State v. Croteau
| Decision Date | 05 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Pen-21-271 |
| Citation | 272 A.3d 286,2022 ME 22 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Brent CROTEAU |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Marianne Lynch, District Attorney, Danielle Pocock, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Lori Renzullo, Stud. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellant State of Maine
David J. Bobrow, Esq. (orally), Bedard and Bobrow, PC, Eliot, for appellee Brent Croteau
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.*
[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from an order of the trial court (Penobscot County, Budd, J. ) suppressing the blood test results of Brent Croteau in the State's prosecution of Croteau for a charge of operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), (5) (2021). The State contends that the court erred in concluding that the blood sample drawn from Croteau for testing was obtained without his voluntary consent. We vacate the judgment and remand for the court to deny Croteau's motion to suppress.
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the court's findings of fact in its suppression order and its order amending those findings of fact. The findings are supported by competent evidence admitted at the suppression hearing. See State v. Cooper , 2017 ME 4, ¶¶ 2, 9, 153 A.3d 759.
[¶3] Brent Croteau was driving southbound on Interstate 95 near Carmel on the evening of February 14, 2020. His vehicle left the highway and came to rest in a ditch near the tree line, with the vehicle's taillights visible from the highway. An off-duty state trooper, who was not wearing a uniform, was driving by in his private vehicle and stopped to see if he could assist with the situation.
[¶4] The trooper found Croteau sitting on the embankment between the road and the tree line. The trooper identified himself as an off-duty state trooper. He asked Croteau if he was injured and if there had been other passengers in the vehicle. Croteau answered, "I don't know," to each question.
[¶5] The trooper asked what had happened, and Croteau asked, "[D]o you want me to be honest?" The trooper responded affirmatively, and Croteau said that he had taken a lot of his medications and wanted to kill himself. Croteau listened to all questions posed to him, answered appropriately, and followed all instructions carefully.
[¶6] The trooper contacted the police dispatch center and requested emergency services. Croteau remained seated until an ambulance arrived, and the trooper helped him into the ambulance.
[¶7] An on-duty state trooper in uniform soon arrived in a marked State Police cruiser. That trooper observed straight tire tracks in the snow leading off the road to the trees. A pill bottle was found in Croteau's car, which was consistent with Croteau's statement that he had ingested large amounts of his medications.
[¶8] The on-duty trooper entered the ambulance briefly and then exited, and Croteau was taken to the hospital for treatment without any roadside sobriety testing. The on-duty trooper then went to the hospital, where he interviewed Croteau and recorded their conversation. That trooper identified himself as the investigating trooper and advised Croteau of his Miranda1 rights. The trooper spoke at a measured pace and took care to obtain "yes" responses to confirm Croteau's understanding of his rights.
[¶9] Croteau agreed to speak with the trooper and explained coherently that he had taken a total of sixty pills between 7:00 and 9:00 p.m. and had then driven on the Interstate. While the trooper and Croteau spoke, medical personnel were asking Croteau questions to determine his immediate physical health. They were checking his vital signs and preparing him for an echocardiogram
(EKG). A nurse indicated that she was going to "steal a little bit more blood."
[¶10] Hospital staff continued to communicate with Croteau about his medical care, and the trooper told Croteau that he had everything he needed for the time being, acknowledging that Croteau had "a lot going on with the hospital here." The trooper said that he would call in a couple of days and told Croteau that he hoped he would feel better.
[¶11] The trooper left momentarily but then returned to ask if Croteau would be willing to submit to a blood test to determine whether he had intoxicants in his system. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:
About twenty minutes later, the trooper returned with a test kit, and Croteau signed a consent form for sample collection before his blood was drawn. The trooper did not read the consent form to Croteau before Croteau signed it.
[¶12] The trooper did not provide Croteau with a form explaining either his statutory duty to submit to testing or his option to refuse to submit to testing and bear the statutory consequences of refusal, which may include license suspension, admissibility of the refusal to consent to testing at a trial for operating under the influence, and sentencing consequences if convicted.2 See 29-A M.R.S. § 2521(3) (2021).
