Commonwealth v. Riggins

• Decision Date: 17 August 1977
• Docket Number: 40.
• Citation: 377 A.2d 140,474 Pa. 115
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Clyde RIGGINS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

377 A.2d 140

474 Pa. 115

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Clyde RIGGINS, Appellant.

No. 40.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

August 17, 1977

Argued April 14, 1977.

William C. Haynes, Asst. Public Defender, Arlene R Popkin, Craig Currie, Philadelphia, for appellant.

D. Richard Eckman, Dist. Atty., James R. Leonard Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Joe C. Madenspacher, Lancaster, for appellee.

Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

ROBERTS Justice.

Appellant was arrested for possession of 53.9 grams (approximately 1.9 ounces) of marijuana. After a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. ^[1] He was sentenced to serve two to five years imprisonment, fined $100 and ordered to pay the costs of prosecution. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa.Super. 32, 332 A.2d 521 (1974) (4-3) (separate dissenting opinions were filed by Hoffman, Cercone and Spaeth, JJ.). We granted allocatur. ^[2]

Appellant contends that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court did not state its reasons for the particular sentence imposed. ^[3] We agree. We therefore vacate judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. I

After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, appellant's counsel informed the court that appellant was waiving his right to file motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. The trial court then proceeded to sentence appellant. The trial court did not request a presentence report. ^[4]

During the trial, testimony established that appellant was 21 years old, married and the father of three young children. He had been employed at a carwash, but was laid off a month before trial when the carwash was closed for repairs. Appellant had no prior criminal record.

During sentencing, the following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: Can I see the Indictment, please.

(Whereupon, the Indictment was presented to the Court at this point.)

THE COURT: All right, does he have any prior record officer?

THE POLICE OFFICER: No, sir, no prior record.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Haynes. (Defense counsel)

MR. HAYNES: Mr. Riggins is here before you for sentencing. We do not wish to make any motions.

As was brought out at the trial, he is twenty-one years old. He is married. He is not currently working because of the place he was employed at had to undergo repairs.

Other than that, I have nothing to add.

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* * *

THE COURT: Now, I don't suppose you knew this, Mr. Riggins, but this offense that you have been convicted of calls for a maximum sentence of fifteen years in the Penitentiary and a fine up to Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00).

MR. HAYNES: Your Honor, excuse me; I thought it was a maximum sentence of five years. I may be wrong on that.

THE COURT: He is indicted under Section 30. It is a felony.

Now, this is classified under Classification Number One.

MR. HAYNES: I don't have a copy of the Act in front of me.

THE COURT: Well, you can look at mine, if you wish. I didn't tell the Defendant that I am going to give him fifteen years. I have no intention of it.

MR. HAYNES: Your Honor, I was under the impression that for sale it is the maximum sentence of fifteen years and a maximum fine of Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00).

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HAYNES: And for this offense I was under the impression that the maximum sentence was five years in jail.

THE COURT: But he is charged under Section 30 which is the Manufacture, Delivery and Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver a Controlled Substance.

You say that the only question is whether this is classified as a narcotic drug, and Schedule One includes marijuana. Of course, Schedule One includes opium and any derivatives of it.

MR. HAYNES: Yes, sir, I know that marijuana appears in Schedule One.

THE COURT: It is set out alone.

All right, he has been indicted and found guilty of Section 30.

All right, I am going to sentence him under Section 30[(f)(2)]. ^[5]

* * *

* * *

* * *

* * * The sentence of the Court is that you pay to the Commonwealth for the use of the County a fine of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), pay the costs of prosecution and undergo imprisonment in the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon for a period of not less than two nor more than five years.

Stand committed."

II

Appellant asserts that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the trial court did not state its reasons on the record for the imposition of its sentence. We agree. When a trial court imposes judgment of sentence, its reasons for the imposition of sentence should appear on the record.

A. Pennsylvania has a system of indeterminate sentencing, ^[6] which carries with it "an implicit adoption of the philosophy of individual sentencing." Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976). This system of indeterminate sentencing "necessitates the granting of broad discretion to the trial judge, who must determine, among the sentencing alternatives and the range of permissible penalties, the proper sentence to be imposed." Id. [474 Pa. 123] at 130, 351 A.2d at 656. ^[7] The exercise of this discretion is "one of the most important, and most easily abused powers vested in the trial court." Id. at 131, 351 A.2d at 657. ^[8] Traditionally, appellate courts have left sentences undisturbed on appeal because of the view that the trial court is in a far better position to weigh the factors involved in sentencing determinations. Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. at 129, 351 A.2d at 656; Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 Rutgers L.Rev. 207, 218 (1971). ^[9]

"We have . . . granted the sentencer almost totally unlimited, unstructured and unreviewable discretion to impose punishment after conviction."

Berger, Reducing Sentencing Disparity: Structured Discretion and the Sentencing Judge, 32 J.Miss.B. 414, 415 (1976).

This "unlimited, unstructured and unreviewable discretion" has been the focus of much critical commentary of our criminal justice system. ^[10]

The sentencing decision is of enormous consequence. It is the culmination of an elaborate and complicated system of procedural and substantive law whose ultimate rationale is the efficient and reliable identification of persons who have committed criminal harms. At the sentencing stage, the decision must finally be made as to what sanction should be imposed, a decision whose total social impact is equalled only by its import to the individual, whose life and liberty are at stake. The American Bar Association, Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (Approved Draft, 1968) notes quite accurately the very delicate balance required in sentencing:

"The consequences of a sentence are of the highest order. If too short or of the wrong type, it can deprive the law of its effectiveness and result in the premature release of a dangerous criminal. If too severe or improperly conceived, it can reinforce the criminal tendencies of the defendant and lead to a new offense by one who otherwise might not have offended so seriously again. . . . A sentence which is not in some fashion limited in accordance with the particular offense can lead to a system of incomparable brutality. Per contra, a sentence or pattern of sentences which fails to take due account of the gravity of the offense can seriously undermine respect for law."

The American Bar Association has noted that the absence of standards for determining the proper sentence to impose is particularly discordant in a system that is otherwise committed to the rule of law:

"Among the ironies of the law, there are many surrounding the manner in which sentences are imposed in the majority of our jurisdictions. One of the most striking involves a comparison of the methods for determining guilt and the methods for determining sentence. The guilt-determining process is hedged in with many rules of evidence; with many tight procedural rules, and, most importantly for present purposes, with a carefully structured system of appellate review designed to ferret out the slightest error. Yet in the vast majority of criminal convictions in this country 90% in some jurisdictions; 70% in others the issue of guilt alone is not disputed.

What is disputed and, in many more than the guilty-plea cases alone, what is the only real issue at stake, is the question of the appropriate punishment. But by comparison to the care with which the less-frequent problem of guilt is resolved, the protections in most jurisdictions surrounding the determination of sentence are indeed miniscule. . . . It is not an overstatement to say of these jurisdictions that in no other area of our law does one man exercise such unrestricted power. " ^[11]

American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, Introduction at 1-2 (Approved Draft, 1968); see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 252-87, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1489-1508, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ^[12] .

Appellant maintains that requiring the trial court to state its reasons for the imposition of sentence will help rationalize the sentencing process. In certain contexts, courts have recognized the value of requiring a statement of reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence to prevent improper considerations from affecting the sentence imposed. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1...