Commonwealth v. Super
Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
Citation | 727 NE 2d 1175,431 Mass. 492 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. JAMES SUPER. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, GREANEY, SPINA, & COWIN, JJ.
Anthony Annino for the defendant.
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth sought relief from a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from a decision of a Superior Court judge ordering a required finding of not guilty for the defendant, James Super. The single justice ruled that the motion was properly before him pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and granted the Commonwealth's petition for relief. The defendant now appeals from this judgment. We agree that the Commonwealth correctly invoked the extraordinary powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3. See note 5, infra. We vacate the judgment of the single justice and affirm the required finding of not guilty ordered by the Superior Court.
1. The prior proceedings in this case are unusual. On May 21, 1998, the defendant was indicted for assault by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b). A pretrial conference report was filed on July 14. The defendant filed several pretrial motions on August 24.
On September 4, an earlier indictment in an unrelated case against the defendant was transferred for trial on September 10 and the instant case was assigned to follow the earlier case. Also on September 4, the instant case was continued for status to September 10, by agreement.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the earlier indictment on September 14. On that same day, a Superior Court judge conducted a hearing on the defendant's motions in the instant case and held this case for trial to follow another case (involving a different defendant)1 on September 17. The following day, September 15, the instant case was sent to the session for trial on September 16.
The Commonwealth moved for a continuance. At approximately noon on September 16, the judge held a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to continue. The prosecutor indicated that he was not prepared to proceed with trial because the Commonwealth's witnesses were unavailable on such short notice. He stated, for the record, that the Commonwealth first received notice on September 14 that the case was scheduled for trial. He explained that the clerk's office advised the Commonwealth to call on September 15 to determine whether the case would be going to trial on September 16.2 The prosecutor stated that he learned at approximately 4 P.M. on September 15 that the case was scheduled for trial on September 17. The judge questioned the prosecutor as to the steps that he took between September 14 and September 17 to secure the attendance of the two trial witnesses, a civilian and a police officer. The Commonwealth attempted to call its witnesses. The prosecutor stated that he reached the civilian witness by telephone on the afternoon of September 15, after several failed attempts. The prosecutor explained that the witness related that he had school and work obligations that week. The prosecutor stated that he told the witness that he would have to come to court. The prosecutor concluded that the witness, although displeased, stated that he would come when requested to do so.
With respect to the police officer, the prosecutor stated that he drafted a summons and sent it by facsimile transmission to the appropriate police station on September 14. The prosecutor stated that he received a message back from the officer that the officer would be out of the Commonwealth on vacation on September 17. The judge suggested that the prosecutor attempt to have the officer testify before he left for his vacation.3 Alternatively, noting that the officer was not a percipient witness, the judge suggested that the prosecutor have another officer testify.
Satisfied with the resolution of these witness issues, the judge denied the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance and ordered the lawyers to return at 2 P.M. to empanel a jury. The prosecutor responded that he would not move for trial before confirming that the Commonwealth's witnesses would be able to attend. The judge advised him, The prosecutor did not seek a stay from the single justice pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. Nor did he ask for time to do so.
When court reconvened at approximately 2 P.M., the prosecutor again told the judge that the Commonwealth was not moving for trial. Nevertheless, the judge began empanelling jurors. The prosecutor stated that he was not going to participate in the proceedings and asked for a stay of the proceedings. The judge denied the request. The prosecutor repeated that he would not participate in the proceedings because he had not moved for trial.4 Defense counsel moved to dismiss, on the ground that the Commonwealth did not move for trial. The judge did not grant the motion, and continued with empanelment proceedings. Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges, but the prosecutor continued to refuse to participate.
Immediately before the jurors were sworn, the prosecutor again asked for a stay. The request was denied and the jurors were sworn. The prosecutor did not ask the judge for time to seek a stay from an appellate court. The prosecutor then declined the opportunity to make an opening statement. The prosecutor refused to call any witnesses or to put on any evidence. The defendant then moved for a required finding of not guilty. The judge granted the required finding and ordered the defendant discharged unless held on some other process.
That afternoon, the Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking relief from a single justice of this court.5 The single justice stayed the discharge of the defendant that same day and heard argument the following day. He issued an order on September 18 vacating the stay of discharge and imposing bail with the conditions set by the Superior Court prior to trial. On October 27, the single justice rendered judgment and ordered that the docket entries reflecting the empanelment of a jury and the entry of a required finding of not guilty be vacated. He ordered that the case be reinstated to the list for trial.
The defendant timely filed notice of appeal and then purported to appeal pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, 421 Mass. 1303 (1995). We issued an order that rule 2:21 was "not applicable because the Superior Court judge's allowance of a motion for a finding of not guilty does not appear to be an interlocutory ruling," and because the single justice granted relief. However, as in Powers v. Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 534, 534 (1998), "because the defendant's [appeal] is based on a double jeopardy claim, successful appellate review after conviction would not provide adequate relief." The defendant pursued his appeal according to the regular appellate process. See id. at 534-535; McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1003, 1004 (1996).
2. The defendant first argues that reversing the decision of the Superior Court judge would place him in danger of double jeopardy. He argues that he has already been through a trial, which resulted in the judge's granting his required finding of not guilty. He states that remanding his case for trial would violate his right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. See Fadden v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604, 610 (1978); Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 681 (1978); Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 18-19 (1923). We agree.
It is a well-settled rule in this Commonwealth that, in a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jurors are sworn. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 426 Mass. 617, 624 (1998); Lovett v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 444, 447 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31, 33 (1976); Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359 Mass. 332, 334-335 (1971). Federal law is no different. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). Here, the defendant was placed in jeopardy. The defendant, set at bar, faced the risk and anxiety of trial by a jury of his peers. Jeopardy attached the moment that the jurors were empanelled and sworn.
3. The Commonwealth alleges that the judge committed three errors, and that, in light of these errors, the subsequent proceedings were bereft of meaning and must be vacated. Given these errors, the Commonwealth reasons, the defendant was never placed in jeopardy, and therefore may not invoke double jeopardy protections. See Ariel A. v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 281, 287 (1995); Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 310 (1984). See also People v. Edwards, 97 Ill. App. 3d 407, 411 (1981) ( ). These arguments have no merit.
a. The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred in denying the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance. We agree. Generally, Commonwealth v. Painten, 429 Mass. 536, 543 (1999). "In considering a request for a continuance, a trial judge should balance the movant's need for additional time against the possible inconvenience, increased costs, and prejudice which may be incurred by the opposing party if the motion is granted." Commonwealth v. Gilchrest, 364 Mass. 272, 276 (1973).
Here, it was an abuse of discretion not to allow the motion to continue. The parties received very short notice of the trial date. The prosecutor promptly attempted to contact the Commonwealth's witnesses to inform them of the trial date. With this short notice, it was difficult, if not nearly impossible, for...
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