Commonwealth v. Satterfield

• Decision Date: 22 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 66 MAP 2020,66 MAP 2020
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jack Edward SATTERFIELD, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

255 A.3d 438

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Jack Edward SATTERFIELD, Appellant

No. 66 MAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: March 12, 2021

Decided: July 22, 2021

Michael F. J. Piecuch, Esq., Snyder County District Attorney's Office, Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., for Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, Amicus Curiae.

Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Defender Association of Philadelphia, Amicus Curiae.

James Jude Karl, Mary Lynn Klatt, Esqs., Dauphin County Public Defender's Office, Paul Watson Muller, Esq., for Appellant.

Francis T. Chardo III, Ryan Hunter Lysaght, Esqs., Dauphin County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

In this case of first impression, we granted allocatur to determine whether Jack Edward Satterfield ("Satterfield") has raised a meritorious challenge to the legality of the sentences imposed on three counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742, stemming from a multi-vehicle crash that resulted in three fatalities. We conclude that two of Satterfield's three sentences were illegal. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 12, 2018, Satterfield was driving a tractor-trailer with a partial load from New Jersey to Wisconsin. At approximately 8:30 p.m., while traveling through Dauphin County on Interstate 83 North, Satterfield approached multiple vehicles stopped at a construction zone. Without reducing his speed of approximately sixty-seven miles per hour, Satterfield crashed into numerous vehicles at Mile Mark 47. As a result of the crash, three people died and many others were injured. Two of the fatalities were in the same car: a twenty-four-year-old father and his sixteen-month-old daughter died as a result of smoke inhalation and thermal burns after their vehicle was engulfed in flames. The third fatality was a twenty-two year old college student traveling with his fiancée; he died as a result of multiple traumatic injuries.

Once the tractor-trailer came to a stop, Satterfield exited the cab through the driver's side window and fled to the parking lot of a nearby hotel, where a crowd of people had gathered to observe the accident scene. Using a photograph of Satterfield, police officers spotted him in the crowd. As they approached Satterfield, he attempted to flee. The officers apprehended him, observing that he smelled of alcohol and smoke and spoke with slurred speech. A consensual blood draw revealed a blood alcohol content of .152%. When police interviewed Satterfield, he admitted that he had stopped to eat at a Mexican restaurant in New Jersey where he drank three margaritas and a beer with his dinner. Before resuming his trip, Satterfield had purchased a six-pack of beer and a bottle of hard liquor. As evident on video taken from the cab of the tractor-trailer, Satterfield drank as he drove from New Jersey toward Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Satterfield entered an open guilty plea to various offenses,¹ including three counts of violating Section 3742,² with each of these counts naming one of the persons killed. The court sentenced Satterfield to incarceration for an aggregate term of twenty-eight and one half (28½) to sixty-three (63) years. Sentencing Order, 8/6/2019. Reasoning that Satterfield "left the scene, leading to the deaths of three individuals[,]" the trial court sentenced him on the three Section 3742 convictions³ to incarceration for consecutive terms of three to six years. Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/2019, at 1–2; 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(b)(3)(i). In support of its ruling, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. Kinney , 863 A.2d 581 (Pa. Super. 2004). Kinney involved a defendant whose vehicle sideswiped another vehicle. As a result of the impact, the second vehicle crossed the highway and collided head-on with a third vehicle. Id. at 583. Two fatalities occurred in the third vehicle, which the defendant's vehicle never struck. The defendant fled the scene, but was forced to stop and call for help due to the extensive damage to her vehicle. Id. Despite the defendant's argument that two accidents had occurred and she was not involved in the second accident (the one that resulted in fatalities), the Kinney Court, relying on the jury verdict, upheld the convictions under Section 3742. Id. at 585.

Satterfield filed a post-sentence motion to modify sentence, challenging the imposition of three sentences on the Section 3742 counts because that section "encompasses the act of not remaining at the scene of an accident where there has been injury or death to offer aid and information[, and he] could only leave the scene of an accident one time, not three, regardless of the number of victims." Motion to Modify Sentencing, 8/14/2019, ¶ 5(d)(ii). The trial court denied his post-sentence motion, and Satterfield filed a timely notice of appeal with the Superior Court.

