Commonwealth v. Rice

Decision Date23 November 1927
Citation158 N.E. 797,261 Mass. 340
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. RICE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Report from Superior Court, Hampden County; Christopher T. Callahan, Judge.

Harry E. Rice was convicted of allowing a motor vehicle to remain standing on a taxicab stand without having a license therefor, and case was reported. Finding of guilty to stand.

1. Municipal corporations k703(3)-Under statute, cities and towns are authorized to enact regulations prescribing routes, stands, and movements of all vehicles for hire (G. L. c. 40, s 22).

Under G. L. c. 40, s 22, cities and towns are authorized to regulate use of public streets and highways by all vehicles whatsoever, and make rules and regulations precribing routes, stands, and movements to be observed by vehicles for hire.

2. Municipal corporations k703(3)-Municipal regulation, requiring taxicabs to make use of taxicab stands, held reasonable (G. L. c. 40, s 22).

Municipal regulation, enacted under G. L. c. 40, s 22, requiring taxicabs and vehicles used for carriage for hire to make use of designated taxicab stands, being enacted to control public traffic and protection of public from solicitation and danger in the street, is reasonable regulation.

3. Municipal corporations k703(3)-Ordinance making observance of regulation establishing taxi stands reasonably possible, by excluding other vehicles from reserved space, held warranted (G. L. c. 40, s 22).

Where regulation enacted under authority of G. L. c. 40, s 22, requiring taxicabs to make use of taxicab stands, was reasonable and necessary in administration of public safety, further ordinance, required to make observance of regulation reasonably possible through exclusion of all other vehicles from reserved space, held valid, and not unconstitutional grant of exclusive privilege in street for private business.

4. Municipal corporations k703(3)-No right of citizens is impaired by ordinance prohibiting parking of vehicles at designated place in street.

No right of any citizen is impaired by ordinance prohibiting parking of vehicles at designated place in public street, where such person has no legal title to land in street, and has no interest therein greater than easement of travel common to all citizens.Charles R. Clason, Dist. Atty., of Springfield, Clifford S. Lyon, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Holyoke, and Charles H. Beckwith, City Sol., and Donald M. Macaulay, Asst. City Sol., both of Springfield, for the Commonwealth.

Gurdon W. Gordon, of Springfield, for defendant.

PIERCE, J.

The defendant was before the district court of Springfield on a complaint which charged in substance that:

‘The defendant did allow a certain motor vehicle to remain standing on a taxicab stand on the north side of Bridge street, beginning thirty (30) feet, westerly from Broadway curb, and extending westerly thirty (30) feet, without having been licensed so to do.’

He was found guilty and fined $3 in the district court on March 11, 1927, from which sentence he appealed to the superior court.

The defendant waived his right to a jury in the superior court, and the case was heard by a judge of that court on a statement of facts, which were found by the judge to be as follows:

‘The defendant, Harry E. Rice, is a resident of Springfield, Hampden county, Massachusetts. * * * On October 18, 1926, the board of aldermen of the city of Springfield passed and the mayor approved an order for the regulation of certain vehicles used in the city of Springfield,’ the material sections of which are:

Section 1. Every motor vehicle used for the carriage of passengers for hire shall be deemed to be a taxicab within the meaning of these orders, except a motor vehicle operated in the manner and for the purposes stated in G. L. c. 159, s. 45.

Section 2. No person having charge of any taxicab shall allow the same to remain standing on any public was within the city to solicit passengers or for any other purpose except in one or more places hereinafter designated as taxicab stands and then only upon being licensed so to do by license duly issued by the transportation board of the city council.

Section 3. The following places in public ways within the city are hereby designated as taxicab stands, each for the number of cars specified and of a length equal to the number of lineal feet along the side of the curbstone specified and of a width sufficient for one car to stand therein when the wheels are within eighteen (18) inches of the curbstone. * * * ( o) One the north side of Bridge street, beginning thirty (30) feet westerly from Broadway curb, and extending westerly thirty (30) feet and to be used by two taxicabs. * * *

Section 4. No person having charge of any vehicle shall allow the same to remain standing within the limits of any taxicab stand except a taxicab and then only at the stand which it is licensed to occupy.

