Commonwealth v. Morris M.

• Citation: 876 N.E.2d 462,70 Mass. App. Ct. 688
• Decision Date: 09 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-P-1450.,06-P-1450.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MORRIS M., a juvenile.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

876 N.E.2d 462

70 Mass. App. Ct. 688

COMMONWEALTH v. MORRIS M., a juvenile.

No. 06-P-1450.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued September 21, 2007.

Decided November 9, 2007.

Jennifer J. Cox, Beverly, for the juvenile.

Linda A. Wagner, Assistant District Attorney (James A. Steinberg, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Present: GRASSO, McHUGH, & MEADE, JJ.

MEADE, J.

In 2004, complaints issued against the juvenile charging him with delinquency by reason of two counts of malicious destruction of personal property valued over $250 in violation of G.L. c. 266, § 127,¹ and one count of use of a motor vehicle without authority in violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a). Following a jury-waived trial in the Juvenile Court, the trial judge found the juvenile delinquent as to all charges and sentenced him to six months' probation. After an evidentiary hearing on another date before a different judge, the juvenile was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,649. On appeal, the juvenile raises the following claims: (1) the evidence supporting the malicious destruction of property charges was insufficient, where the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with malice; (2) the evidence supporting the use of a motor vehicle without authority charge was insufficient, where the Commonwealth failed to prove that he operated on a public way; (3) the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not act out of necessity; (4) the restitution judge improperly admitted an exhibit at his restitution hearing; and (5) the restitution judge failed to consider the juvenile's ability to pay the ordered restitution. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

1. Facts. a. The crimes. On December 31, 2003, Susan Beaudin permitted her son Ryan to use her 1989 Jeep Cherokee (Jeep) to attend a New Year's Eve party. Ryan was the only person authorized to use the Jeep. Just after midnight, Ryan left the party with some friends, including the juvenile, to go home. After he dropped off one of the passengers at her home, Ryan and the others learned, as a result of some cellular telephone calls, that an individual named Sean was looking for the juvenile. Sean had a history of problems with the juvenile.

To avoid bringing any problems to the juvenile's house, Ryan drove to the Whirlaway Golf Range on Route 110 in Methuen, which was near the juvenile's house. Approximately one minute after Ryan pulled the Jeep into the parking lot, another car pulled in next to the Jeep. This car contained five youths, including Sean, who requested that the Jeep's doors be unlocked to allow them entry and access to the juvenile.

When Sean gained entry through a back door, the juvenile began swinging around an "eightball" he had wrapped inside a handkerchief. In the course of this action, the juvenile "smashed" out the Jeep's back left window with the makeshift weapon. Alarmed by the damage, Ryan and another boy jumped out of the Jeep, but Ryan's girlfriend, Melanie, remained in the front seat.

The juvenile then moved into the driver's seat, "hit the gas," drove across the parking lot, and crashed through a chain link fence onto the driving range grass. The juvenile continued driving on the driving range while Melanie and Sean screamed at him to stop. In her own effort to stop the Jeep, Melanie pulled the emergency brake, which stopped the Jeep long enough for her to jump out. The juvenile continued to drive in circles until he collided with a utility pole in the middle of the driving range. Upon colliding with the pole, the juvenile exited the Jeep and ran to his nearby home. The Jeep left behind was seriously damaged and inoperable. The front end was smashed in, the undercarriage was damaged, and it had to be towed away.

b. The restitution hearing. At a separate restitution hearing, Beaudin testified as to the estimated cost for the repair to her Jeep. A damage estimate by her insurance company, which totaled $2,649, was admitted as an exhibit.² Due to the expense, she had not insured the Jeep with collision coverage. There was too much damage to repair, and the Jeep was deemed a "total loss." The Jeep was retired to the junkyard.

At the hearing, the juvenile's father testified that he had seen Ryan driving the Jeep after the incident. The restitution judge made no inquiry relative to the juvenile's ability to pay the restitution. The matter was not argued and no evidence was offered on the subject. Payment of the restitution was made a condition of the juvenile's probation.

