Commonwealth v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 22 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-P-1009.,17-P-1009.
• Citation: 93 Mass.App.Ct. 792,109 N.E.3d 535
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Wilfredo SANTIAGO.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

93 Mass.App.Ct. 792

109 N.E.3d 535

COMMONWEALTH

v.Wilfredo SANTIAGO.

No. 17-P-1009.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex..

Argued April 4, 2018

Decided August 22, 2018

Edward Crane, Cambridge, for the defendant.

David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Rubin, Sacks, & Singh, JJ.

SACKS, J.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm, second offense,¹ and possession of a loaded firearm. On appeal, the defendant argues that a Superior Court judge (motion judge) erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm and some cash discovered during a stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger. The defendant asserts that police conduct during the stop -- including boxing the vehicle in and approaching with guns drawn -- escalated the encounter to an arrest, for which probable cause was lacking.

After considering the circumstances as a whole, we conclude that the officers' show of force was sufficiently significant to convert the stop to an arrest. Because the Commonwealth concedes that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time, the motion to suppress should have been allowed. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions.

1. Background. We summarize the motion judge's detailed findings of fact, supplementing with additional facts from testimony that the judge implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337, 861 N.E.2d 404 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818, 882 N.E.2d 328 (2008). Here, the defendant concedes that police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle in which he was traveling, based on evidence of drug dealing as well as traffic violations. We therefore focus our recitation on the facts relevant to the defendant's challenge on appeal.

In the summer of 2014, State police were conducting an investigation into suspected drug dealing in Lawrence, centering on the defendant, and using a confidential informant. During the investigation, officers determined that the defendant was known to the Lawrence police and had a prior conviction of a firearms offense. The confidential informant told police that the defendant was selling cocaine and was "involved with firearms."

On August 6, 2014, police initiated surveillance of the defendant based on the informant's report that the defendant would be traveling to Lynn to pick up cocaine to bring to Lawrence. The surveillance team comprised multiple officers from the State police, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, in unmarked vehicles. During the course of the surveillance, officers observed the defendant, along with three other men about whom police apparently had no information,² depart a home in Lawrence in a red GMC Envoy sport utility vehicle. The defendant was seated in the right rear passenger's seat. The surveillance team followed the GMC surreptitiously. After making a number of stops in Lawrence and then in Lynn, at about 6:00 P.M. the defendant and his companions proceeded in the GMC to Route 114 westbound toward Lawrence.

When the GMC reached a point where the road widened from one to two lanes and motorists often accelerate to pass slower vehicles, it suddenly more than doubled its speed, operating well over the posted speed limit. Believing that the GMC's occupants had detected the surveillance, officers decided to stop the GMC, rather than waiting for its expected return to Lawrence, as they had originally planned.

Officers contacted a uniformed State trooper who was patrolling the area in a marked cruiser and asked him to stop the vehicle. The trooper observed the GMC cross the double yellow line in the middle of the road twice. He turned on his cruiser's flashing lights, and the GMC pulled over promptly. The trooper's cruiser and at least three other unmarked police cars moved in around the GMC, effectively boxing it in.

Four or five officers simultaneously approached the GMC's four doors, yelling for the occupants to raise their hands. At least two of the officers had their guns drawn. As one officer neared the GMC, he observed the defendant, who was still sitting in the right rear passenger's seat, reach forward, pull open the seat-back pocket in front of him, and stuff an object into it. Suspecting that the defendant had attempted to conceal a firearm, the officer opened the left rear door and ordered the rear seat passengers not to move. He observed a firearm in the seat-back pocket in front of the defendant.

Officers ordered the defendant and other passengers out of the GMC and recovered a loaded revolver from the seat-back pocket. The defendant was arrested and searched, and just under $5,500 in cash was found on his person. No drugs were found. 2. Discussion. The defendant agrees on appeal that the stop of the GMC was lawful and supported by observed traffic violations as well as reasonable suspicion of drug dealing. He maintains, however, that his motion to suppress was improperly denied because police conduct escalated the seizure to an arrest without probable cause.³ We agree.

