Commonwealth v. Mehmeti
| Decision Date | 08 July 1983 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bejtullah MEHMETI, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Submitted April 21, 1983.
David Katz, Ellen Edge Katz, Stroudsburg, for appellant.
Thomas J. Nickels, Adam D. Bavolack, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Before ROBERTS, C.J., and NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ.
This is a direct appeal from an order of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, following the conviction of appellant for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault.
Mr. Mehmeti was charged with killing one William Haslam, and injuring James Dietrich, in a shooting incident which occurred on December 25, 1979. He was originally tried on these charges on March 18, 1980. This trial ended on March 22, 1980, when a mistrial was declared due to a jury deadlock. The declaration of mistrial was objected to by appellant's counsel. Thereafter, new charges were filed, and appellant filed a "Motion for Dismissal of Charges", asserting double jeopardy as a bar to retrial. This motion was denied and on May 5, 1980, appellant's second trial was begun.
At this second trial the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce over the objection of appellant's counsel, a head and shoulders photograph of the deceased victim in which he was clean shaven and dressed in a suit. The picture had been taken at the wedding of the victim's son, three years prior to the shooting. The victim's son was permitted to identify the photo, and to tell when and where it had been taken. The trial judge admitted this photograph and permitted it to go out with the jury during their deliberations.
On May 8 1980 the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. Post-trial motions were timely filed, raising the issue of double jeopardy, as well as the propriety of admitting the photograph of the deceased. The trial court denied these motions, and appellant was sentenced to a prison term of not less than two years, nor more than fifty-nine and a half months, plus a fine of $2,500.00 on the voluntary manslaughter charge. He was also given identical prison terms on the other two charges, with all sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
As a rule double jeopardy attaches if a mistrial is declared without manifest necessity, or without the defendant's request or consent. However, a genuine inability of the jury to agree on a verdict can constitute manifest necessity, and the declaration of a mistrial in such circumstances will not bar re-prosecution. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 492 Pa. 297, 424 A.2d 870 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 484 Pa. 130, 398 A.2d 978 (1979).
Appellant argues that the facts of this case do not indicate that the jury at the first trial was deadlocked. A review of the record indicates otherwise. After two days of deliberations the jury reported to the trial judge that they were hopelessly deadlocked. At that point the trial judge spoke with the jury and impressed upon them the importance of trying to reach a unanimous verdict. (N.T. Trial No. 1, Vol. IV at 29-30, March 21, 1980.) The jury agreed to deliberate further in an attempt to reach a verdict. Approximately three and one half hours later, the jury returned to the courtroom and the following exchange took place:
There was then a discussion amongst the trial judge and the attorneys, in which appellant's counsel objected to the grant of a mistrial. The trial judge then re-addressed the jury.
THE COURT (to the Jury): You said that your decision that you were hopelessly deadlocked was not unanimous. In other words, are there people on this jury who feel that you can reach a verdict?
JURY FOREMAN: I didn't say that in that respect, your Honor. I was referring to the poll on the deadlock. There was a poll and the majority voted for the deadlock. Then I said, we are going down there and he is going to ask us to come back or reconsider or accept it. Now, is there anyone here who is of the opinion that they could change their mind or opinion, or their vote, and it was unanimous that no one would change their vote. This is what I am saying.
* * *
THE COURT (to the Deputy Clerk of Courts): Hannah, will you poll the Jury and ask if they are willing to change their vote, without asking what their vote was, or what it is. Just ask if they are willing to change their vote which is now in a deadlock.
Thereafter the judge stated:
THE COURT: It is apparent to the Court that the Jury is hopelessly deadlocked. Therefore, we will declare a mistrial and discharge you from further duty in this case or from further duty in this term. However, in spite of the result, we want to thank you for your conscientious effort in trying to reach a decision. We know you conscientiously tried to reach what you thought was the proper decision. We are sorry and disappointed that no verdict was reached but that just happened. Thank you very much for your time and for your efforts. We appreciated it.
(N.T. Trial No. 1, Vol. IV at 32-34, March 22, 1980.)
Appellant's double jeopardy argument is based solely on the confusion engendered by the comment of Juror No. 5. However, the decision as to whether or not a deadlock existed was for the judge to determine. To this end the opinion of one juror was only one factor to be considered. In light of the fixed opinions of each member of the jury, there was no error in the trial judge concluding that there existed manifest necessity for the grant of a mistrial. See, Commonwealth v. Monte, 459 Pa. 495, 329 A.2d 836 (1974).
Appellant's second issue concerns the admissibility of the photograph of the deceased victim. In Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1981), we held that photographs of a victim and/or his family, which are irrelevant to a determination of guilt or innocence, are inadmissible. Cf. Commonwealth v. Green, 488 Pa. 611, 615 n. 2, 413 A.2d 651, 654 n. 2 (1980) (). Since the admitted purpose of the Commonwealth in offering the photograph was merely "to show what kind of man he (the victim) was," (N.T. Trial No. 2, Vol. III, at 395-396, May, 1980) there was no relevancy to the question of appellant's guilt or innocence.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred when it admitted the photograph into evidence. Our inquiry does not, however, end with this conclusion. The question remains as to whether the error in admitting the photograph was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Story, supra, 476 Pa. at 405-406, 383 A.2d at 164.
The standards for determining whether a trial error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt were well stated by this Court in Story.
This Court has stated than an error may be harmless where the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 178-79, 305 A.2d 715, 719 (1973); accord, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972). Under this approach, a reviewing court first determines whether the untainted evidence, considered independently of the tainted evidence, overwhelmingly establishes the defendant's guilt. If " 'honest, fair minded jurors might very well have brought in not guilty verdicts,' " an error cannot be harmless on the basis of overwhelming evidence. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. at 181, 305 A.2d at 721 quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26, 87 S.Ct. 824, 829, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Once the court determines that the evidence of...
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