Commonwealth v. Rosa
| Decision Date | 24 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | SJC-13277 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Roberto ROSA & another. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Darcy Jordan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Esther J. Horwich, for Roberto Rosa.
Present (Sitting at Plymouth): Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
The defendant's trial for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and other related charges was continued three times because the prosecutor was not ready for trial.2 Two of these continuances were due to the unavailability of the Commonwealth's key witness, the State police trooper who had arrested the defendant. When the witness was unavailable for a third time, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution and requested that the Commonwealth be required to file a motion to vacate the dismissal if it chose to refile the case. The judge granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The order of dismissal also required the Commonwealth to file a motion to vacate if it decided to proceed with the prosecution of the case. The Commonwealth then sought extraordinary relief in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, on the ground that the judge's order violated the district attorney's constitutional authority to choose which cases to prosecute. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court.
We conclude that the judge's decision to require the Commonwealth to seek court approval before refiling charges was an abuse of discretion. Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protects a prosecutor's right to decide whether to prosecute a defendant and for which offenses; a court may not impede the exercise of that right by imposing an additional requirement on the prosecution before it can refile the charges.
1. Background. On January 2, 2020, a complaint issued in the Boston Municipal Court charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1) ; negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ) ; possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24I ; and a marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89, § 4A. A jury trial was scheduled for February 27, 2020.
On what would have been the first day of trial, the Commonwealth's request for a continuance was allowed because its key witness, the State police trooper who had stopped and arrested the defendant, was unavailable, as she had been summonsed to appear in a different court. The case then was rescheduled two more times due to the state of emergency arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Thereafter, on August 4, 2020, trial again was continued because the Commonwealth was not ready for trial, and the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. A jury-waived trial was scheduled for September 4, 2020. On that date, the Commonwealth answered not ready for trial because the State police trooper was on vacation. Again, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. A jury-waived trial was rescheduled for November 9, 2020, and, on the scheduled day, trial again was continued. A jury trial subsequently was scheduled for March 8, 2021, but was rescheduled because there were no jurors. For reasons not indicated in the record, on May 13, 2021, the jury trial was continued to July 7, 2021, and, on that date, trial again was continued, this time to October 12, 2021. By that point, four Boston Municipal Court judges had allowed continuances of the trial.
On the morning of October 12, 2021, the Boston Municipal Court judge who had allowed the continuance on November 9, 2020, presided. When the judge asked whether the Commonwealth was ready for trial, the prosecutor responded that it was not. The prosecutor explained that, although the State police trooper had sent an electronic mail message to the prosecutor one week previously to confirm the date of trial, the trooper had called earlier that morning to say that she had had a family emergency and was unable to appear. The prosecutor requested that the trial again be rescheduled, asserting, "I understand today is the trial date and this has been on for trial several times, but there was a family emergency on her end, and I did expect her to come today."
Defense counsel objected to any further continuances. She said, "[T]his is at least three separate occasions when the [t]rooper has not been available, and I'd ask you to dismiss the matter." The judge inquired of the prosecutor whether she had the same memory of the trooper having been unavailable on previous dates, and the prosecutor affirmed that she did.
The judge then asked the prosecutor whether, on the prior dates when the trooper had not appeared, she had received advance notice of the trooper's unavailability. The prosecutor responded, "On [August 4, 2020], ... I knew why [the trooper] wasn't here, but I don't believe she gave me [any more] advanced notice than like the morning of." The judge said, The prosecutor answered,
The judge asked defense counsel whether she still intended to move for dismissal. Counsel responded,
The judge then allowed the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution and noted that the dismissal was over the Commonwealth's objection. After dismissing the case, the judge added, "Should the Commonwealth wish to pursue this case, the Commonwealth is ordered to file a [m]otion to [v]acate the [d]ismissal, [and to] notify [the defendant and his attorney] so that we can set this up for a hearing where everybody can be heard." The judge also told the defendant, A notation of dismissal without prejudice was entered on the docket. The Commonwealth then filed a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, and a single justice reserved and reported the case, without decision, to the full court.
2. Discussion. The Commonwealth argues that the judge lacked the authority to require it to file a motion to vacate the dismissal before it could seek a new criminal complaint against the defendant. Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts, the judge's ruling effectively was an improper dismissal with prejudice. The defendant maintains that, in allowing the prosecutor to file a motion to vacate the dismissal, the judge provided the Commonwealth with an adequate opportunity to argue, at a hearing, that the prosecutor should be allowed to refile the case. The defendant also argues that the order was permissible, given the court's inherent authority to manage its docket.
Article 30 prohibits one branch of the government from interfering with the functions of another. See K.J. v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 488 Mass. 362, 368, 173 N.E.3d 363 (2021). Among the functions exclusively within the domain of the executive branch is "the decision to proceed with [a] prosecution." Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 747, 755, 89 N.E.3d 1159 (2018). Judicial review of such a decision "would constitute an intolerable interference by the judiciary in the executive department of the government and would be in violation of art. 30." Id. at 755-756, 89 N.E.3d 1159. For this reason, "[i]n the absence of a legal basis to do so, it is well established that a judge may not dismiss a valid complaint over the Commonwealth's objection." Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 780, 73 N.E.3d 762 (2017). "[W]hen a judge, without any legal basis[,] preempts the Commonwealth's presentation of its case[,] that action effectively usurps the decision-making authority constitutionally allocated to the executive branch" (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted). Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574, 800 N.E.2d 309 (2003).
A prosecutor nonetheless does not have the authority to delay prosecution indefinitely once charges have been filed. See Commonwealth v. Super, 431 Mass. 492, 499, 727 N.E.2d 1175 (2000) ; Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996) (). "[T]he prosecutor's broad discretion over whether a case is prosecuted must be considered in conjunction with the judiciary's wide discretion as to when a case goes to trial." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 428 Mass. 623, 629, 704 N.E.2d 170 (1999). If the Commonwealth fails to prosecute a case, a judge has "the inherent authority to dismiss [the] indictment for failure to prosecute." Commonwealth v. Graham, 480 Mass. 516, 536, 106 N.E.3d 581 (2018). This authority extends to situations where the Commonwealth is not ready for trial because one of its witnesses is absent. Id.
When a judge dismisses a case for failure to prosecute, the dismissal ordinarily is without prejudice, thus allowing the prosecutor to refile the charges and to proceed with the prosecution. See Graham, 480 Mass. at 537, 106 N.E.3d 581. Because a dismissal without prejudice does not preempt further prosecution of a defendant, it is "upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Id. at 536, 106 N.E.3d 581, quoting Commonwealth v. Connelly, 418 Mass. 37, 38, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Myrthil
...for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 491 Mass. 369, 370 (2023). This case is controlled in all material respects by Rosa. Rosa, a judge allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution and added a condition, requiring the Commonwealth to file a motion to va......