Commonwealth v. Poissant

• Decision Date: 02 March 2005
• Citation: 823 NE 2d 350,443 Mass. 558
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. NELSON POISSANT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

443 Mass. 558

823 NE 2d 350

COMMONWEALTH v. NELSON POISSANT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

January 6, 2005.

March 2, 2005.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

Alison R. Bancroft, Assistant District Attorney (Mimi McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Edward E. Eliot (David Hirsch, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for the defendant.

David Hirsch, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

COWIN, J.

The primary issue that the parties in this appeal raise is whether a defendant in a sexually dangerous person proceeding who has been examined by two qualified examiners, see G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a), must also submit to an examination by an expert selected by the Commonwealth. A secondary question is whether, if the defendant refuses to participate in such an examination, he may be barred from presenting the testimony of his own expert at trial.¹ See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (b).

A Superior Court judge found that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant, Nelson Poissant, was a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of G. L. c. 123A, and ordered his commitment to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center). There, the defendant was examined by two qualified examiners in conformance with G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a), neither of whom concluded that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person. The Commonwealth nevertheless petitioned for trial, and moved for an order that the defendant submit to an interview with the Commonwealth's proposed expert. The motion was denied. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review of that decision, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We conclude that a defendant need not submit to an examination by an expert selected by the district attorney, and a defendant's refusal to participate in such an examination may not result in the barring of expert testimony presented in his defense at trial.²

Facts. The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child (his daughter) and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen years. Prior to his release on December 4, 2001, the Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), to commit the defendant as a sexually dangerous person, and an order issued for the temporary commitment of the defendant. See G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (e). As a result of a report by a doctor who, based on his review of relevant materials, believed the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, the judge, on December 13, 2001, continued the defendant's temporary commitment. Due to a series of scheduling conflicts and court congestion, the probable cause hearing was delayed for several months, with no objection by the defendant.

Another judge held a probable cause hearing on May 7, 2002, which concluded on May 23, 2002. On October 28, 2002, the judge found that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant met the definition of a sexually dangerous person under G. L. c. 123A,³ and ordered him committed to the treatment center for the sixty-day examination period mandated by G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a).⁴

During the sixty-day examination period, one qualified examiner interviewed the defendant with defense counsel present. Because the defendant refused to undergo a second examination without counsel present, the second qualified examiner was not able to interview the defendant. Nevertheless, both experts submitted reports to the court on December 13, 2002. One found that the defendant did not suffer a personality disorder likely to cause him to engage in sexual offenses, while the second was unable to conclude that the defendant was likely to re-offend. Despite these reports, the Commonwealth petitioned for a trial to commit the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a).⁵,⁶ On January 9, 2003, as allowed by G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (b),⁷ the defendant informed the Commonwealth that he intended to call his own expert to testify at trial. The Commonwealth then requested that the court order the defendant to submit to an interview by an expert of its selection or, in the alternative, that all evidence and testimony of the defendant's expert be excluded. The defendant opposed this motion, and a judge denied the Commonwealth's request for an interview on February 10, 2003. The judge based his denial both on the protracted nature of the proceedings and on the lack of authority in G. L. c. 123A for examinations by anyone other than the qualified examiners and an examiner selected by the defendant.⁸ The Commonwealth appealed the denial of its request for an interview by its expert. Discussion. In interpreting G. L. c. 123A to determine whether a defendant must submit to an examination by an expert selected by the Commonwealth, we look first to the language of the statute. "Statutory language is the principal source of insight into legislative purpose." Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 392 Mass. 407, 415 (1984), quoting Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984). The language of c. 123A makes no provision for a separate examiner selected by the Commonwealth. The sections of the statute concerning the commitment of sexually dangerous persons refer to examiners in only three contexts. First, G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a), requires examination and diagnosis by two "qualified examiners" during the sixty-day evaluation period. General Laws c. 123A, § 1, defines a qualified examiner as "a physician who is licensed pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 2, who is either certified in psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or eligible to be so certified, or a psychologist who is licensed . . .; provided, however, that the examiner has had two years of experience with diagnosis or treatment of sexually aggressive offenders and is designated by the commissioner of correction." The statute also authorizes an examiner for the defendant, whom the defendant may retain both during the sixty-day examination period, see G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (d),⁹ and after the petition for trial is filed, see G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (b). If the defendant is indigent, the court must provide for or assist the defendant in obtaining such an examiner. See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 13 (d), 14 (b). In addition, after a person has been adjudicated sexually dangerous, that person may petition for discharge, and if he does so, the court is to order an examination by two qualified examiners. See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.¹⁰ There is no other mention of examiners in the statute. Chapter 123A thus does not authorize any further examinations by a Commonwealth expert. "We will not add words to a statute that the Legislature did not put there, either by inadvertent omission or by design." Commonwealth v. Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 443 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 294 (2002), and cases cited. See Civitarese v. Middleborough, 412 Mass. 695, 700 (1992) ("We will not read into the plain words of a statute a legislative intent that is not expressed by those words").

A review of other provisions within the sexually dangerous person statute supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to require the defendant to submit to examination by anyone other than the two qualified examiners. "A statute should be read as a whole to produce an internal consistency." Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 873 (1985). Under § 9 (petition for discharge), if a person who has been committed "refuses, without good cause, to be personally interviewed by a qualified examiner . . . , such person shall be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on the petition and the petition shall be dismissed upon motion filed by the Commonwealth." G. L. c. 123A, § 9. Had the Legislature intended to mandate an examination by a Commonwealth expert in the commitment scheme, it would presumably have provided a penalty for a failure to do so, just as it provided such a penalty in § 9. In the absence of a similar penalty clause in the commitment sections, we cannot read one into the statute.

Citing Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 511 (2000), the Commonwealth argues that the absence of statutory authorization for its expert to examine the defendant is not determinative. The Commonwealth is correct that, in the Bruno case, we concluded that, despite the lack of a statutory mandate, the Commonwealth must produce expert testimony to support a G. L. c. 123A, § 12, petition for temporary commitment. Id. Our interpretation today is not inconsistent with the Bruno case. That case only requires that there be expert testimony; it does not prescribe the form that testimony will take or the extent of examination of the defendant, if any, that precedes that testimony. Here, the Legislature has enacted such a prescription.

The Commonwealth contends that it is disadvantaged because, while the defendant can have an expert to advocate his position, the qualified examiners are not agents of the district attorney's office and thus there is no advocate for the government. Whether the qualified examiners are agents of the district attorney is irrelevant to the issue before us. The Legislature has not contemplated a typical advocacy proceeding here. The sexually dangerous person proceeding presents a unique situation: the defendant is incarcerated beyond the length of his mandated sentence because of his sexual dangerousness. Although these proceedings are not criminal, see Commonwealth v. Bruno, supra at 500-502, they do result in the deprivation of the defendant's freedom. For this atypical situation, the Legislature has seen fit to impose unusual requirements. The statute envisions that the defendant will be examined by two qualified examiners and gives...