Commonwealth v. Seskey
| Decision Date | 25 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1858 WDA 2016.,1858 WDA 2016. |
| Citation | 170 A.3d 1105 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Regis SESKEY, Appellee |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Michael W. Streily, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Chris R. Eyster and Victor A. Delnore, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on November 16, 2016, as made final by the disposition of Regis Seskey's ("Appellee's") post-sentence motion on December 5, 2016. In this case, we hold that our Supreme Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (" Batts II ") requires that an individual convicted of first or second-degree murder1 for a crime committed as a minor be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. As the trial court in this case sentenced Appellee, who was convicted of first-degree murder for a crime committed as a minor, to a maximum term of 26 years' imprisonment, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for the sole purpose of resentencing.
The factual background of this case is as follows. Appellee and Marc Bova ("Victim") were partners in a drug dealing operation. At some point, Appellee became angry at Victim for using too much of the crack cocaine supply. Appellee was also unhappy that Victim owed him several hundred dollars. Appellee expressed his frustration to Scott Thorton ("Thorton"). Thorton suggested that they scare Victim by inviting him to a field, with the promise of crack cocaine, and confronting him with a sawed-off shotgun.
On the night of October 12, 1992, Appellee and Thorton lured Victim to the field. Instead of scaring Victim, Appellee fired five shots at Victim using the sawed-off shotgun. Victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds
he sustained. Appellee then proceeded to eat at a local establishment where he stated that killing Victim was like killing a rabbit. At the time of the murder, Appellee was a minor.
The relevant procedural history of this case is as follows. On March 22, 1994, Appellee was convicted of first-degree murder.2 The trial court immediately sentenced him to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Sesky, 450 Pa.Super. 718, 676 A.2d 286 (1996) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 545 Pa. 670, 681 A.2d 1342 (1996).
On August 15, 1997, Appellee filed a petition pursuant to the Post–Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 – 9546. On August 11, 1998, the PCRA court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This Court affirmed that dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Seskey, 816 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 573 Pa. 716, 828 A.2d 350 (2003).
On July 19, 2010, Appellee filed his second PCRA petition. On May 1, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed that dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 627 Pa. 765, 101 A.3d 103 (2014), overruled , Montgomery v. Louisiana, –––U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
On January 27, 2016, Appellee filed his third PCRA petition. The Commonwealth conceded that, because Montgomery made the rule against mandatory LWOP sentences for minor offenders retroactive, Appellee was entitled to resentencing.3 It argued, however, that he must receive a maximum term of life imprisonment. On November 16, 2016, the PCRA court granted Appellee's PCRA petition. The trial court then immediately sentenced him to a term of 13 to 26 years' imprisonment. On November 17, 2016, Appellee filed a post-sentence motion. On December 5, 2016, the trial court granted Appellee's post-sentence motion and recommended that Appellee be immediately paroled. This timely appeal followed.4
The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review:
In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because the maximum term of imprisonment was set at 26 years instead of life.5 Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the trial court possessed unfettered sentencing discretion and it was not required to impose any minimum or maximum term of imprisonment. When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 159 A.3d 531, 532 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In order to understand the Commonwealth's illegal sentence argument, it is necessary to review the relevant Pennsylvania statutes regarding mandatory LWOP sentences for minors convicted of first or second-degree murder. The Crimes Code provides that an individual convicted of first or second-degree murder must be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a), (b). The Parole Code provides that an individual sentenced to a term of life imprisonment is not eligible for parole. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(1) ; but see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (discussed infra ). Finally, the Juvenile Act provides that the term "delinquent act" does not include the crime of murder. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
Under this statutory framework, a minor who commits first or second-degree murder must be charged as an adult. If convicted, the minor must be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment and is not eligible for parole. But see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (discussed infra ). Thus, a minor convicted of first or second-degree murder receives a mandatory LWOP sentence. But see id.
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held that mandatory LWOP sentences for minors violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–489, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Our General Assembly responded to Miller by passing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1. Section 1102.1 provides that an individual between the ages of 15 and 17 years old convicted of first-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1). The minimum term of imprisonment for such an offender can be set anywhere from 35 years to life, i.e. , LWOP. See id. Section 1102.1 further provides that an individual under 15 years old convicted of first-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(2). The minimum term of imprisonment for such an offender can be set anywhere from 25 years to life, i.e. , LWOP. See id.
Section 1102.1 provides that an individual between the ages of 15 and 17 years old convicted of second-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c)(1). The minimum term of imprisonment for such an offender can be set anywhere from 30 years to life, i.e. , LWOP. See id. Section 1102.1 further provides that an individual under 15 years old convicted of second-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c)(2). The minimum term of imprisonment for such an offender can be set anywhere from 20 years to life, i.e. , LWOP. See id.
After our General Assembly passed section 1102.1, our Supreme Court held that it does not apply to those minors, like Appellee, who were convicted of first or second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. Commonwealth v. Batts, 620 Pa. 115, 66 A.3d 286, 293 (2013) (" Batts I ") (citations omitted).
The question presented in this case is what sentencing framework applies to those minor offenders who were convicted of first or second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. As noted above, the Commonwealth argues that these offenders must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment and trial courts have the discretion to determine the appropriate minimum sentence. Appellee, on the other hand, argues that trial courts possess unfettered discretion when resentencing these offenders.
In support of his argument that the trial court had unfettered sentencing discretion, Appellee relies upon Batts I. After this case was argued, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Batts II. In that case, our Supreme Court held that whether a minor offender is eligible for LWOP is a purely legal question subject to de novo review. Batts II, 163 A.3d at 434–436. Our Supreme Court also held that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that a minor is eligible for LWOP beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 452–455.
Most importantly for our disposition of this case, our Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Batts I that:
For those defendants [convicted of first or second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012] for whom the sentencing court determines a [LWOP] sentence is inappropriate, it is our determination here that they are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon resentencing [.]
Batts II, 163 A.3d at 421, citing Batts I , 66 A.3d at 297 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). In other words, our Supreme Court merely severed "the prohibition against paroling an individual sentenced to serve life in prison in section 6137(a)(1) as applied to these offenders." Id.
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