Commonwealth v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 27 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2684 EDA 2013,2684 EDA 2013
• Citation: 2014 PA Super 182,99 A.3d 116
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Byshere LAWRENCE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

99 A.3d 116

2014 PA Super 182

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Byshere LAWRENCE, Appellant.

No. 2684 EDA 2013

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 16, 2014.

Filed Aug. 27, 2014.

James A. Lammendola, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.

Opinion

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, Byshere Lawrence, appeals from the May 24, 2013 aggregate judgment of sentence¹ of 45 years to life imprisonment after he was found guilty of first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, and possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).² After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows. On September 26, 2011, the Commonwealth filed an information charging Appellant with the above-mentioned offenses as well as one count each of criminal conspiracy, possession of a firearm by a minor, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, and recklessly endangering another person (REAP).³ On July 31, 2012, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at the conclusion of which, the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, and PIC. The jury acquitted Appellant of criminal conspiracy. The Commonwealth nolle prossed the possession of a firearm by a minor, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, and REAP charges. On May 24, 2013, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment.⁴ On June 3, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. Relevant to this appeal, Appellant's only constitutional issue in his post-sentence motion argued that the application of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1) to his case violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See Appellant's Post–Sentence Motion, 6/3/13, at ¶¶ 7–10. On September 18, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant's post-sentence motion. On September 24, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.⁵

On appeal, Appellant raises three issues for our review.

A. Is 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under the United States Constitution because it violates its Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause?

B. Is 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under the United States Constitution because it violates the Equal Protection Clause in that it treats juveniles convicted of first or second degree murder after its passage differently than juveniles convicted of the identical crimes prior to its passage?

C. Was the sentence imposed on Appellant under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 unconstitutional under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions because it violates their Ex Post Facto Clauses?

Appellant's Brief at 2.

In this case, all three of Appellant's issues challenge the constitutionality of Section 1102.1. “We note that duly enacted legislation carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality.”Commonwealth v. Turner, ––– Pa. ––––, 80 A.3d 754, 759 (2013) (citation omitted). “A presumption exists ‘[t]hat the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth’ when promulgating legislation.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 621 Pa. 401, 78 A.3d 1044, 1050 (2013), quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(3).

In conducting our review, we are guided by the principle that acts passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be constitutional, including the manner in which they were passed. Thus, a statute will not be found unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. If there is any doubt as to whether a challenger has met this high burden, then we will resolve that doubt in favor of the statute's constitutionality.

Commonwealth v. Neiman, ––– Pa. ––––, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Turner, supra.

In his first issue, Appellant avers that Section 1102.1 is unconstitutional because “it requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty-five years['] incarceration upon defendants fifteen years or older convicted of first-degree murder ... without consideration of the factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, [––– U.S. ––––] 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).” Appellant's Brief at 14.

The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”⁶ U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment is unique in constitutional jurisprudence because it “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality). “[T]he Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008), quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” Hall v. Florida, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1992, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014) (citation omitted).

Appellant argues that Section 1102.1 violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause because the statute imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 35 years to life without “giving [any] consideration to [Appellant's] age and attendant circumstances of youth.” Appellant's Brief at 15. The statute provides in relevant part as follows.

§ 1102.1. Sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a law enforcement officer

(a) First degree murder. —A person who has been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.

(2) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 25 years to life.

...

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a). Appellant is correct insofar that, by its text, the statute requires the trial court to impose a sentence of not less than 35 years' imprisonment in Appellant's case. Id. § 1102.1(a)(1). The trial court is divested of any discretion to impose a lesser minimum sentence. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(f) (stating, “[i]f a sentencing court refuses to apply this section where applicable, the Commonwealth shall have the right to appellate review of the action of the sentencing court[ ]”).

Within the last ten years, the Supreme Court has on three occasions considered the Eighth Amendment's application to juvenile offenders. In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for those under 18 years of age at the time of the offense.⁷ Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In 2010, the Court concluded a juvenile convicted of non-homicide crime could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Finally, in Miller, the question was whether the Eighth Amendment barred a state from imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon a juvenile, even for a homicide offense. As with Roper and Graham, the Court noted that juveniles differ from adults in three distinct ways.

First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Second, children “are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child's character is not as “well formed” as an adult's; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183.

Id. at 2464 (parallel citations omitted); see also Graham, supra at 68–69, 130 S.Ct. 2011 ; Roper, supra at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The Court went on to observe that “the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations.” Id. at 2466. “By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” Id. In the Court's view, this scheme could not be reconciled with the considerations espoused in Roper and Graham. Id. at 2469.

Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime

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