Com. v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 04 December 1950
• Citation: 95 N.E.2d 666,326 Mass. 525
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. DIAZ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 666

95 N.E.2d 666

326 Mass. 525

COMMONWEALTH v. DIAZ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 3, 1950.

Decided Dec. 4, 1950.

W. J. Foley, Dist. Atty., Boston (J. J. Sullivan, Asst. Dist. Atty, Boston, with him), for the Commonwealth.

M. I. Bearak, Boston (J. F. Sullivan, Boston, with him), for appellant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

On an appeal from a District Court to the Superior Court the defendant was tried and convicted on a complaint charging a violation of regulations governing the Logan Airport and was sentenced to pay a fine of $25. The regulations involved, which were introduced in evidence, read as follows: 'Section II(13). The operator of each taxicab or limousine in the proper line shall, at all times until engaged for hire, remain in the operator's seat and at the wheel of his vehicle, or outside and within six(6) feet of his vehicle, and shall, at no time while outside his vehicle, obstruct vehicular or pedestrian traffic.' 'Section IV(3): Any person who violates the provisions of these rules and regulations, shall be subject to the penalty not exceeding five hundred ($500.00) dollars for any one offence.' The regulations of which these are a part are entitled, 'Rules and regulations for the operation of taxicabs, limousines, motor buses, and charter automobiles at General Edward Lawrence Logan Airport established by the State airport management board, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 637, acts of 1948.'

The case comes here on the defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict. There was evidence which would warrant a finding that the defendant, an operator of a taxicab, violated the regulations in question. The defendant does not contend otherwise. The ground urged in support of his exception is that the statute from which these regulations stem is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. That statute so far as material reads as follows: 'The commissioner shall make such rules and regulations, subject to the approval of the board, for the use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned airports as he may from time to time deem reasonable and expedient, which may provide penalties for the violation of said rules and regulations not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one offence.' Now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 50D. These provisions are part of St.1948, c. 637, the title of which is 'An Act changing the laws relative to state-owned airports in respect to their management, operation and maintenance and otherwise.' The board referred to in the statute is the State airport management board. The commissioner mentioned therein is the commissioner of airport management. The commissioner is appointed by the State board of airport management, with the approval of the Governor and Council, and is 'responsible for general supervision of all state-owned airports.' Now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 6, § 59B.

That the Legislature cannot under our Constitution delegate its general power to make laws is so well settled that a citation of authorities is not necessary. That is especially true with respect to its power to define crimes and establish penalties therefor. See Petition of Sheehan, 254 Mass. 342, 345, 150 N.E. 231. But one of the exceptions to or qualifications of that doctrine is that the Legislature may delegate to a board or an individual officer the working out of the details of a policy adopted by the Legislature. Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 341-342, 52 N.E.2d 566, and cases cited. Commonwealth v. Fox, 218 Mass. 498, 500, 106 N.E. 137. 'To deny this [power] would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.' Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694, 12 S.Ct. 495, 505, 36 L.Ed. 294. It is on this principle that ordinances and by-laws of municipalities and the regulations of various boards have been upheld. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 600-602, 66 N.E. 607. Of course such ordinances or regulations, to be valid, must be within the ambit of the enabling statute. Winthrop v. New England Chocolate Co., 180 Mass. 464, 62 N.E. 969; Commonwealth v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 97 N.E. 783; Commonwealth v. Atlas, 244 Mass. 78, 138 N.E. 243. The defendant makes no contention that the substance of the regulations under consideration is not within the scope of the delegated authority. The gist of his argument is that the statute upon which the regulations are based exceeds the limits of what may be lawfully delegated. Here, it is argued, the statute went beyond authorizing the commissioner and the board to work out the details of a policy adopted by the Legislature, and attempted to delegate to them the power to declare what acts shall constitute a criminal offence and to fix the penalties therefor.

Reading St.1948, c. 637, as a whole, we are of opinion that a sufficiently definite legislative mandate is laid down so that the commissioner and board may constitutionally fill in the details and that the authority delegated was not excessive. The power granted to them to make such rules and regulations 'for the use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned airports as he may from time to time deem reasonable and expedient' is not essentially different from the power granted by statute to the board of metropolitan park commissioners which was upheld in Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N.E. 607. There the board were given authority to 'make rules and regulations for the government and use of the roadways or boulevards under its care, breaches whereof shall be breaches of the peace, punishable as such in any court having jurisdiction of the same.', 182 Mass. at pages 599-600, 66 N.E. at page 608. Other cases upholding similar delegations of power to local governing bodies are Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224, 2 L.R.A. 142; Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N.E. 687, and Commonwealth v. Rice, 261 Mass. 340, 158 N.E. 797, 55 A.L.R. 1128.

The fact that the statute empowered the commissioner, subject to the board's approval, to provide penalties for the violation of the regulation did not render it invalid. This is not a case where the statute authorized the commissioner to fix such penalties as he saw fit. Had the statute attempted to do that we have no doubt that it would have been an excessive delegation of power. See State v. Curtis, 230 N.C. 169, 52 S.E.2d 364; People v. Ryan, 267 N.Y. 133, 195 N.E. 822. But the statute here did not do that; it empowered the commissioner, subject to the board's approval, to 'provide penalties for the violation of said rules and regulations not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one offence.' While the commissioner could prescribe penalties he could do so only within limits definitely prescribed by the Legislature.

In some instances where a local governing body or board is authorized to make regulations the peralty is fixed by the statute itself. See, for example, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 20, fixing penalties for violation of regulations made by the registrar of motor vehicles pursuant to G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 31, and G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 111, § 5, as most recently amended by St.1945, § 615, authorizing the department of public health to establish rules and regulations. Statutes of this type have uniformly been upheld as against the objection that the local governing body was enacting criminal laws. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563, and cases collected in note.

But penalties attaching to the violation of regulations are not always fixed in this manner. Frequently, as here, the local governing body or board is empowered to prescribe the penalties within limits prescribed by the Legislature. See G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40, § 21, authorizing towns to 'affix penalties for breaches [of their bylaws] not exceeding twenty dollars for each offence'. The regulation upheld in Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 380, 19 N.E. 224, 225, 22 L.R.A. 142, authorized the board to prescribe penalties 'not exceeding twenty dollars for each offense' for violation of its regulations. See also the statutes involved in Commonwealth v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 296, 297, 97 N.E. 783 (authorizing cities to prescribe penalties not exceeding $100 for each violation of such regulation); Commonwealth v. Atlas, 244 Mass. 78, 138 N.E. 243 (authorizing cities and towns to...