Commonwealth v. Richmond
| Decision Date | 03 January 1911 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. RICHMOND. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
COMMONWEALTH
v.
RICHMOND.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.
Jan. 3, 1911.
Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; John C. Crosby and Wm. F. Dana, Judges.
Elizabeth Richmond was convicted of murder, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.
[207 Mass. 243]J. J. Higgins, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
R. W. Gloag, for defendant.
RUGG, J.
The defendant was indicted for murder.
1. The defendant filed no motion to quash the indictment. Hence the faint suggestion now made that it is defective, in that it is uncertain whether the assault and murder are charged of one and the same person, because ‘said’ does not precede the second mention of the name of the person alleged to have been murdered, is not open to her. We do not intimate that there would be anything in the point even if seasonably presented. The indictment followed the form prescribed in Rev. Laws, c. 218, § 67. Com. v. Min Sing, 202 Mass. 121-132, 88 N. E. 918;Com. v. Jordan, 93 N. E. 809.
2. One motive suggested for the commission of the crime was robbery. A considerable amount of evidence was introduced by the commonwealth tending to show that prior to the alleged homicide the defendant was heavily in debt and in need of ready money, and that immediately thereafter she had bills in her possession. When the evidence as to the financial embarrassment of the defendant was offered, although not objected to, the jurors were instructed in substance that it was admitted only as bearing upon the motive of the defendant in the commission of the offense charged, and that, in order to be material for their final consideration, ‘certain other evidence must appear, and if that evidence does not appear, then this evidence which is now being admitted should be disregarded.’ No exception was taken, but at the close of the evidence the defendant asked for an instruction that this evidence should be disregarded. Subject to exception, this prayer was denied, and the instruction was given [207 Mass. 244]that although the commonwealth was not required to show any motive for the commission of the crime, evidence tending to show such motive was always competent. After referring to evidence that ‘the prisoner was pressed for money prior to the finding of the body of the deceased,’ and ‘that on that day she had a roll of bills,’ the court further instructed the jurors that in order to consider the evidence at all they must be satisfied that the deceased had money in his possession immediately before his death, and thereafter the defendant had this money in her possession. These instructions were in accordance with well-settled principles. Com. v. O'Neil, 169 Mass. 394, 48 N. E. 134;Com. v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N. E. 1035;Com. v. Devaney, 182 Mass. 33, 64 N. E. 402;Com. v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457-467, 76 N. E. 127,7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056. The chief argument urged is that there was no sufficient evidence that the deceased possessed any money shortly before his death. But this contention cannot be sustained. It might have been found that the murdered man was
[93 N.E. 818]
young, active, able-bodied, and had been at work for many months in a state institution in a country town. Although the amount of his compensation was not shown the jury might have used their general knowledge in drawing an inference in this respect. Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1-8, 85 N. E. 877. There was also evidence that he was in Cambridge for the purpose of attending the wedding of his sister, was on his way to spend a vacation in Prince Edward's Island, whither he had checked his trunk and had bought his ticket, was a guest at a public house where he had given coin as a gratuity to a waiter, had manifested great care to keep near him a dress suit case, had said to a friend that he was sorry he had before asked him for money, that he had money ‘enough to see him through,’ and that no money whatever was found upon his remains. If these circumstances were found by the jury, the inference would have been warranted that the deceased had money to the amount of which the defendant was possessed after the homicide. It is argued also that there was error because the district attorney said in his argument to the jury that the deceased had been working for $30 per month when there was no evidence of it. But the argument was not interrupted, and no ruling was requested on this point, and no exception taken respecting it. Under these [207 Mass. 245]circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the defendant suffered any harm of which she can now complain.
3. The presence of the defendant in her bed room or parlor, rooms which were connected, in the early evening of a certain day, was a material fact upon the trial. Against the exception of the defendant one Hannigan was permitted to testify that she overheard one Paige while standing near the bedroom door, and after the defendant had been called without any response, say, in a loud voice, in the course of talk with a servant of the defendant in which he demanded money or some satisfaction as to a disagreement about the hire of a room, ‘I shall bring an officer,’ and that next morning the defendant asked the witness not to let Paige bring an officer, and that ‘there was no need of any officer being brought about the room rent.’ There was no evidence that the defendant learned of this threat as to an officer in any other way than by being in the bedroom or parlor at the time it was uttered and thus hearing it. The evidence plainly had some tendency to prove that she was there. It was competent to this end, and was carefully limited by the court to this purpose. If there were inconsistencies in some details of the testimony, its weight only and not its competency were affected. It is also urged that this testimony tended to contradict that given by other witnesses called by the commonwealth. It was not introduced for that purpose, but was the direct statement of the witness of the records of her own senses. Even if pointedly contradicting other evidence, it was still competent. Rev. Laws, c. 175, § 24.
4. One Clifford, a witness called by the commonwealth, having testified at length concerning the people in the house where the deceased met his death, and their actions and some of their conversation, and that one Drohan had said in reply to his question a short time before the lifeless body of the deceased was discovered that MacTavish was in the house, was asked on cross-examination, ‘When was MacTavish again mentioned by any of you?’ This question was properly excluded. It was indefinite as to persons, and appears to bear no relation to any issue in the case.
5. The chief inspector of police of Cambridge, who had been active in the investigation of the crime, was asked by the defendant [207 Mass. 246]whether after the defendant was indicted he had not ‘procured the putting of one of the government witnesses on probation after he had pleaded guilty to a crime.’ There was no error in the exclusion of this inquiry unsupported...
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