Commonwealth v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 November 2003
• Citation: 836 A.2d 5,575 Pa. 203
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. April Georgette SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

836 A.2d 5

575 Pa. 203

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. April Georgette SMITH, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 15, 2001.

Decided November 19, 2003.

Thomas Sundmaker, Jeffrey G. Valander, Stroudsburg, for April Georgette Smith, appellant.

Bruce Lee Castor, Timothy Woodward, Michael Marino, Mary MacNeil Killinger, Patricia Eileen Coonahan, Norristown, for the Com. of PA, appellee.

Ronald T. Williamson, William H. Ryan, Harrisburg, Robert A. Graci, Pittsburgh, D. Michael Fisher, Harrisburg, for Atty. Gen. of PA.

Before: ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

Justice CASTILLE.

This case presents both state and federal search and seizure issues arising from a drug interdiction operation at a commercial bus station terminal. We affirm the order of the Superior Court below.

On November 22, 1996, Agent Ronald Paret of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office and Trooper David Hodges of the Pennsylvania State Police performed a drug interdiction investigation at the King of Prussia bus terminal in the Valley Forge Shopping Center in Montgomery County. At approximately 11:20 a.m., a Greyhound bus en route from New York to Pittsburgh made a scheduled stop at the terminal. Agent Paret and Trooper Hodges approached the driver of the bus, identified themselves officially, and requested to examine the bus tickets of the passengers. After first allowing passengers to board or to exit the bus, Agent Paret and Trooper Hodges boarded the bus.

Once inside the bus, Trooper Hodges identified himself as a police officer and explained to the passengers the purpose of the interdiction. Agent Paret and Trooper Hodges were dressed in plain clothes, but wore jackets which clearly identified them as police officers. The officers proceeded to the rear of the bus and, while Agent Paret examined the restroom for illegal drugs, Trooper Hodges began to question the passengers. The officers physically situated themselves so that the aisle remained clear for passenger movement and the bus door was open at all times. Testimony established generally that, while performing a drug interdiction, the officers would abide by the schedule of the bus; thus, once the driver indicated that it was the scheduled time to depart, the officers would conclude their investigation and leave the bus. Additionally, in order to place the passengers at ease, Agent Paret and Trooper Hodges spoke in a normal tone of voice and, if any passenger indicated an unwillingness to cooperate, the officers would simply move on to the next passenger.

The officers eventually made their way to the front row of the bus, where appellant was seated. Because she was in the front row, appellant was the last person Trooper Hodges approached. While talking with appellant, Trooper Hodges stood in the stairwell of the bus and Agent Paret stood behind appellant, leaving the aisle clear and the bus door open and accessible. Trooper Hodges asked appellant to see her ticket and identification, examined them and returned them to her. He then inquired about her trip, and appellant responded that she was going to Pittsburgh for five days. Since Trooper Hodges had noticed that appellant did not have a luggage claim ticket stapled to her bus ticket, he inquired about her possession of any luggage. Appellant responded that she had no luggage with her. Trooper Hodges observed a black bag on the floor of the bus between appellant's right foot and the side of the bus and asked appellant if the bag belonged to her. Appellant looked away and said that the bag did not belong to her. Trooper Hodges then asked the passenger sitting on appellant's left-hand side if the bag was hers. That passenger also denied ownership. Trooper Hodges then held the bag up in the front of the bus and asked the other passengers if the bag belonged to any of them. After receiving no response, the officer asked again, but no one claimed the bag.

Trooper Hodges placed the bag on the stairwell of the bus, out of sight of appellant and the other passengers, and examined it for identifying information. Trooper Hodges found a shirt and plastic bags containing zip-lock bags which appeared to contain drugs. (Subsequent testing revealed that the plastic bags contained 496 grams of crack cocaine.) Trooper Hodges testified that, at this time, he did not believe that he had probable cause to arrest appellant, albeit he believed that the bag was hers. Trooper Hodges then asked appellant to speak with him outside the bus. In making this request, the trooper did not physically touch appellant or make any show of force other than that previously described. Appellant followed Trooper Hodges from the bus. Agent Paret remained on the bus to question the other passengers who were sitting next to and behind appellant about the bag. Outside the bus, Trooper Hodges again asked appellant if the bag was hers. Appellant again denied owning the bag. Trooper Hodges advised appellant that the police would eventually be able to identify the owner of the bag through fingerprint and hair samples. Appellant stood silent for a moment and responded that the bag was hers, but that the drugs were not, and that she was transporting them for someone else.

After appellant made this statement, Trooper Hodges led her into the bus station, informed her of her Miranda¹ rights and arrested her for transporting illegal drugs. Appellant waived her Miranda rights and admitted to Trooper Hodges that she was transporting the drugs for a friend in exchange for four hundred dollars, which she needed to buy her son shoes. Incident to appellant's arrest, Trooper Hodges searched her handbag and seized two small packs of marijuana.

On February 19, 1997, appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking to suppress the physical evidence seized from the black bag and her handbag, as well as the incriminating statements she made. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Appellant then proceeded to a bench trial, at which the testimony from the suppression hearing was incorporated. Appellant was convicted of possession and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine)² and possession of marijuana.³ On December 5, 1997, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of four to eight years' imprisonment.⁴ Appellant appealed to the Superior Court.

On appeal, a divided Superior Court panel affirmed in a published opinion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 732 A.2d 1226 (Pa.Super.1999). With respect to the suppression claims, the panel majority concluded that the initial questioning on the bus was a mere encounter, relying upon the reasoning of Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), and not a seizure.⁵ The panel majority also concluded that appellant voluntarily abandoned the black bag containing the cocaine. Finally, the Superior Court concluded that the statements appellant made prior to the issuance of Miranda warnings were admissible because she was not in custody at the time. Then-President Judge McEwen dissented without opinion. Appellant now alleges, as she did below, that the suppression court erred in denying her motion to suppress the drugs and her statements. In addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion, this Court's review is limited to "the evidence for the prosecution and whatever evidence for the defense which is uncontradicted on the record as a whole." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043, 1049 (1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 523 Pa. 384, 567 A.2d 1023, 1028 (1989)). Additionally, we are bound by the facts found by the suppression court which are supported by the record. We may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from the supported facts are erroneous. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545, 751 A.2d 1153, 1156 n. 1 (2000). Since the operative facts here are not in dispute,⁶ our review is of the legal conclusions below; review of such questions of law is plenary.

In forwarding her claim on appeal, appellant cites interchangeably to the Fourth Amendment and to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and cites to cases sounding under both charters.⁷ A primary purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 "is to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures." In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). Not every encounter between citizens and the police is so intrusive as to amount to a "seizure" triggering constitutional concerns. See Commonwealth v. Boswell, 554 Pa. 275, 721 A.2d 336, 340 (1998) (opinion in support of affirmance) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). This Court has noted that there are three basic categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first category, a mere encounter or request for information, does not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second category, an investigative detention, derives from Terry v. Ohio and its progeny: such a detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, it does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. The final category, the arrest or custodial detention, must be supported by probable cause. See Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047-48; see also In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164. This Court has acknowledged this approach to police/citizen encounters under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8. See Commonwealth v. Polo, 563 Pa. 218, 759 A.2d 372, 375 (2000) (construing Article I, Section 8); Ellis, 662 A.2d at 1047 ("Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and police."). Accord In the Interest of D.M.

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