Commonwealth v. Lee
| Decision Date | 03 January 1910 |
| Docket Number | 310 |
| Citation | 226 Pa. 283,75 A. 411 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Lee, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 18, 1909
Appeal, No. 310, Jan. T., 1909, by defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Mifflin Co., Jan. T., 1909, No. 1, on verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree in case of Commonwealth v. Frank Lee. Reversed.
Indictment for murder. Before WOODS, P.J.
At the trial the prisoner introduced evidence tending to show that he was insane at the time of the killing.
The prisoner presented the following points:
6. That if the jury believe from the evidence in the case that the mind of the defendant was so affected by rage and passion arising from the provocation given as to be incapable of resisting the impulse of the moment, when the defendant fired the fatal shot, even though he intended to kill, he is but guilty of manslaughter. Answer: If the intention to kill exists and the weapon was selected and the deed committed, it would be murder either of the first or second degree, unless you believe, gentlemen of the jury, that the defendant was insane. [3]
8. The burden of proof never shifts but rests on the prosecution throughout, so that if the jury cannot find from the evidence malice beyond a reasonable doubt, such reasonable doubt is sufficient to reduce the grade to voluntary manslaughter. Answer: The burden of reducing the crime from murder to manslaughter where it is proved that the prisoner committed the deed, lies on him; but it is incumbent upon the commonwealth to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt of those facts and circumstances which constitute the crime of murder in the first degree. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that malice did not exist, then the killing would be manslaughter. [4]
10. If the jury believe from the evidence that at the time of the homicide the defendant was insane, he must be acquitted. Answer: This point is affirmed, but you should be fully satisfied of defendant's insanity before you should acquit him of all crime. [6]
Verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (3, 4, 6) above instructions, quoting them.
F. W Culbertson, with him R. W. Patton, for appellant. -- The prisoner's eighth point should have been affirmed Tiffany v. Com., 121 Pa. 165; Pannell v. Com., 86 Pa. 260; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289; Coyle v. Com., 100 Pa. 573.
The court erred in its answer to the prisoner's tenth point as the same placed upon the prisoner a greater burden in making out his defense of insanity than the law required of him: Pannell v. Com., 86 Pa. 260; Meyers v. Com., 83 Pa. 131; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289; Coyle v. Com., 100 Pa. 573.
L. J. Durbin, with him J. C. Houser, district attorney, for appellee. -- Where the killing is admitted and insanity or want of legal responsibility is alleged as an excuse, it is the duty of the defendant to satisfy the jury that the insanity actually existed at the time of the act, and a doubt as to such insanity will not justify the jury in acquitting him upon that ground: Lynch v. Com., 77 Pa. 205; Sayres v. Com., 88 Pa. 291; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138; Com. v. Heidler, 191 Pa. 375.
Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.
Defendant was charged with the crime of murder. On the trial of the case this instruction was asked for on his behalf, "If the jury believe from the evidence that at the time of the homicide the defendant was insane he must be acquitted." The point was answered in this way, -- "This point is affirmed, but you should be fully satisfied of defendant's insanity." In Meyers v. Com., 83 Pa. 131, where a like defense was set up, the instruction was that the defense could avail only as the jury were "satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt" that the prisoner was insane at the time the act was committed. We there held that the instruction was too stringent; that it threw the prisoner upon a degree of proof beyond the legal measure of his defense; that all that is required is proof which is satisfactory, such as flows fairly from a preponderance of the evidence; and the judgment was accordingly reversed. In Coyle v. Com., 100 Pa. 573 the instruction was that the defense of insanity must be established "by clearly preponderating evidence." This was held to be error on the ground that it was practically saying that the defense was to be established beyond all doubt or uncertainty; and a reversal there followed. In Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 289, the instruction was that the insanity relied on as a defense "must be clearly proved." This was held to be error, and the judgment was reversed. In this latter case it was said, "As applied to the degree of proof required to rebut the presumption of sanity, and sufficiently prove the existence of insanity, there is no appreciable difference between the expression "clearly proved," and "proved by clearly preponderating...
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