In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings unless clearly erroneous, see Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 137, 371 N.E.2d 777 (1977), aff'd, 439 U.S. 280, 99 S.Ct. 712, 58 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978), and make an "independent determination on the correctness of the judge's ‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.’ " Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806, 501 N.E.2d 1154 (1986), quoting from Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).

"The Constitution does not require officers ‘to gamble with their personal safety,’ Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407 Mass. 147, 152 (1990), and police officers conducting a threshold inquiry may take reasonable precautions, including drawing their weapons, when the circumstances give rise to legitimate safety concerns." Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 794, 784 N.E.2d 625 (2003). "Such steps do not automatically turn a stop into an arrest." Commonwealth v. Dyette, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 556, 32 N.E.3d 906 (2015), quoting from Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 117, 661 N.E.2d 617 (1996).

Whether a police seizure has been transformed into an arrest "depends on the proportional relationship of the degree of intrusiveness on the defendant to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion." Commonwealth v. Willis, 415 Mass. 814, 819, 616 N.E.2d 62 (1993). This determination is highly fact-specific, and in assessing the reasonableness of the officers' conduct, we view the facts and circumstances "as a whole." Williams, 422 Mass. at 116, 661 N.E.2d 617.

We have held that "[a]n approach with drawn guns is generally thought excessive in the absence of any suggestion that the defendant is armed or other circumstances suggesting the possibility of violence." Commonwealth v. Fitzgibbons, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308, 502 N.E.2d 142 (1986). Even with information suggesting that a defendant possesses a firearm illegally, however, police are not generally justified in drawing their guns in the absence of additional "fear-provoking circumstances." Commonwealth v. Bottari, 395 Mass. 777, 782, 482 N.E.2d 321 (1985). When considering a vehicle stop, "we also look to the number of police used to effectuate the stop and whether the movement of the automobile was impeded." Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 398 Mass. 761, 766, 500 N.E.2d 1337 (1986).

Here, the police response, viewed as whole, included the presence of multiple cars and officers, the use of four police vehicles to box the GMC in, and the approach of at least two officers with guns drawn. We conclude that this was disproportionate "to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion" and constituted an arrest. Willis, 415 Mass. at 819, 616 N.E.2d 62. The surrounding circumstances here lacked factors present in other cases that held such precautions justified even absent probable cause.

Here, "[t]he officers' use of force was not precipitated by any actions of the defendant[ ], nor did the officers testify that they feared for their safety or the safety of others at the time they approached the [GMC] with their guns drawn." Bottari, 395 Mass. at 782, 482 N.E.2d 321. Though it is certainly relevant that police had information as to the defendant's prior nonspecific "involvement" in firearms and knew the defendant to have had a prior firearms conviction, they had no particular information suggesting that he possessed a firearm at the time of the stop. Cf. Willis, 415 Mass. at 815-816, 819, 616 N.E.2d 62 (officers had detailed information that defendant with previous arrest for armed robbery was carrying loaded stolen gun at time of seizure); Haskell, 438 Mass. at 793-794, 784 N.E.2d 625 (officers received reliable report that defendant was seen publicly loading handgun in high-crime area at 2:00 A.M. ); Commonwealth v. McKoy, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 314, 983 N.E.2d 719 (2013) (defendant and companion were coming from direction of reported shooting, were only persons on street, and had hands in pockets).

The officers had no information about any history of violent conduct on the part of the defendant. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 347-351, 746 N.E.2d 544 (2001) (police show of force did not transform seizure into arrest, where defendants were suspected of just having committed home invasion). Though police information regarding the defendant's possible drug dealing is relevant in our analysis, "case law often observes that the mere fact that drugs are involved does not support the view that guns or other weapons are present." Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 341, 348, 921 N.E.2d 1026 (2010). See Commonwealth v. Washington, 449 Mass. 476, 482, 869 N.E.2d 605 (2007) ("we are reluctant to adopt a blanket rule...