Commonwealth v. Seskey, 1858 WDA 2016.
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
| Citation | 170 A.3d 1105 |
| Docket Number | No. 1858 WDA 2016.,1858 WDA 2016. |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Regis SESKEY, Appellee |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2017 |
170 A.3d 1105
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Regis SESKEY, Appellee
No. 1858 WDA 2016.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued May 10, 2017
Filed August 25, 2017
Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Chris R. Eyster and Victor A. Delnore, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and RANSOM, JJ.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on November 16, 2016, as made final by the disposition of Regis Seskey's ("Appellee's") post-sentence motion on December 5, 2016. In this case, we hold that our
Supreme Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (" Batts II ") requires that an individual convicted of first or second-degree murder1 for a crime committed as a minor be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. As the trial court in this case sentenced Appellee, who was convicted of first-degree murder for a crime committed as a minor, to a maximum term of 26 years' imprisonment, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for the sole purpose of resentencing.
The factual background of this case is as follows. Appellee and Marc Bova ("Victim") were partners in a drug dealing operation. At some point, Appellee became angry at Victim for using too much of the crack cocaine supply. Appellee was also unhappy that Victim owed him several hundred dollars. Appellee expressed his frustration to Scott Thorton ("Thorton"). Thorton suggested that they scare Victim by inviting him to a field, with the promise of crack cocaine, and confronting him with a sawed-off shotgun.
On the night of October 12, 1992, Appellee and Thorton lured Victim to the field. Instead of scaring Victim, Appellee fired five shots at Victim using the sawed-off shotgun. Victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. Appellee then proceeded to eat at a local establishment where he stated that killing Victim was like killing a rabbit. At the time of the murder, Appellee was a minor.
The relevant procedural history of this case is as follows. On March 22, 1994, Appellee was convicted of first-degree murder.2 The trial court immediately sentenced him to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Sesky, 450 Pa.Super. 718, 676 A.2d 286 (1996) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 545 Pa. 670, 681 A.2d 1342 (1996).
On August 15, 1997, Appellee filed a petition pursuant to the Post–Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 – 9546. On August 11, 1998, the PCRA court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This Court affirmed that dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Seskey, 816 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 573 Pa. 716, 828 A.2d 350 (2003).
On July 19, 2010, Appellee filed his second PCRA petition. On May 1, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed that dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 627 Pa. 765, 101 A.3d 103 (2014), overruled , Montgomery v. Louisiana, –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
On January 27, 2016, Appellee filed his third PCRA petition. The Commonwealth conceded that, because Montgomery made the rule against mandatory LWOP sentences for minor offenders retroactive, Appellee was entitled to resentencing.3 It argued,
however, that he must receive a maximum term of life imprisonment. On November 16, 2016, the PCRA court granted Appellee's PCRA petition. The trial court then immediately sentenced him to a term of 13 to 26 years' imprisonment. On November 17, 2016, Appellee filed a post-sentence motion. On December 5, 2016, the trial court granted Appellee's post-sentence motion and recommended that Appellee be immediately paroled. This timely appeal followed.4
The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court erred in imposing an illegal sentence when it refused to sentence [A]ppellee to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment with the chance for parole?
2. Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion in not imposing a sentence which had, as its maximum, a sentence of life imprisonment with the chance for parole?
Commonwealth's Brief at 6.
In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because the maximum term of imprisonment was set at 26 years instead of life.5 Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the trial court possessed unfettered sentencing discretion and it was not required to impose any minimum or maximum term of imprisonment. When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 159 A.3d 531, 532 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In order to understand the Commonwealth's illegal sentence argument, it is necessary to review the relevant Pennsylvania statutes regarding mandatory LWOP sentences for minors convicted of first or second-degree murder. The Crimes Code provides that an individual convicted of first or second-degree murder must be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a), (b). The Parole Code provides that an individual sentenced to a term of life imprisonment is not eligible for parole. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(1) ; but see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (discussed infra ). Finally, the Juvenile Act provides that the term "delinquent act" does not include the crime of murder. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
Under this statutory framework, a minor who commits first or second-degree murder must be charged as an adult. If convicted, the minor must be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment and is not eligible for parole. But see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (discussed infra ). Thus, a minor convicted of first or second-degree murder
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Foust, 1118 WDA 2016
...to sentence Appellant, who was convicted of first-degree murder, to a maximum term of life imprisonment. Commonwealth v. Seskey , 170 A.3d 1105, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnote omitted); Batts II , 163 A.3d at 421. In other words, there was valid statutory authority to impose a maximum sen......
-
Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 709 CAP
...Saylor's Dissenting Opinion with respect to the denial of Jacoby's request for a Frye hearing on the subject of Y–STR DNA testing. For 170 A.3d 1105this reason, I would reverse the trial court's ruling.--------Notes:1 This case was reassigned to this author.2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 3502(a),......
-
Commonwealth v. Felder, 18 EAP 2018
...1102(b)’s mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder"); accord Commonwealth v. Seskey , 170 A.3d 1105, 1105-06 (Pa. Super. 2017). In other cases, the intermediate court has partially restricted our holdings in Batts II and Machicote . See, e.......
-
Waters v. Mason, CIVIL 1:22-cv-448
...II required the court to sentence Appellant to a mandatory maximum of life imprisonment. See id. at 458. See also Commonwealth v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Ct. 2017). Accordingly, we find Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. (Doc. 14-4, at 48). Accordingly, to the exten......