Commonwealth v. Minor

• Decision Date: 17 March 1976
• Citation: 356 A.2d 346,467 Pa. 230
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Lloyd MINOR.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

356 A.2d 346

467 Pa. 230

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Lloyd MINOR.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 17, 1976

Argued Oct. 21, 1975.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 1976.

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., James A Shellenberger, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Edward Griffith, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before EAGEN O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS Justice.

On July 4 1971, appellee Lloyd Minor was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. On June 19, 1972, his pleas of guilty to both charges were accepted. During the colloquy which preceded the pleas, there was no explanation of either the elements which made out the crimes charged or of the relationship of the facts of appellee's case to those definitions. The only mention of the charges at the guilty plea hearing was:

'Q. (by defense counsel) Do you (Minor) understand the charges which you appear at the bar of the Court to wit: Aggravated Robbery and C.C.D.W., that you have an absolute right to have this matter heard by a jury?

A. (by Minor) Yes.'

Following imposition of sentence, appellee appealed to the Superior Court, alleging that the failure to explain the elements of the crimes charged rendered the pleas unknowing and unintelligent. That court reversed the judgment of sentence, finding appellee's contention to be meritorious. The Superior Court, however, reversed not because the colloquy failed to satisfy Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), decided after appellee's guilty plea was accepted, which requires that the elements of the crimes charged be explained to a defendant who is about to plead guilty, but because the plea colloquy failed to satisfy Pre-Ingram standards and rule 319(a). ^[1]

The Commonwealth requested and was granted permission to file an appeal ^[2] to this Court to determine (1) whether Ingram controlled appellee's case, (2) if Ingram did not control appellee's case, whether the plea colloquy satisfied Pre-Ingram standards, and (3) what the remedy should be if it is determined that a plea colloquy is inadequate to show a valid guilty plea. The issue has resolved itself to whether Ingram announced new law. We hold that it did not and, therefore, find that Pre-Ingram and Post-Ingram standards for guilty plea colloquies are the same. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court reversing appellee's judgment of sentence.

I.

In Pennsylvania, even before we decided Ingram, it has been the law that an understanding of the elements of the offense charged is necessary to an intelligent, knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

In United States ex rel. McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1965), the third circuit stated that in Pennsylvania 'the question whether the plea of guilty is voluntarily and intelligently made can only be determined if it is shown on the record what comprehension the accused had of the nature and elements of the charge against him . . ..'

In Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968), we suggested that trial courts make a record which adequately reflects, inter alia, the defendant's understanding of the offense charged. ^[3] Since that decision we have frequently indicated that such an understanding is essential to a valid guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa. 131, 134--36, 249 A.2d 290, 292 (1969) (listing defendant's knowledge of elements of crime as aspect of voluntariness of plea); Commonwealth v. Enty, 442 Pa. 39, 40, 271 A.2d 926, 927, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913, 91 S.Ct. 1396, 28 L.Ed.2d 656 (1971) ('understanding of the nature of the charges' an aspect of voluntariness); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 445 Pa. 311, 317, 285 A.2d 448, 450 (1971) (quoting Enty); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 449 Pa. 398, 296 A.2d 926 (1972) (Court satisfied itself that defendant knew elements of both crime charged and other forms of homicide in sustaining voluntariness of guilty plea); Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 412, 300 A.2d 503, 506 (1973) ('Review of the record satisfies us that the appellant was aware of the nature of the offense with which he was charged and that he understood that his acts constituted that offense'); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 417, 419, 299 A.2d 209, 210 (1973) ('Review of the colloquy . . . satisfies us that the trial judge properly determined that appellant pleaded guilty with an understanding of the nature of the charge and how his acts constituted the offense with which he was charged'); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 468, 304 A.2d 121, 122 (1973) ('The crucial elements of the offense . . . were sufficiently conveyed to appellant'); Commonwealth v. McNeil, 453 Pa. 102, 106, 305 A.2d 51, 54 (1973) ('The guilty plea colloquy must be considered in light of the overall objective which is to ensure that the plea is made with an understanding of the charge and an awareness of its consequences').

These cases demonstrate that the defendant's understanding of the nature and elements of the charges against him has long been an essential part of a valid guilty plea in Pennsylvania. In this respect Ingram cannot be said to be new law. ^[4] A reading of Ingram itself reveals that it was not, and was not intended to be, a statement of new law:

'The revised comments to Rule 319, paragraph (a), specifically recommend that (appellant understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty as one of) three points (to) be among those 'minimum' points covered in the examination of the defendant. While we have not yet voided a plea because the presumption of innocence was not mentioned to a defendant, we have indicated that a factual basis for the plea must be demonstrated and that the defendant must understand the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, . . . ; Commonwealth v. Jackson, . . .; Commonwealth v. Maddox, . . .. This is consistent with the comment to paragraph (a) of Rule 319 which suggests that the rule was intended to codify the 'preferred practice' suggested by our decisions in Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, . . . and Commonwealth v. Belgrave, . . .. This 'preferred practice' (which is now 'mandatory practice' under Rule 319) was that the trial court should 'conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges . . ..'

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 201, 316 A.2d 77, 79 (1974).

This conclusion is strengthened by examination of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), which set forth the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea colloquy. ^[5]

II.

Boykin plead guilty ^[6] to five counts of common law robbery, and was sentenced, by a jury, ^[7] to death on each of the five counts. On direct appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgments and sentences. ^[8] The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed stating: 'It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept (Boykin's) guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.' ^[9]

The Court failed to specify the precise nature of the required showing. It did, however, emphasize the dual nature of a guilty plea as both a waiver of constitutional rights and an admission of criminal conduct. Further, the Court implicitly recognized that the decision to waive constitutional rights depends, in part, upon the defendant's actual knowledge that he committed the crime charged and the facts which the state would have to prove by competent evidence. To ensure that the defendant has the information necessary to decide intelligently how to plead, the Court suggested that an explanation of the elements of the crime charged and how the facts fit that definition was necessary to an intelligent, knowing and voluntary plea:

"(B)ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts."

395 U.S. at 243 n.5, 89 S.Ct. at 1712 n.5, quoting McCarthy v. United States, 395 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)(construing Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 requirements for guilty plea colloquy in federal court).

Finally, the Court recognized that the best and surest way to assure both that the defendant's rights are protected and that the plea is validly taken is to make an adequate record at the plea hearing:

'What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought . . . and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.' ^[10]

Id. at 243--44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712--13.

Boykin has been recognized as requiring an on the record determination that the defendant understood the nature and elements of the charges against him. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Boykin as holding that:

'an on the record examination conducted by the trial court accepting a guilty plea which includes, inter alia, an attempt by that Court to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges . . . (and) acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged . . . is sufficient to insulate the plea (in state court) from...