On appeal, Satterfield renewed his argument that he should not have been given three sentences on the Section 3742 counts because there was only one accident, and, therefore, he violated Section 3742(a) only once. He claimed that the plain language of the text of Section 3742 supports his interpretation that the phrase "an accident" in Section 3742 refers to one accident, and thus he only violated the statute once. The Superior Court affirmed Satterfield's judgment of sentence in an unpublished memorandum opinion, Commonwealth v. Satterfield , 2020 WL 3866653 (Pa. Super. 2020), determining that the phrase "an accident" is not clear as to whether a person can be sentenced on three counts where there is a single accident and three victims die. Id. at *6. To resolve Satterfield's sentencing challenge, the Superior Court turned to its decision in Kinney and legislative intent. Id. at *6–*7.

Citing Kinney , the Superior Court concluded that, even if there was only one accident, Satterfield could be sentenced on three counts of violating Section 3742 given the number of victims. Satterfield , 2020 WL 3866653, at *7. Looking at Senate Journal, 2014 Reg. Sess. No. 45, June 30, 2014, for legislative intent, the Superior Court noted that Section 3742 was amended in 2014 to make the penalty prescribed by Section 3742(b)(3)(i) equal to the penalty for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence ("homicide-by-vehicle-DUI"), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735(a), thereby resolving sentencing discrepancies between Sections 3742 and 3735. Satterfield , 2020 WL 3866653, at *7. The Superior Court observed that the purpose of the 2014 amendment was to discourage individuals from fleeing the scene of an accident to avoid the more serious homicide-by-vehicle-DUI charge by equalizing the penalties for both offenses. Id. According to the Superior Court, adopting Satterfield's interpretation of Section 3742 "would eviscerate this resolution," resulting in "great incentive to flee the scene" of serious accidents involving multiple victims, since a defendant who remained at the scene could be sentenced on multiple counts of homicide-by-vehicle-DUI, but "only a single count of accident[s] involving personal injury or death if he fled." Id. The Superior Court found nothing in the legislative history that "would demonstrate [the legislature] intended to give a volume discount in cases of accidents involving multiple cars and victims." Id.

This Court granted Satterfield's petition for allowance of appeal on the following issue:

Whether the Superior Court erred when it affirmed the trial court's imposition of illegal sentences when the trial court sentenced [Satterfield] to separate, consecutive sentences on three counts of accidents involving death or personal injury where the applicable statute contemplates a single offense for each accident regardless of the number of persons injured or killed in such an accident?

Commonwealth v. Satterfield , 240 A.3d 615 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam).⁴

"Whether a claim implicates the legality of a sentence presents a pure question of law, in which case our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review, de novo." Commonwealth v. Weir , ––– Pa. ––––, 239 A.3d 25, 30 (2020) (citation omitted). Resolution of Satterfield's issue also involves interpretation of a statute, Section 3742, which presents a pure question of law; again, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review, de novo. Commonwealth v. Peck , ––– Pa. ––––, 242 A.3d 1274, 1278 (2020) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Wisneski , 612 Pa. 91, 29 A.3d 1150, 1152–53 (2011).

Arguments of the Parties

Satterfield asserts that the plain language of Section 3742 is unambiguous. That offense focuses on the actor being the driver of a vehicle involved in "an accident" resulting in injury or death. Satterfield's Brief at 18 (emphasis in original). According to Satterfield, the actus reus of the offense is not causing an accident, but failing to fulfill two duties: (1) a driver involved in an accident must stop the vehicle at or near the accident scene and (2) must remain there until they have fulfilled the obligations set forth at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3744, namely, providing information and rendering aid. Satterfield's Brief at 18–19. Because the actus reus does not relate to the driver's fault or to resulting injuries or death, Satterfield reasons that a driver's failure to remain at the scene ("a single action") of an accident ("a single event") completes the offense. Id. at 19. Even if the single event involves multiple injured persons or deaths, the nature of the single action remains the same because a person can leave the scene of an accident only once.⁵ Satterfield's Brief at 19. Accordingly, Satterfield concludes that the plain meaning of Section 3742(a) is that a driver involved in an accident commits a single offense upon leaving the scene...