MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Appellant, Anthony J. Scholl, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions of attempted homicide, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"). We affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:
On September 5, 2012, at approximately 10:30 P.M., Colin Albright rode his bicycle from the Squirrel Hill section of the City of Pittsburgh to the South Side section of the city. As he traveled along Hot Metal Street, Albright exited the bike path and entered the roadway in front of Appellant's vehicle. Albright's actions apparently offended Appellant who was driving his vehicle on Hot Metal Street. Consequently, Appellant followed Albright as he made his way to a set of city steps which led from Harcum Way to Josephine Street. Albright began to ascend the steps towards his home, which was on Josephine Street, carrying his bicycle over his shoulder. Appellant parked his vehicle and ran up the stairs to confront Appellant. (T.T.(I) 38, 40-41, 43; T.T.(II) 39-40, 42, 174-176).4 4 The designation "T.T.(I)" followed by numerals refers to Trial Transcript, March 3, 2014. The designation "T.T.(II)" refers to Trial Transcript, March 3-5, 2014.
When Albright heard Appellant approaching from behind, Albright moved out of the way to allow Appellant to pass him on the stairs. Instead, Appellant stopped and began to stab Albright in the back of the head and shoulder. Albright, believing he was being robbed, told Appellant that he could take the bicycle. Appellant grabbed Albright by the top of the head, and slit Albright's throat lengthwise, from ear to ear. At the same time, Albright pushed the bicycle towards Appellant, who took the bicycle, ran down the steps, threw the bicycle over the railing, and fled in his car. (T.T.(I) 43-46; T.T.(II) 50).
Albright immediately called 911 and wrapped his shirt around his neck in an attempt to stop the bleeding. The 911 dispatcher was unable to ascertain Albright's location without a street address, so Albright made his way to the Birmingham Bridge Tavern, which was approximately four blocks away, to await assistance. (T.T.(I) 46-52; T.T.(II) 31-32, 43). Albright was emergently transported to the hospital where he remained for approximately five days. Appellant had severed Albright's external jugular vein and several other arteries in his neck. Albright received twenty-one sutures in his neck and fifteen staples for the stab wounds to his head. At the time of trial, Albright was still undergoing physical therapy and had significant and permanent scarring to his head, shoulder, and neck. (T.T.(I) 33, 53-56; T.T.(II) 7, 11, 14, 17).
Albright assisted the police in creating a composite sketch of his attacker. (T.T.(II) 17, 108-112). Upon further investigation and tips received from the public, Appellant was identified as a suspect. Albright identified Appellant from a photo array as being very similar to the individual who attacked him, and Appellant confessed to the attack during a subsequent interview. (T.T.(II) 23, 167-180, 200).
Trial Court Opinion, 1/15/15, at 8-10.
In a criminal information dated October 25, 2012, and filed on June 11, 2013, Appellant was charged with the crimes of criminal attempt (homicide), aggravated assault - serious bodily injury, and REAP. On July 9, 2013, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress his confession and statements to police, and his identification. The suppression court held a hearing December 2 through December 3, 2013. In an order dated December 29, 2013, the suppression court denied the motion to suppress.1
On March 5, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of the three crimes stated above. On July 17, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of incarceration of seven to fourteen years, to be followed by a term of probation of five years for the conviction of attempted homicide. For the crime of REAP, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a consecutive term of probation of two years. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS INSOFAR AS [APPELLANT'S] CONFESSION WAS THE
FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST BECAUSE THE POLICE HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE AT THE TIME THEY HANDCUFFED HIM, PLACED HIM IN LEG-IRONS AND TRANSPORTED HIM FROM THE COUNTY JAIL TO THE HOMICIDE OFFICE TO BE INTERVIEWED?
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS INSOFAR AS [APPELLANT'S] RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 1, § 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, WAS VIOLATED WHERE HE HAD OBTAINED COUNSEL FOR AN EARLIER, UNRELATED OFFENSE, AND THE POLICE SUBSEQUENTLY INITIATED INTERROGATION REGARDING THE INSTANT OFFENSE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL; AND HIS PURPORTED WAIVER OF COUNSEL AFTER BEING GIVEN MIRANDA WARNINGS,[3] WAS INVALID?
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS INSOFAR AS [APPELLANT] DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS BECAUSE HE SUFFERED FROM MENTAL ILLNESS AND WAS SUBJECTED TO COERCIVE TACTICS?
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHO WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED [APPELLANT'S] CLAIM THAT HIS STATEMENT WAS INVOLUNTARY, WAS INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL?
Appellant's Brief at 5.
In his first three issues, Appellant argues that his motion to suppress his statement to the police was improperly denied. With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has stated the following:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is whether the factualfindings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record. . . . Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). "It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006).4
Further, we are aware that Pa.R.Crim.P., which addresses the suppression of evidence, provides in relevant part as follows:
(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden . . . of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's rights.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).
Initially, Appellant claims that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest because the police lacked probable cause when they handcuffed him and took him from the county jail, where he was incarcerated on unrelated charges, to the homicide office to be interviewed regarding the instant crimes. Appellant's Brief at 27-30. Basically, Appellant contends that his transportation to the homicide office amounted to the functional equivalent of an arrest, which required the police to possess probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby ensuring the "right of each individual to be let alone." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa. Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2002). However, as explained below, police are not required to possess probable cause in order to transport a prisoner from jail to a police station to be interviewed in connection with another crime, and prisoners are not arrested under these circumstances because they are, by virtue of their pre-existing incarceration, already validly within state custody. Our Supreme Court analyzed this issue in Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), and held that the transfer of a defendant from jail to the offices of a criminal investigation division
did not implicate appellant's rights under the Fourth Amendment. At the time appellant was moved . . . , he wasalready a prisoner serving time on unrelated charges; he was already unquestionably "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The only change in appellant's status . . . was the location of his custody. The transfer from jail to the . . . offices . . . did not constitute a separate seizure of appellant under the Fourth Amendment for the obvious reason that he was already lawfully in custody.
Id. at 846. See also Commonwealth v. Watkins, 750 A.2d 308, 314 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that "[d]ue to the administrative nature of the transport process used by the police herein and the fact that prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights are not coextensive with those of free citizens, we decline to require police officers to possess probable cause when transporting prisoners to police stations for custodial interrogation.").
In concluding that Appellant's motion to suppress based upon an alleged illegal arrest or detention lacked merit, the suppression court concluded that "[t]he facts in this matter are nearly identical [to the facts in Watkins] and require the same result."...
