Commonwealth v. Parker
Decision Date | 01 May 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 877 MDA 2016,877 MDA 2016 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Donte Lamar PARKER, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Diana C. Kelleher, Public Defender, Lancaster, for appellant.
Craig W. Stedman, Assistant District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Maria A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Appellant, Donte Lamar Parker, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver ("PWID"),1 criminal use of a communication facility2 and criminal conspiracy.3 Appellant challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress information that he provided to police officers during an encounter on the street on August 1, 2014. We reverse the order denying suppression.
On November 20, 2014, Appellant was arrested for committing drug-related offenses on June 24, 2014 and July 17, 2014. The Commonwealth filed (1) an information at No. 5814–2014 charging Appellant with committing PWID and criminal use of a communication facility on June 24, 2014, and (2) an information at No. 5837–2014 charging Appellant with committing PWID, criminal conspiracy and criminal use of a communication facility on July 17, 2014. Subsequently, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to consolidate both informations for trial.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence that police officers obtained during an encounter on the street with Appellant on August 1, 2014.4 Mot. to Suppress, 7/17/15. On February 1, 2016, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion.
The trial court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, but it found the following facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:5
Trial Ct. Op., 7/18/16, at 5–7 ( ). These findings of fact are accurate except for one omission. Officer Boas did not stop Appellant by himself on August 1, 2014. Instead, both Officer Boas and Officer Mease stopped Appellant by stationing their bicycles in front of him. N.T. Suppression Hr'g, 2/1/16, at 29–30.
Appellant moved to suppress the information that he gave Officer Boas on August 1, 2014, i.e. , his name, date of birth, address, telephone number and Social Security number, on the grounds that Officer Boas (1) lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant, and (2) gave a pretextual reason for stopping Appellant. Id. at 3–4. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Officer Boas had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant and denied Appellant's motion. Id. at 37.
On February 2, 2016, a jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant on April 27, 2016 to an aggregate term of sixteen months' to three years' imprisonment followed by two years' probation. On May 27, 2016, Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises one issue in this appeal, a challenge to the evidence obtained from him on August 1, 2014:
Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant's] Motion to Suppress, where police subjected him to an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity on August 1, 2014?
Commonwealth v. Jones , 121 A.3d 524, 526–27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). When reviewing the suppression court's rulings, we consider only the suppression record. In re L.J. , 622 Pa. 126,79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (2013) ().6
"The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. Walls , 53 A.3d 889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there are three categories of interactions between citizens and the police:
The first [category] is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicions, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an "investigative detention," must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gutierrez , 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention.
Commonwealth v. Clemens , 66 A.3d 373, 379 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the objective Jones/Mendenhall7 standard "in determining whether the conduct of the police amounts to a seizure or whether there is simply a mere encounter between citizen and police officer." Commonwealth v. Matos , 543 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769, 774 (1996) (citations omitted). The Matos co...
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