Commonwealth v. Miller

• Decision Date: 18 November 2013
• Citation: 80 A.3d 806,2013 PA Super 298
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Cody MILLER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

80 A.3d 806

2013 PA Super 298

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Cody MILLER, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Sept. 3, 2013.

Filed Nov. 18, 2013.

Thomas P. Sundmaker, Stroudsburg, for appellant.

Elmer D. Christine, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: ALLEN, OTT, and COLVILLE ^*, JJ.

OPINION BY ALLEN, J.:

Cody Miller (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered December 14, 2012, subjecting him to the sex offender registration requirements set forth in Subchapter H of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq., effective December 20, 2012. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:

On May 3, 2011, [Appellant] pled guilty to one count of Indecent Assault by Forcible Compulsion, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3126(a)(2), a misdemeanor of the first degree. On August 15, 2011, Appellant was sentenced to nine to thirty-six months in the Monroe County Correctional Facility. He was further ordered to comply with the registration requirements of the version of Megan's Law that was in effect at the time. Under that version of the law, [Appellant] was required to register for ten years.

[Appellant] did not appeal the judgment of sentence. Similarly, [Appellant] did not seek reconsideration of or otherwise challenge the provision in the sentencing order requiring him to register as a sex offender.

[At the time of his sentencing in 2011, Appellant was subject to the registration requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9791–9795.4. That version of Megan's Law subsequently expired and was recodified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–9799.41 effective December 20, 2012. The amended version of Megan's Law retroactively imposed new registration requirements on sex offenders such as Appellant, and required the trial court to notify the affected sex offenders of their new registration requirements.]

On December 14, 2012, [the trial court] convened a sex offender notification hearing ... to advise [Appellant] and other Monroe County sex offenders of their registration and reporting duties under the current version of Megan's Law and to give offenders required written notice of their obligations. The order [Appellant] is attempting to challenge in this appeal was issued at the conclusion of the hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/13, at 2–3.

Appellant did not file any motions before the trial court challenging the December 14, 2012 order. Rather, on January 10, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. WAS THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT PURSUANT TO Pa.R.CRIM.P. 720 A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 341?

II. DOES THE [SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT (SORNA) ] REQUIREMENT THAT PERSONS CONVICTED OF OFFENSES COMMITTED PRIOR TO SORNA'S EFFECTIVE DATE REGISTER AS SEX OFFENDERS POSE ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

III. DOES THE SORNA VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE BY SEIZING FOR THE LEGISLATURE POWER TO PROSCRIBE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURE(S) IN THE COURTS AND THEIR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS?

Appellant's Brief at 5.

Preliminarily, we note that the December 14, 2012 order which Appellant is challenging subjected Appellant to the sex offender registration obligations set forth in Subchapter H of the Sentencing Code, currently codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10–9799.41, entitled “Registration of Sexual Offenders” and generally referred to as “Megan's Law.” We will briefly discuss the history of the law.

In 1995, the General Assembly amended the Sentencing Code by adding Subchapter H, “Registration of Sexual Offenders,” then codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A §§ 9791–9799 (“Megan's Law I”). “The law was subsequently reenacted and amended numerous times. Megan's Law I, was to a significant extent ruled unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Donald Williams, 557 Pa. 285, 733 A.2d 593 (1999). The General Assembly subsequently enacted Megan's Law II, whose constitutionality [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] substantially upheld in Commonwealth v. Gomer Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 (2003).” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 598 Pa. 211, 956 A.2d 399, 400, n. 1 (2008). In Gomer Williams, while largely upholding Megan's Law II, the Supreme Court held that certain penalties imposed for noncompliance were unconstitutionally punitive, but severable. Gomer Williams, 832 A.2d at 985–986. “In the Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243 (known as Megan's Law III), the General Assembly addressed several matters, including that portion of Megan's Law II held to be unconstitutional in Gomer Williams. In the Act of November 29, 2006, P.L. 1567 (effective January 1, 2007), the General Assembly amended the legislation once again.” Leidig, 956 A.2d at 400, n. 1. Most recently, on December 20, 2011, the General Assembly amended Megan's Law, effective December 20, 2012. We refer to this current, amended version of Megan's Law as “Megan's Law IV.”

On December 14, 2012, the trial court in this case convened a hearing to notify offenders,including Appellant, who were subject to the retroactive provisions of Megan's Law IV, of their new registration requirements. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court detailed the circumstances surrounding the December 14, 2012 hearing as follows:

After the [Megan's Law IV] amendments were adopted, trial court, county correctional facilities, state, and county probation offices, and state agencies ... wrestled with a host of practical, logistical, and financial issues pertaining to implementation of Megan's Law IV. One significant issue was when and how to notify offenders subject to the retroactive application of Megan's Law IV of their obligations under the law, and thereafter register and process them in accordance with ... the law.¹ Courts became directly involved in these issues because the General Assembly included language in Megan's Law IV that purports to direct courts and their chief probation officers to perform specific legislatively assigned administrative tasks.

[The Monroe County courts] opted for a procedure centered on a hearing at which offenders under the supervision of our probation office or the jurisdiction of [the trial court] would be advised of their registration and reporting obligations under Megan's Law IV and given a written Megan's Law notification form. [T]he notification hearing was held on December 14, 2012. Ample notice of the hearing was given to all offenders and defense counsel including [Appellant] and his attorney.²

At the beginning of the hearing, [the trial court] advised all offenders, as a group, of their reporting and registration requirements under Megan's Law IV and the consequences of non-compliance. Some of the offenders, such as [Appellant] were already subject to registration requirements under Megan's Law III, but others were not. [The trial court] informed [Appellant] and others who were already registered of their increased registration periods and changed obligations [and] advised all offenders of the time periods within which they had to register or re-register under the new law.

After speaking to all convened, the [trial court] conducted a general colloquy to ensure that the offenders heard and understood what [the trial court] had told them. [The trial court] then handed out written Megan's Law notificationforms and adjourned for a sufficient period of time to allow each offender ample time to discuss his notification form with his attorney.

Following the break, [the trial court] called cases individually. Each offender was informed of his duty to comply with Megan's Law, his sex offender classification or Tier, the length of his registration period, the frequency with which he is required to report to confirm and update registration information, and the penalties for non-compliance. In addition, each offender was advised of the outside date by which he was statutorily required to register under Megan's Law IV. [The trial court] also went over each offender's notification form which, in turn, confirmed the information, dates, and times [the trial court] had orally given the offender. An order was entered in each individual case directing the offender to comply with the requirements of Megan's Law IV.

[S]everal offenders expressed an intent to challenge the registration requirements of Megan's Law IV. [The trial court] invited [all the offenders present] to file an appropriate motion and appear on January 8, 2013 for a hearing at which [the trial court] planned to hear all such motions. [The trial court] even indicated that if a challenger filed a good-faith motion on or before the date he was scheduled to register, and then appeared for the hearing, [the trial court] would not ... enforce the registration and reporting requirements until the challenge had been resolved. In addition, both before and after, [the trial court] spoke individually with each offender, [the trial court] permitted defense counsel to place on the record their concerns regarding or potential challenges to the registration requirements.

[Appellant] was present at the hearing and represented by counsel.... [Appellant's] attorney told [the trial court] that [Appellant] had read and understood his Megan's Law notification form, but would not sign it on advice of counsel.

After the hearing, several offenders filed motions challenging Megan's Law IV, [the] hearing orders, or both....

Cases that could not be resolved were called for hearing on January 8, 2013, as scheduled. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] gave the offenders and the Commonwealth the opportunity to brief relevant issues and return for a second hearing. In order to facilitate a fruitful discussion at the...