Commonwealth v. Moreau
| Citation | 190 N.E.3d 1060 |
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | SJC-13168 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Eric J. MOREAU. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Ann Grant, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, & David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the Hampden district & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
The defendant, Eric J. Moreau, has been charged with operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) or with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or greater, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1) ( § 24 [1] [a ] [1]), and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ) ( § 24 [2] [a ]). The defendant filed this interlocutory appeal to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress the results of the test of the defendant's blood for BAC conducted by the State police crime laboratory (crime lab) without the defendant's consent. For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress.1
Background. We summarize the relevant facts found by the judge, supplemented where appropriate with uncontroverted testimony from the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431, 35 N.E.3d 357 (2015). The relevant facts are undisputed for the purposes of the present appeal. On September 29, 2020, a police officer responded to a report of a motor vehicle accident. On arrival at the scene, the officer observed a pickup truck that had collided with a tree off the side of the road, suffering extensive front-end damage. No other vehicle was involved in the collision. The officer spoke with the defendant, who was seated in the driver's seat and admitted that he was the operator of the vehicle. The officer observed the defendant to be unsteady on his feet, slurring his speech, and glassy-eyed; a strong odor of alcohol emanated from the defendant's person. The defendant was transported to a nearby hospital. Police gave to hospital personnel a "preservation of evidence letter," seeking the preservation of any blood that might be drawn during medical treatment.
Police then obtained and executed a search warrant for the defendant's blood. The blood was transported to and analyzed by the crime lab for BAC. Police never requested or obtained the defendant's consent to test his blood for BAC.
The defendant was charged with OUI in violation of § 24 (1) (a ) (1) and negligent operation of a motor vehicle in violation of § 24 (2) (a ). The defendant moved to suppress the results of the BAC analysis conducted by the crime lab, arguing that he did not consent to having his blood tested. The judge denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant filed an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), to which the Commonwealth assented. A single justice of this court allowed the application and ordered that the appeal proceed in the Supreme Judicial Court.
Discussion. The sole issue on appeal is whether, pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e ) ( § 24 [1] [e ]), a BAC test done by or at the direction of the police without the defendant's consent is inadmissible in a prosecution for OUI pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) ( § 24 [1] [a ]), where the blood was first drawn independently by a third party. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we review the issue de novo.
Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 4, 99 N.E.3d 778 (2018). "The meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in [the] language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Commonwealth v. Bohigian, 486 Mass. 209, 213, 157 N.E.3d 59 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555, 557, 5 N.E.3d 1206 (2014). Additionally, "[a] basic tenet of statutory construction requires that a statute be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous" (quotations omitted). Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704, 802 N.E.2d 64 (2004), quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 136, 140, 691 N.E.2d 929 (1998).
Section 24 (1) (e ) provides the conditions under which "evidence of the percentage, by weight, of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time of the alleged offense, as shown by chemical test or analysis of his blood ... shall be admissible" in prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol pursuant § 24 (1) (a ).2 ,3 The statute sets forth three distinct prerequisites to the admissibility of BAC evidence in a prosecution for OUI under § 24 (1) (a ), the first of which is that a defendant must consent to a "chemical test or analysis" of his blood when "such test or analysis [is] made by or at the direction of a police officer."4 G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e ). Our interpretation of this provision is controlled by our decision in Bohigian.
In Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 211, 157 N.E.3d 59, the court stated that "[§] 24 (1) (e ) requires that where a test of a defendant's breath or blood to determine alcohol content is made by or at the direction of a police officer, it must be done with the defendant's consent in order for the results to be admissible in a prosecution for OUI under ... § 24 (1) (a )" (emphases added). The court also concluded that "the testing of [BAC] ... includ[es] the drawing of blood." Id. Of course, a blood draw is a prerequisite to a chemical test or analysis of blood where such test or analysis requires a blood sample to be tested or analyzed. Therefore, separate from the discussion of safety concerns surrounding blood draws in Bohigian, the Bohigian court's conclusion that a test or analysis of blood includes the preceding blood draw such that police must obtain a defendant's consent to such draw is correct for this reason. See id. at 211, 216-217, 157 N.E.3d 59.
Relying on Bohigian, the defendant argues that § 24 (1) (e ) provides that a BAC "test or analysis" done "by or at the direction of" the police is inadmissible in an OUI prosecution under § 24 (1) (a ), unless the defendant has consented to such test or analysis. The Commonwealth contends that Bohigian stands for the proposition that, under § 24 (1) (e ), a defendant's consent is required only when his blood is drawn "by or at the direction of" the police, and that a defendant's consent is not required when a defendant's blood is tested or analyzed "by or at the direction of" police, so long as the blood first was drawn independently by a third party. For the following reasons we agree with the defendant and do not read the statute to apply only where both a blood draw and subsequent chemical test or analysis is done by or at the direction of police.
First, such an interpretation would contradict the plain language of the statute, rendering the consent provision of § 24 (1) (e ) inoperative in certain situations where, according to the plain language of the statute, the consent provision applies. We will not read an exception to the consent provision into the statute that the Legislature "did not see fit to put there." Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 537, 23 N.E.3d 929 (2015), quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126, 842 N.E.2d 926 (2006). Second, such a reading of the statute makes sense only if the Legislature's sole intent in drafting § 24 (1) (e ) was to mitigate safety concerns related to nonconsensual blood draws. Although such concerns likely were part of the Legislature's motivation in drafting § 24 (1) (e ), we have no direct evidence of such intent, and the plain language of the statute indicates that the Legislature was motivated by other concerns as well.
Regarding a plain language interpretation of § 24 (1) (e ), the statute provides in part that BAC evidence, "as shown by chemical test or analysis of [the defendant's] blood ... shall be admissible ... provided, however, that if such test or analysis was made by or at the direction of a police officer, it was made with the consent of the defendant" (emphases added).5 G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e ). Thus, by its plain language, where a "chemical test or analysis ... was made by or at the direction of a police officer," the defendant's consent is required for the resulting BAC evidence to be admissible, regardless of whether the preceding blood draw was done by or at the direction of a police officer. To hold that the consent provision is only triggered where the defendant's blood is first drawn by or at the direction of police would contradict the plain language of the statute.
Notably, both § 24 (1) (e ) and G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f ) (1) ( § 24 [1] [f ] [1]), which were intended to work in tandem, Bohigian, 486 Mass. at 211, 157 N.E.3d 59, discuss a defendant's consent "to a chemical test or analysis of his ... blood," rather than consent to a blood draw. Section 24 (1) (e ) "further" requires that "blood shall not be withdrawn ... for the purpose of such test or analysis except by a physician, registered nurse or certified medical technician" (emphasis added). Section 24 (1) (f ) (1) "further" provides that "no person who is afflicted with hemophilia
, diabetes or any other condition requiring the use of anticoagulants shall be deemed to have consented to a withdrawal of blood" (emphasis added). Thus, in separately discussing "a chemical test or analysis of ... blood" and "withdrawal of blood" or "blood ... be[ing] withdrawn," the Legislature appears to have conceived of "a chemical test or analysis" of a defendant's blood as distinct from a blood draw.
This interpretation is...
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