Commonwealth v. POIRIER, SJC-10675.

• Decision Date: 26 October 2010
• Docket Number: SJC-10675.
• Citation: 458 Mass. 1014,935 N.E.2d 1273
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Eric S. POIRIER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

458 Mass. 1014

935 N.E.2d 1273

COMMONWEALTH

v.Eric S. POIRIER.

SJC-10675.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Oct. 26, 2010.

Rachel Lynn Weber, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Beth L. Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with her), for the defendant.

RESCRIPT.

On December 11, 2008, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts on two counts of indecent assault and battery, and was sentenced, as to count one, to two and one-half years in a house of correction, with one year to be served and the balance suspended for one year; and, as to count two, two years of probation, to be served concurrently. One of his special conditions of probation, as required under G.L. c. 265, § 47, was that he wear a global positioning system (GPS) device. ¹ On July 15, 2009, the defendant was released from the house of correction, having served the committed portion of his sentence as to count one. In accordance with his conditions of probation, he reported on Thursday, July 16, to the Greenfield District Court probation office. ² The defendant informed his probation officer that he was homeless but, after learning that he needed to find a temporary residence in order to implement the GPS monitoring, the defendant located a place to reside. When the probation officer attempted to arrange for GPS monitoring, however, he was told that the GPS monitoring device could not be delivered to Greenfield for installation until, at the earliest, Monday, July 20. The probation officer then served the defendant with a notice of probation detention hearing, alleging that the condition of probation requiring GPS monitoring had not been met because the GPS device was not available until July 20. A hearing was held on the afternoon of July 16, with the defendant represented by appointed counsel. ³

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge found probable cause and ordered the defendant detained. ⁴

On July 17, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider, in which he offered to undergo electronic monitoring (ELMO) and house arrest until the GPS unit could be installed on July 20, and argued that ELMO with house arrest was a “comparable device” to a GPS under G.L. c. 265, § 47. The judge denied the motion, concluding that the ELMO is not “comparable as a mechanism to control the defendant's movements.” The judge added that the “Legislature was clear in its intention that individuals convicted of specified sex offenses shall be monitored by GPS or a comparable device. Here, the defendant agreed to a plea that included probation, incarceration and a GPS requirement. It was his affirmative obligation to prepare for release and the GPS condition. He acknowledged such by signing terms as a condition of probation.” (Emphasis in original.)

The defendant appeals from the District Court judge's finding of probable cause that the defendant had committed a probation violation, asking that the finding be reversed. On February 26, 2010, the Commonwealth, represented by the Attorney General, submitted a letter in lieu of a brief “to confess error” and declare that it did not oppose the reversal of the judge's finding of probable cause. The Commonwealth conceded that the probation department's inability to equip the defendant with a GPS device on July 16 “cannot be properly attributed” to the defendant, and that he did nothing to prevent the probation department from installing the GPS device. The Commonwealth also conceded that it is not reasonable to fault the defendant for not having advised his local probation office of his anticipated release, because neither his general nor his special conditions of probation gave him fair notice that he was expected or required to do so. The Commonwealth further conceded that the defendant's proposed alternative of ELMO with house arrest “likely” was a “comparable device” that satisfied the requirements of G.L. c. 265, § 47.

[1] [2] “Confessions of error are, of course, entitled to and given great weight, but they do not ‘relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function.’ ” Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), quoting Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942). See Commonwealth v. Clark, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 375, 379, 502 N.E.2d 564 (1987); Commonwealth v. Williams, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 915, 916, 471 N.E.2d 394 (1984). Because “our judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties,” Young v. United States, supra at 259, 62 S.Ct. 510, “our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the errors confessed.” Id. at 258-259, 62 S.Ct. 510. ⁵

[3] [4] We agree with the Commonwealth that the finding of probable cause must be reversed. The record demonstrates that the defendant acted reasonably and in good faith to comply with his statutorily mandated probation condition of GPS monitoring. He promptly reported to his probation officer after his release and made a reasonable, good faith (and...