Commonwealth v. Rice

• Docket Number: 1036 EDA 2022,J-A03035-23
• Decision Date: 07 November 2023
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JAMAL RICE Appellee
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

1

2023 PA Super 227

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JAMAL RICE Appellee

No. 1036 EDA 2022

No. J-A03035-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 7, 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered March 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-51-CR-0008765-2021

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. ^[*]

OPINION

KING J.

Appellant the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Jamal Rice. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with possession of a firearm prohibited, possession of firearm with an altered manufacturer's number, firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia.^[1] Appellee filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence on March 10, 2022.

The court held a suppression hearing on March 25, 2022. Officer Zachary Zgleszewski testified that on May 27, 2021, he and his partner were on patrol around the area of 4500 North 19^th street in Philadelphia. Both officers were in uniform and traveling in a marked car. Officer Zgleszewski testified he was working overtime that day because additional police presence was needed in the area due to heightened gun violence, homicides, and drug sales. Officer Zgleszewski testified that at approximately 7:25 p.m., he and his partner were driving westbound on Wingohocking street, approaching the intersection of Wingokocking street and 19^th street. Officer Zgleszewski saw Appellee exit a corner store and begin to walk eastbound on Wingohocking street towards the officers. Officer Zgleszewski observed an "L" shaped bulge in the front of Appellee's waistband that appeared to be a possible firearm. As the officers continued to drive forward on the street towards Appellee, Appellee quickly turned around and began walking in the opposite direction and then northbound on 9^th street after he reached the intersection.

The officers did not activate their car siren but pulled up next to Appellee. Officer Zgleszewski exited the car and began to approach Appellee. Appellee continued to walk down the street and began to look back in Officer Zgleszewski's direction. Officer Zgleszewski stated, "come here" and simultaneously, Appellee fled northbound on foot. Officer Zgleszewski pursued Appellee on foot while his partner followed in the car. During the chase, Appellee reached toward the bulge in the front of his waistband, produced a firearm in his right hand, and continued to run with the firearm in his hand. Officer Zgleszewski continued his pursuit of Appellee, while giving numerous verbal commands to "drop the gun." As he continued to run, Appellee threw the firearm underneath a parked car. Officer Zgleszewski recovered the discarded firearm. Appellee was apprehended and arrested by Officer Zgleszewski's partner.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court granted Appellee's motion to suppress all physical evidence. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on April 5, 2022, per Pa.R.A.P. 311(b).^[2]. On April 11, 2022, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the Commonwealth complied on April 19, 2022.

The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review:

Did the [suppression] court err by suppressing the gun [Appellee] voluntarily abandoned while fleeing from police, where the pre-flight encounter between [Appellee] and the officers did not constitute an investigative detention and thus did not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and where [Appellee's] subsequent unprovoked flight in a high-crime area was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for police pursuit?

(Commonwealth's Brief at 6).

The Commonwealth argues that the court erred in finding that Officer Zgleszewski's initial interaction with Appellee was an investigative detention rather than a mere encounter. The Commonwealth argues that the officer's statement to Appellee to "come here" does not by itself escalate a mere encounter to an investigative detention because the statement alone does not communicate to an individual that they are not free to decline the request or terminate the encounter. The Commonwealth contends that the officers did not activate the emergency lights of the patrol car, brandish their weapons, engage in any show of force, tell Appellee that he was not free to leave, or position themselves in a manner that obstructed Appellee's ability to continue walking. The Commonwealth asserts that Appellee's subsequent unprovoked flight in a high-crime area, coupled with Appellee's previous evasive behavior and Officer Zgleszewski's observations of an "L" shaped bulge in Appellee's waistband, was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to justify the officers' pursuit of Appellee. Additionally, the Commonwealth claims that the officers were permitted to recover the gun that Appellee voluntarily abandoned during his flight. The Commonwealth concludes the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify their pursuit of Appellee, and the court erred in suppressing the gun that Appellee voluntarily abandoned during his flight. We agree.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the suppression court's order granting a suppression motion is well settled:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 639 Pa. 157, 159 A.3d 933 (2016).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166 A.3d 357, 363-64 (Pa.Super. 2017). "To secure the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise individual liberty." Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 456 (Pa.Super. 2019). Because interactions between law enforcement and the general citizenry are widely varied, search and seizure law examines how the interaction is classified and if a detention has occurred. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.Super. 2000).

The focus of search and seizure law "remains on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime." Commonwealth v. Moultrie, 870 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa.Super. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]n assessing the lawfulness of citizen/police encounters, a central, threshold issue is whether...the citizen-subject has been seized." Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 57, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000).

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general classifications:

The first [level of interaction] is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005)). During a mere encounter, "[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

In evaluating whether an interaction constitutes a mere encounter, we must consider "all circumstances evidencing a show of authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements." Commonwealth v. Parker, 161 A.3d 357, 363 (Pa.Super. 2017). The following non-exclusive list of factors are also relevant to the inquiry:

[T]he number of officers present during the interaction whether

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