Commonwealth v. Peck

• Decision Date: 22 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 75 MAP 2019,75 MAP 2019
• Citation: 242 A.3d 1274
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Mitchell Gregory PECK, Jr., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

242 A.3d 1274

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Mitchell Gregory PECK, Jr., Appellant

No. 75 MAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 27, 2020

Decided: December 22, 2020

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

Mitchell Gregory Peck, Jr. ("Peck") was convicted of drug delivery resulting in death pursuant to Section 2506 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2506 ("DDRD"), and sentenced to twenty to forty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, we consider the interplay between the territorial application of the Crimes Code, including in particular Section 102, 18 Pa.C.S. § 102, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Specific to this appeal, we address whether Peck's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence where the drug delivery occurred in Maryland and the resulting death occurred in Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that while the Commonwealth had subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Peck for DDRD, it could not present evidence to support his conviction. We therefore reverse the Superior Court's decision to the contrary and vacate Peck's judgment of sentence.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On the evening of December 9, 2014, James Hunt returned home from work and spoke with his son Kevin before going to bed. The next morning, Mr. Hunt left for work without seeing Kevin. When he returned that evening, he noticed that the door to Kevin's room was locked. After unlocking the door, Mr. Hunt discovered Kevin's lifeless body on the floor. Emergency services were called and Pennsylvania State Trooper Thomas Grothey responded to the Hunt residence. In Kevin's bedroom, Trooper Grothey found a "rock" of heroin on the nightstand and Kevin's cell phone on the floor, near Kevin's body. On the cell phone were text messages between Kevin and Peck. These messages included an exchange indicating that the prior evening, Kevin met Peck at a High's convenience store, approximately ten miles south of Pennsylvania's border in Maryland, where Peck sold the rock of heroin to Kevin. Messages between the two men between 11:36 and 11:47 p.m. reveal that during that time Kevin ingested the heroin and thanked Peck for it.

Peck was subsequently arrested and charged with two crimes. In Count One, the Commonwealth charged Peck with delivery of a controlled substance pursuant to Section 780-113(a)(30) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act ("the Drug Act"), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). In Count Two, Peck was charged with DDRD, which is defined in the Crimes Code as follows:

§ 2506. Drug delivery resulting in death

(a) Offense defined .--A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person intentionally administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells or distributes any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the Act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and another person dies as a result of using the substance.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2506(a). Sections 13(a)(14) and (30) of the Drug Act, specifically referenced in the DDRD statute, provide the following:

§ 780-113. Prohibited acts; penalties

(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:

(14) The administration, dispensing, delivery, gift or prescription of any controlled substance by any practitioner or professional assistant under the practitioner's direction and supervision unless done (i) in good faith in the course of his professional practice; (ii) within the scope of the patient relationship; (iii) in accordance with treatment principles accepted by a responsible segment of the medical profession.

* * *

(30) Except as authorized by this Act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this Act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(14), (30) (emphasis added).

Prior to the commencement of trial, Peck sought dismissal of Count One on the basis that because Section 780-113(a)(30) requires that the drug delivery must occur "within the Commonwealth," the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a drug delivery that the parties agreed occurred in Maryland. The Commonwealth conceded this point and the trial court dismissed the charge. See N.T., 7/17/2017, at 5-6. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Peck guilty of DDRD and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twenty to forty years of imprisonment. As to the conviction under Count Two, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court rejected Peck's contention that the Commonwealth had not proven a "violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the [Drug] Act," as required by the DDRD statute. The trial court ruled that because the resulting death is an element of the offense of DDRD, "the location of the delivery of the heroin did not affect Count 2." Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 3/18/2018, at 2. Moreover, the trial court held that Peck's delivery of heroin was a violation of Maryland law ( MD Code, Criminal Law § 5-602, 5-402, 5-101 ), and, had the delivery occurred in Pennsylvania, it would have also violated Pennsylvania's Drug Act. Id. As such, the trial court concluded that just because the drug delivery occurred in Maryland, any determination that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of DDRD "was absurd, and would lead to a result the Legislature did not intend." Id.

In his appeal to the Superior Court, Peck renewed his argument that because the drug delivery occurred in Maryland, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DDRD. In so arguing, Peck distinguished this claim from one challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over the charge. Commonwealth v. Peck , 202 A.3d 739, 743 (Pa. Super. 2019), reargument denied (Mar. 13, 2019), appeal granted in part , ––– Pa. ––––, 218 A.3d 374 (2019). The Superior Court disagreed. It first pronounced that DDRD consists of "two principal elements: (i) [i]ntentionally administering, dispensing, delivering, giving, prescribing, selling or distributing any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance and (ii) death caused by (‘resulting from’) the use of that drug[.]" Id. at 744 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kakhankham , 132 A.3d 986, 991-92 (Pa. Super. 2015) ). The Superior Court then turned to Section 102 of the Crimes Code, entitled "Territorial applicability." It focused on subsections (a)(1) and (c), which state as follows:

§ 102. Territorial applicability

(a) General rule .--Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under the law of this Commonwealth of an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable if either:

(1) the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this Commonwealth[.]

* * *

(c) Homicide. --When the offense is homicide or homicide of an unborn child, either the death of the victim, including an unborn child, or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a "result" within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, and if the body of a homicide victim, including an unborn child, is found within this Commonwealth, it is presumed that such result occurred within this Commonwealth.

Id. (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 102(a)(1), (c) ). The intermediate appellate court reasoned that " Section 102 clearly establishes that acts occurring outside of Pennsylvania may be subject to criminal prosecution in Pennsylvania" and that "[c]ontrary to Peck's assertion, an analysis of Section 102 is critical to determine whether (1) the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction to convict him of an offense under Section 2506, and (2) the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the conviction based on Decedent's death in Pennsylvania." Id. at 744-45 (internal citations omitted). The court explained that:

[h]ere, the Commonwealth presented evidence that (1) although the conduct, i.e., the delivery, occurred in Maryland, it was in violation of [the Drug Act], (2) a death resulted from the delivery, and (3) [Peck] acted recklessly when causing Decedent's death. Therefore, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict [Peck] of the delivery under Section 102, the Commonwealth still established the sufficiency of the evidence of a drug delivery resulting in death. Accordingly, we find no merit to [Peck's] sufficiency of the evidence challenge based solely on the fact that the predicate drug delivery occurred outside Pennsylvania.

Id. at 745 (internal citations omitted).

We granted Peck's petition seeking allowance of appeal to consider the following questions:

1. Where the [DDRD] statute explicitly applies only to deliveries occurring "in violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of" [the Drug Act], is violation of the Drug Act an essential element of drug delivery resulting in death?

2. Where a drug delivery occurs wholly in another state, can that delivery violate the Drug Act, which explicitly applies only to deliveries occurring "within the Commonwealth?"

3. If a violation of the Drug Act is an element of [DDRD] and an out-of-state delivery does not violate the Drug Act, did the Superior Court err in affirming [Peck's] [DDRD] conviction based on a delivery occurring wholly in Maryland?

Commonwealth v. Peck, ––– Pa. ––––, 218 A.3d 374 (2019). These issues require interpretation of the relevant statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law and therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Hall , 622 Pa. 396, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (2013).

II. The Arguments of the Parties

Peck's argument is straightforward. In his view, the Superior Court essentially ignored...