Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority

• Citation: 467 N.E.2d 87,392 Mass. 407
• Parties: , 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3136 LOCAL 589, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
• Decision Date: 05 July 1984
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 87

467 N.E.2d 87

392 Mass. 407, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3136

LOCAL 589, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued March 7, 1984.

Decided July 5, 1984.

Douglas Taylor, District of Columbia (John F. McMahon, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Joseph H. Elcock, Boston (Carol A. Buckley, Boston, with him), for defendant.

Holly C. Laurent, Boston (Arthur L. Stevenson, Boston, with her), for James J. Healy, amicus curiae.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and LYNCH, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

Local 589 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (union) is the recognized representative for certain maintenance and operating personnel of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). The union filed an action in the Superior Court seeking to enforce the terms of an arbitration award issued in accordance with G.L. c. 161A, § 19G. The union alleged that the MBTA had refused to abide by four provisions of the award regarding part-time employees. The MBTA denied that it was bound by the contested provisions. The arbitrator who issued the award then sought to intervene in the union's action. The first appeal addressed in this case is the arbitrator's appeal from a ruling by a judge of the Superior Court denying his motion to intervene. The second appeal is by the union from a second judge's entry of summary judgment sustaining the MBTA's position. We find no merit in either appeal and affirm both orders.

The background of these appeals is not disputed and may be summarized briefly. A collective bargaining agreement between the union and the MBTA expired on December 31, 1980. In July of 1980, both parties began bargaining on the terms of a new agreement but were unsuccessful. Just prior to the expiration of the contract, in December, 1980, the Legislature enacted St. 1980, c. 581, amending the MBTA's enabling legislation. G.L. c. 161A. Section 8 of c. 581, codified at G.L. c. 161A, § 19, designated certain matters as inherent management rights and prohibited the board of directors of the MBTA from bargaining collectively with labor organizations representing its employees over any of them. In June, 1982, the union and the MBTA proceeded to interest arbitration pursuant to G.L. c. 161A, §§ 19C-19G. The arbitrator held hearings between August and November, 1982. On January 15, 1983, the arbitrator issued his opinion and award. The MBTA refused to abide by four provisions of the award regarding part-time employees, discussed in more detail infra. The union filed an action in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 161A " § 19G, and the arbitrator filed a motion to intervene. A judge of the Superior Court denied the motion to intervene. The union and the MBTA then both filed motions for summary judgment. A second judge entered a summary judgment declaring invalid the challenged provisions of the award, severing them from the remainder of the award, and enforcing the award as severed. The union appealed, and we allowed the union's application for direct appellate review.

I. THE ARBITRATOR'S MOTION TO INTERVENE.

The arbitrator sought to intervene in the union's action against the MBTA as a matter of right, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 24(a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974), and alternatively, based on the motion judge's discretion, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 24(b), 365 Mass. 769 (1974). The judge denied the motion on both grounds and the arbitrator appealed.

While the denial of a motion to intervene by right, along with the denial of an accompanying request for permissive intervention, may be appealed immediately, Attorney Gen. v. Brockton Agricultural Soc'y, 390 Mass. 431, 433, 456 N.E.2d 1130 (1983), Mayflower Dev. Corp. v. Dennis, 11 Mass.App. 630, 634-635, 418 N.E.2d 349 (1981), we need not reach the merits of the arbitrator's appeal.

The basis of the arbitrator's motion to intervene is G.L. c. 161A, § 19G. In relevant part G.L. c. 161A, § 19G, inserted by St. 1978, c. 405, § 2, provides that "[a]ny determination by the arbitrator ... shall be binding upon the parties ... and may be enforced at the insistence of either party or by the arbitrator in the superior court." The arbitrator contends that he has special position under this statute as a guardian of the public interest and therefore should be allowed to intervene. Even if the judge should have allowed him to intervene in the proceedings, either by right or by discretion, we conclude the arbitrator was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion. The interests of the union and the arbitrator, as evidenced by the pleadings, are virtually identical, and the arbitrator made no allegation or showing that the union's advocacy of those interests was inadequate. In addition, the judge had before him the arbitrator's sixty-two page opinion explaining the award. Finally, the arbitrator was allowed to file an amicus curiae brief before this court addressing the merits of the union's enforcement action against the MBTA. We therefore dismiss the arbitrator's appeal.