2. Discussion. a. Sufficiency of the evidence. The juvenile argues that his delinquency findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to support a delinquency determination, the relevant "question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (emphasis in original)." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979), quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).³

i. Malicious destruction of personal property. When evaluating sufficiency, the evidence must be reviewed with specific reference to the substantive elements of the offense. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra at 677-678, 393 N.E.2d 370. To prove a violation of G.L. c. 266, § 127, as amended by St.1994, c. 168, § 4, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile "destroy[ed] or injure[d] the personal property, dwelling house or building of another...." If the destruction or injury is "wilful and malicious," the permissible penalty is greater than if it is merely "wanton," which is a separate crime requiring different proof. See Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352, 557 N.E.2d 1380 (1990).

Here, the juvenile contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the judge's finding that his actions were "wilful and malicious." We agree. The terms "wilful" and "malicious" represent two distinct elements of the crime, both of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Peruzzi, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 437, 443, 446 N.E.2d 117 (1983); Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 4, 757 N.E.2d 249 (2001); Nolan & Sartorio, Criminal Law § 427, at 438 (2001). "The word `wilful' means intentional and by design in contrast to that which is thoughtless or accidental. Malice, on the other hand, refers to a state of mind of cruelty, hostility or revenge." Nolan & Sartorio, supra.

In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence that the juvenile acted wilfully was more than sufficient. He intentionally swung the makeshift eightball weapon inside the Jeep (resulting in the broken window), he took control of the Jeep by design, and he intentionally drove the Jeep through the fence and onto the driving range, damaging them both. Ordinarily, malice may be inferred from the wilful commission of an unlawful act without excuse. See Commonwealth v. Mezzanotti, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 522, 528, 529 N.E.2d 1351 (1988). However, the wilful doing of an unlawful act does not, by itself, suffice to prove malice under G.L. c. 266, § 127. Commonwealth v. Redmond, supra at 4, 757 N.E.2d 249.⁴ In other words, the evidence does not support the inference — there was no direct evidence of malice — that these intentional acts were done out of cruelty, hostility, or revenge.

Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, the evidence of the juvenile's hostile acts toward Sean, and his conduct in avoidance of Sean and the others, do not equate to destructive acts that were by design hostile to the owner (even if unknown) of the property. Id. at 5, 757 N.E.2d 249. See Commonwealth v. Hosman, 257 Mass. 379, 384-385, 154 N.E. 76 (1926). Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile's conduct was wanton, i.e., the acts he committed were "done heedlessly and in reckless disregard of the rights of others." Nolan & Sartorio, supra at 440. See Commonwealth v. Byard, 200 Mass. 175, 177-178, 86 N.E. 285 (1908). However, the juvenile was not charged with wanton destruction of personal property, and it is not a lesser included offense of malicious destruction of property. See Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, supra at 352, 557 N.E.2d 1380; Commonwealth v. Redmond, supra at 5, 757 N.E.2d 249.

The Commonwealth's reliance on Commonwealth v. Cimino, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 925, 611 N.E.2d 738 (1993), is misplaced. In Cimino, the defendant was convicted of malicious destruction of personal property based on his shooting car windows with a BB gun. Id. at 926, 611 N.E.2d 738. What made the shootings malicious and not wanton conduct was the fact that he aimed the gun at the car windows and acted with the principal purpose of causing damage to the windows, i.e., his intended targets. The car windows were not damaged as a result of the defendant's casual or reckless firing of the BB gun. Ibid. Here, however, it is not a reasonable inference from the evidence that the juvenile's intended target was the Jeep. Nor may it be reasonably inferred that by design he purposefully destroyed the fence and turf motivated by hostility, cruelty, or vengeance toward their owner as opposed to the resulting damage being occasioned by, or incidental to, his desire to escape his circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Redmond, supra at 4-5, 757 N.E.2d 249 (evidence of malicious destruction was insufficient where the destruction of the property was not designed to intimidate or overpower its owner, but rather was an incidental means to carry out the defendant's goal of theft). There being insufficient evidence of malice, the two delinquency findings based on the juvenile's violation of G.L. c. 266, § 127, must be vacated.⁵

ii. Use of a motor vehicle without authority. The juvenile further claims that the delinquency finding based on his unauthorized use of the Jeep, which he...