Commonwealth v. Mayberry

• Decision Date: 27 June 1969
• Citation: 435 Pa. 290,255 A.2d 548
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Richard O. J. MAYBERRY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

255 A.2d 548

435 Pa. 290

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Richard O. J. MAYBERRY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 27, 1969.

Richard O. J. Mayberry, in pro. per.

Arlen Specter (submitted), Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, James D Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief Appeals Div., Richard Max Bockol, Asst. Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, First Asst Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

O'BRIEN Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction of contempt, arising out of appellant's actions at his trial in Philadelphia County for perjury. Appellant, Richard O. J. Mayberry, is no stranger to this Court, his conviction for contempt in Allegheny County having recently been affirmed, sub nom. Commonwealth v. Langnes, Pa., 255 A.2d 131 (1969). In the instant case, appellant was sentenced to a total of five years imprisonment for various contemptuous actions committed in the presence of the Court, including throwing a book at the trial judge and narrowly missing him. He also told the judge that he wished he would 'break his neck instead of hurting his back.' He referred to the proceedings as a 'kangaroo court.' The court below, pursuant to the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041, found that this conduct was so offensive to the administration of justice that conviction and sentence were appropriate and justified. We agree.

Appellant makes numerous constitutional arguments, all of which boil down to the contention that the summary procedure used in the instant case, necessarily including the denial of a trial by jury, was unconstitutional. He relies chiefly upon the case of Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) which held that the constitutional guarantees of jury trial extend to serious criminal contempts. However, in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), the Court held that Bloom need not be applied retroactively. The Court considered the very issues raised by appellant here: 'The considerations are somewhat more evenly balanced with regard to the rule announced in Bloom v. State of Illinois. One ground for the Bloom result was the belief that contempt trials, which often occur before the very judge who was the object of the allegedly contemptuous behavior, would be more fairly tried if a jury determined guilt. Unlike the judge, the jurymen will not have witnessed or suffered the alleged contempt, nor suggested prosecution for it. However, the tradition of nonjury trials for contempts was more firmly established than the view that States could dispense with jury trial in normal criminal prosecutions, and reliance on the cases overturned by Bloom v. State of Illinois was therefore more justified. Also, the adverse effects on the administration of justice of invalidating all serious contempt convictions would likely be substantial. Thus, with regard to the Bloom decision, we also feel that retroactive application is not warranted.'

Since appellant's trial began long prior to the decision in Bloom on May 20, 1968, he would not be entitled to the benefits of that decision even if he could show that he otherwise came within its scope.

Since prior to Bloom, courts undoubtedly had the power to convict and sentence summarily for contempts committed in their presence, Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222 (1953), appellant's argument must fail. The judgment of sentence is affirmed.

BELL, C.J., files a concurring opinion.

COHEN, J., concurs in the result.

BELL, Chief Justice (concurring).

I join in the majority Opinion but (1) so many contempts or alleged contempts of Court, especially indirect contempts, have recently occurred in trial Courts or against trial Judges, and (2) the law on the subject of contempt has been so recently altered by the Supreme Court of the United States but, in many cases, still left in doubt, and (3) the Constitutional questions raised by the appellant are so important, that I am impelled to analyze and review the subject matter of contempt of Court in far greater detail than does the Majority.

This is an appeal from a conviction arising out of a Direct criminal contempt In the presence of the Court. Appellant was Summarily convicted on five charges of contempt of Court And sentenced to five separate and consecutive Sentences of one year for each separate contempt.

In October of 1963, appellant Richard Mayberry was indicted for perjury. In May and June of 1965, during the pre-trial hearing of the perjury charge and during the trial itself, Judge Weinrott cited Mayberry for contempt of Court, and at the conclusion of the perjury trial imposed the above-mentioned sentences upon Mayberry. Among other things, Mayberry In open Court threw a World Almanac at Judge Weinrott, which barely missed striking him. He also told the Judge that he wished he would 'break his neck instead of hurting his back.' In addition to the personal epithets which Mayberry in open Court hurled at the Judge, Mayberry during the voir dire of prospective jurors referred to the proceeding as a 'kangaroo court.' Judge Weinrott, pursuant to the Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. 2041, found that this conduct was so offensive to the administration of Justice that conviction and sentence was appropriate and justified. We agree.

The Act of 1836, supra, in § 2041 provides: 'The power of the several courts of this commonwealth to issue attachments and to Inflict summary punishments ^[1] for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases, to wit:

'* * *

'III. To the misbehavior of any person In the presence of the court1, thereby obstructing the administration of justice. * * *'

The statute further provides, in § 2042:

'The punishment of imprisonment for contempt as aforesaid shall extend * * * to such contempts as shall be committed in open court, and All other contempts shall be punished by fine only.'1

Defendant contends (1) that he was entitled to a trial by jury under (a) the Constitution of the United States and (b) under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and (2) that the Pennsylvania direct contempt statute, supra, violates the Federal and State guarantees of due process of law. There is no merit in any of defendant's contentions. Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336; Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669; Mack Appeal, 386 Pa. 251, 258, 126 A.2d 679; Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222; Philadelphia Marine Trade Association v. International Longshoremen's Association, 392 Pa. 500, 140 A.2d 814; Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159, 69 S.Ct. 425, 93 L.Ed. 569; Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 45 S.Ct. 18, 69 L.Ed. 162; Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405.

We shall quote a few pertinent principles regarding contempt of Court which were recently stated at great length in Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336, supra. In Brocker v. Brocker, the Court said (pages 519, 523, 241 A.2d pages 338, 340):

'The Courts have always possessed the inherent power to enforce their Orders and Decrees by imposing penalties and sanctions for failure to obey or comply therewith. Commonwealth ex rel. Beghian v. Beghian, 408 Pa. 408, 184 A.2d 270; Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669; Michaelson v. United States, ex rel. Chicago, St. M. & O.R. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 45 S.Ct. 18, 69 L.Ed. 162; Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; Commonwealth v. Perkins, 124 Pa. 36, 16 A. 525, 2 L.R.A. 223; Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania et al., 114 Pa.Super. 7, 174 A. 11; Commonwealth v. Sheasley, 102 Pa.Super. 384, 157 A. 27.

'Contempt is divided legally into two classes: (1) Civil Contempt and (2) Criminal Contempt, (a) direct contempt and (b) indirect contempt. Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669, supra; Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 392 Pa. 500, 140 A.2d 814; Commonwealth ex rel. Beghian v. Beghian, 408 Pa. 408, 184 A.2d 270, supra; Marco Industries, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 401 Pa. 299, 164 A.2d 205.

'The dominant purpose and objective of the Court's Order is the Controlling ^[2] factor in the determination of whether the contempt was civil or criminal. Not only is the dividing line between civil and criminal contempt sometimes shadowy or obscure, but the same facts or conduct may constitute or amount to both civil and criminal contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, supra. * * *

'In Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669; supra, the Court said page 375, 127 A.2d p. 671: 'A direct criminal contempt consists of misconduct of a person in the presence of the court, or so near thereto to interfere with its immediate business, and punishment for such contempts may be inflicted summarily: Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, §§ 23, 24, 17 P.S. §§ 2041, 2042; Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222; Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33, 76 A.L.R. 666. An indirect criminal contempt consists of the violation of an order or decree of a court which occurs outside the presence of the court: Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pennsylvania et al., 318 Pa. 401, 178 A. 291; Kegg v. Bianco, 151 Pa.Super. 234, 30 A.2d 159. * * *'

In Levine Contempt Case, 372 Pa. 612, page 618, 95...