II. THE UNION'S APPEAL OF THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The union contends that the trial judge erred in declaring unenforceable the challenged provisions of the award, severing these provisions, and enforcing the award without them. According to the union, the judge made three different errors. The union first argues that the judge failed properly to defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of the management rights portion of G.L. c. 161A, § 19. It next contends that the disputed provisions of the award do not impermissibly infringe upon the MBTA's inherent management rights under the statute. Finally, it argues that even if the challenged provisions are unenforceable, the judge erred in severing these provisions from the award instead of remanding the entire award to the arbitrator for reconsideration. We treat each argument separately.

Standard of review. The union contends that judicial review of the arbitrator's award is limited to whether it is supported by substantial evidence or is "utterly unreasonable." The arbitrator asserts that we should "Defer to the Arbitrator with Respect to the Interpretation and Application of the Relevant Statutory Provisions." In the context of the instant case, we reject both of these positions.

The MBTA makes a jurisdictional challenge. It claims that the contested portions of the arbitrator's award are unenforceable because they go beyond the arbitrator's authority. Whether an arbitrator has acted beyond the scope of authority conveyed to him is always open to judicial review. See School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 685, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976); Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 390-391, 294 N.E.2d 340 (1973). An arbitrator exceeds his authority where his award requires conduct by a public employer beyond that to which the public employer may bind itself or allow itself to be bound. See Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347 v. Watertown, 376 Mass. 706, 715, 383 N.E.2d 494 (1978); School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, supra. In determining whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority in a provision of an arbitration award, judicial review of the award is independent. See Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 386 Mass. 197, 212-213, 434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982). Those portions of an arbitrator's award which exceed the arbitrator's authority are void and may be vacated by a court. See id; School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 690-691, 343 N.E.2d 145 (1976); J.F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co. v. Southbridge Water Supply Co., 304 Mass. 130, 134, 23 N.E.2d 165 (1939). Accordingly, the judge was correct not to defer to the interpretation of the arbitrator in considering whether the challenged portions of the award are void because they extend to issues beyond the power of the arbitrator to consider or to bind the MBTA under G.L. c. 161A, §§ 19-19G. Similarly, we need not defer to the arbitrator in reviewing the judge's conclusions that the provisions did exceed the arbitrator's authority.

Challenged provisions. The challenged portions of the arbitrator's award all purport to restrict the MBTA's exercise of its discretion in connection with part-time employees: "A. The maximum number of part-time employees shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the number of full-time employees in the classification. B. No full-time employee will lose his regular weekly pay because of a layoff while a part-time employee is actively employed in the same classification. C. Part-time employees shall not ... work on Saturdays or Sundays .... L. All charters, vacation reliefs, and any regular runs left vacant because of the absence of regular full-time operators will be worked only by full-time operators." The judge agreed with the MBTA that these portions of the arbitrator's award were unenforceable because they exceeded the arbitrator's ability to bind the MBTA under express provisions of G.L. c. 161A, § 19. The union contends that the judge erred in his determination. According to the union, the challenged provisions do not improperly restrict the MBTA's inherent management rights under G.L. c. 161A, § 19, and, therefore, do not extend beyond the arbitrator's authority as to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. We agree with the judge that the challenged provisions of the arbitrator's award are unenforceable as beyond the scope of the arbitrator's authority.

Whether an arbitrator has exceeded his authority by including provisions in an arbitration award depends upon what matters were properly before him for consideration. See Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347 v. Watertown, supra; Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., supra 363 Mass. at 391, 294 N.E.2d 340. Cf. J.F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co. v. Southbridge Water Supply Co., supra 304 Mass. at 135, 23 N.E.2d 165; ...