2018. Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/18, at 1-32. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that it incorrectly determined that exigent circumstances existed to permit the warrantless search. Id . at 12. In view of its error, the trial court asked this Court to "suppress Appellant's blood test results" and "affirm [Appellant's convictions for EWOC and REAP] based upon the circumstantial evidence." Id . at 32.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:12

I. [Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress when the Commonwealth failed to comply with 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3755(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code?]
II. [If the Commonwealth did comply with Section 3755(a) ’s requirements, did the trial court still err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because statutory compliance is insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in light of the recent decisions in Birchfield v. North Dakota , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), Commonwealth v. Myers , 640 Pa. 653, 164 A.3d 1162 (2017), and Commonwealth v. March , 643 Pa. 95, 172 A.3d 582 (2017) ?]
III. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant's] [m]otion for [s]uppression of [e]vidence [when] there were not exigent circumstances [and] the police officers could have reasonably obtained a search warrant before [requesting the transfer of Appellant's blood sample to NMS laboratory for testing] without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search?
IV. Did the trial court err in finding that, as a matter of law, the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof regarding [the following convictions: homicide by vehicle while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, EWOC, and REAP?]
V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [Appellant's] [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otion where the jury's verdict [was against the weight of the evidence for the following convictions: homicide by vehicle while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, EWOC and REAP?]

Appellant's Brief at 1-2.

In Appellant's first three issues, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Appellant's Brief at 45-58. "Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights." Commonwealth v. Wallace , 615 Pa. 395, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (2012) ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court has declared:

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
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5 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • July 20, 2022
  • State v. Croteau
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 5, 2022
    ... ... that compliance is required, as when an officer declares the intention to search and relies on the person's acquiescence to the search, Commonwealth v. Carr , 458 Mass. 295, 936 N.E.2d 883, 890 (2010), or simply conducts the search without asking for consent, see State v. Boyd , 2017 ME 36, ... 653, 164 A.3d 1162, 1181 (2017) (holding that consent was not voluntarily given when the subject was unconscious); Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams , 237 A.3d 528, 542-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (holding that consent was not voluntarily given when the subject was drifting in and out of ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. Gump
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • April 16, 2021
    ... ... In Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 237 A.3d 528 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court discussed Commonwealth v. March, 154 A.3d 803 (Pa. Super. 2017), vacated, 172 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2017), in which a similar issue emerged. As we explained in Jones-Williams, March was unconscious and nonresponsive, but not under arrest, at the time of a ... ...
  • Commonwealth v. Gump
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • April 16, 2021
    ... ... entered ... to permit effective and meaningful review of the lower court decisions." Commonwealth v ... Hood , 872 A.2d 175, 178 (Pa. Super. 2005). 8. In Commonwealth v ... Jones-Williams , 237 A.3d 528, 531 (Pa. Super. 2020), the appellant's car collided with a train and he was transported to the hospital. First responders at the scene had told police that they smelled marijuana on appellant. Id ... When police arrived at the hospital, they were unable to obtain a consent from ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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