Section 5. The transportation board of the city council may grant and issue licenses and permits to one or more owners of taxicabs to occupy one or more taxicab stands, such licenses shall be indeterminate and shall be subject to termination at any time by the transportation board.

Section 6. Applications for such licenses shall be made to said board on forms furnished by it, and shall set forth, under oath such information as said board may require.

Section 7. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules and orders, the vehicles of the fire and police departments, the sealer of weights and measures and his deputies, and emergency vehicles of the water department and public service corporations operating within the city may stand in such reserved places from time to time and for such langth of time as may be necessary in the performance of the public service in which they are then engaged.

Section 8. Any person having charge of any motor vehicle who shall allow the same to remain standing on any taxicab stand except as licensed or permitted under the provisions hereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty ($20) dollars for each offense.’

The order of the board of aldermen was approved by the mayor on October 18, 1926, and published in a newspaper published in Springfield on October 31, 1926. Its provisions were in effect on December 25, 1926.

‘Bridge street in the city of Springfield is a public highway, the abutting owners owning the fee thereof subject to the easement of travel by the public. The owner of land abutting on that part of Bridge street described in the order [as ( o)] has not expressly consented to the establishment of a stand for two taxicabs thereon. Such abutting owner has not been asked to consent and has made no objections to the establishment of such a taxicab stand on that portion of Bridge street hereinabove described. * * * On December 25, 1926, the defendant was in charge of a motor vehicle and allowed * * * it to remain standing within the limits of * * * taxicab stand ( o) for about an hour [it] was not a taxicab and was not then licensed or permitted to occupy said stand under the provisions of * * * the order. [The] taxicab stand was plainly posted by two signs reading, ‘Lic. 15 Taxicab Stand-No Parking.”

The defendant made the following motion:

‘And now comes the defendant in the above entitled cause and upon all the evidence in the case, moves the court to find the defendant ‘not guilty’ for the following reasons:

‘1. The order passed by the board of aldermen of the city of Springfield, October 18, 1926, purporting to be for the regulation of certain vehicles used in the city of Springfield, is not a regulation of traffic upon a public street, but is a grant of an exclusive privilege in a portion of a public street for the benefit of a private business, and that such order is unconstitutional and void.

‘2. That the order of the board of aldermen passed October 18, 1926, purporting to be for...

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19 cases
  • Leveillee v. Wright
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 26 Mayo 1938
    ...citizen is impaired by an ordinance which prohibits the parking of vehicles [in the circumstances described].’ Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340, 158 N.E. 797, 55 A.L.R. 1128. * * * Doubtless temporary and reasonable stops of automobiles in highways are lawful as an incident to travel.' I......
  • Leveillee v. Wright
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 26 Mayo 1938
    ...of any citizen is impaired by an ordinance which prohibits the parking of vehicles . . . [in the circumstances described].' Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340 . . . temporary and reasonable stops of automobiles in highways are lawful as an incident to travel." In the case of Commonwealth v......
  • Town of Milton v. Donnelly
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 3 Julio 1940
    ...Mass. 355;Commonwealth v. Newhall, 205 Mass. 344, 91 N.E. 206;Commonwealth v. Gile, 217 Mass. 18, 104 N.E. 572;Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340, 158 N.E. 797, 55 A.L.R. 1128;Wilbur v. City of Newton, 301 Mass. 97, 16 N.E.2d 86, 121 A.L.R. 570. The permit from the State department did not......
  • Com. v. Diaz
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 4 Diciembre 1950
    ...v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224, 2 L.R.A. 142; Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N.E. 687, and Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340, 158 N.E. 797, 55 A.L.R. 1128. The fact that the statute empowered the commissioner, subject to the board's approval, to provide penalties for ......
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