[¶13] On April 11, 2020, the State charged Croteau by criminal complaint with operating under the influence (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(A), (5). Croteau pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the results of his blood test.3 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on July 16, 2021. The court received testimony from the off-duty and on-duty troopers and admitted in evidence the signed consent form for sample collection, the on-duty trooper's dashboard camera recording, and the on-duty trooper's recorded conversations with Croteau.
[¶14] The court granted the motion to suppress, reasoning that Croteau's blood was obtained through inadvertent misrepresentation because he was never advised of his right not to submit to the test. The court found that the trooper's request for a blood sample "was delivered in passing, almost as an ‘oh by the way’-type afterthought," which did not allow Croteau time to consider and reflect on the request. The court found that Croteau was distracted by medical personnel and preparation for the EKG, had been told by a nurse that his blood was going to be drawn, and did not have time to reflect on his decision. The court concluded that the blood draw was a result of mere acquiescence to the trooper's authority.
[¶15] The State moved for the court to amend its findings. Croteau filed an "answer" to the State's motion in which he requested additional findings as well. The court amended its findings to indicate that (1) the nurse stated that she was going to draw blood over a minute before the trooper requested another blood draw for chemical testing and (2) about twenty minutes passed between Croteau's oral consent and his signature of the consent form.
[¶16] The court reaffirmed its ruling, emphasizing that Croteau did not know that he had the discretion to refuse a blood draw and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Croteau had the capacity to make an informed decision, especially given that the officer had advised him that he was finished interacting with him and was leaving so that Croteau could receive medical attention. The State obtained the approval of the Attorney General to take the interlocutory appeal and timely appealed from the court's decision. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1), (5) (2021) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 21(b).
[¶17] The State argues that the court's factual findings require the conclusion that Croteau voluntarily consented to have his blood drawn for testing because he voluntarily spoke with the trooper after being advised of his Miranda rights, orally assented to submit to testing, and signed a written consent form. The State further argues that the court's conclusion that Croteau did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw is inconsistent with its conclusion that Croteau freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Finally, according to the State, the trooper was not required to inform Croteau of the consequences of a refusal to submit to the test before obtaining his consent.
[¶18] Croteau argues that the court properly found that, in the totality of the circumstances, he did not voluntarily consent to the search. He contends that, as a factual matter, he "was simply not of the mindset to provide voluntary consent to the blood draw."
[¶19] In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we "review factual findings for clear error and issues of law de novo." State v. Palmer , 2018 ME 108, ¶ 8, 190 A.3d 1009 ; Cooper , 2017 ME 4, ¶ 9, 153 A.3d 759. Thus, we "review a court's factual findings regarding whether consent was given for clear error, and the ultimate question of whether an individual consented to the search de novo." State v. Ayotte , 2019 ME 61, ¶ 8, 207 A.3d 614. When a court has granted a motion to suppress based on findings of fact that are not disputed on appeal, the ultimate question of voluntary consent to the search is a legal issue that we review de novo. See State v. Bennett-Roberson , 2019 ME 49, ¶ 9, 206 A.3d 303 ; State v. Hasenbank , 425 A.2d 1330, 1332 (Me. 1981) ; see also State v. Cefalo , 396 A.2d 233, 239 (Me. 1979) ().
[¶20] "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable...
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State v. Wilcox
...a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given." State v. Croteau , 2022 ME 22, ¶ 21, 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted).7 See, e.g. , State v. Nagel , 320 Or. 24, 880 P.2d 451, 455-56 (1994) (holding that ......
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State v. Wilcox
...a preponderance of the evidence that consent was objectively manifested by word or gesture and was freely and voluntarily given." State v. Croteau, 2022 ME 22, 21, 272 A.3d 286 (quotation marks omitted). [7] See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 880 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Or. 1994) (holding that field sobr......