Commonwealth v. Smith
| Decision Date | 09 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | SJC–11624. |
| Citation | 471 Mass. 161,28 N.E.3d 385 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Rashidi J. SMITH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
471 Mass. 161
28 N.E.3d 385
COMMONWEALTH
v.
Rashidi J. SMITH.
SJC–11624.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.
Submitted Dec. 4, 2014.
Decided April 9, 2015.
Chauncey B. Wood, Boston, for the defendant.
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Rebecca Rose, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.
LENK, J.
The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder in the second degree in the death by shooting of fourteen year old
Marvin Constant. At the time of his arrest for the shooting, the defendant was seventeen years and five months old. The Commonwealth's evidence at trial included, among other things, incriminating statements that the defendant made to police after waiving his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to suppress these statements. He argues on appeal that their introduction at trial was error given our common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with an "interested adult" before waiving his or her Miranda rights, since he did not have such an opportunity.
The interested adult rule, as we have defined it to date, applies only to those who have not yet reached the age of seventeen. Several years after the defendant was convicted, however, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, c. 84 (2013 act), which amended an array of statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles.
The 2013 act does not affect the current case, both because it is prospective in its application and because it does not itself modify the interested adult rule, which is a creature of our common law. We therefore affirm the defendant's conviction. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to expand the reach of our rule to encompass seventeen year olds, but do so on a prospective basis.1
1. Background. a. The crime. The facts that could have been found by the jury include the following. In June, 2007, members of two gangs were present at a cookout at a home on Crescent Street in Brockton. The defendant was associated with one of the two gangs. A fight broke out at the cookout, and a window was broken.
The next day, the defendant arrived at the Crescent Street home, wearing a red sweatshirt with black sleeves. The defendant spoke to a member of the gang with which he was associated, saying that the events of the previous night had been
"messed up." The defendant then had a conversation with the victim, who belonged to the other gang.
The defendant and the victim left the house together. A few minutes later, witnesses heard three gunshots. A witness saw the victim lying in the street and a person wearing a red sweatshirt
ride off on a bicycle. An autopsy revealed that the victim had been killed by two gunshot wounds.
By happenstance, police officers were, at that time, driving an unmarked sport utility vehicle (SUV) in the area. They saw the defendant drop a bicycle to the ground, run, and hurriedly flag down and enter a passing green Honda automobile. Before getting into the vehicle, the defendant was seen clutching his waistband area in a manner that suggested to the officers that he might be concealing a weapon there. After briefly following the Honda, the detectives stopped it. They found a gun on the floor of the Honda where the defendant had been sitting. The gun's ten-bullet magazine had seven bullets in it, and the gun was jammed; that type of jam could have occurred only if the gun had been fired. Ballistics testing subsequently indicated that the gun had been used to shoot three cartridge casings and one spent projectile that were recovered in the vicinity of the victim's body.
b. Statements to police.2 The defendant, then seventeen years and five months old, was arrested and taken to the Brockton police station. The defendant previously had been involved in several delinquency cases, and had been charged with firearm-related offenses that ultimately were dismissed. Police booked the defendant and informed him of his Miranda rights. They then provided the defendant with a Miranda waiver form and asked him to read the form aloud. When the defendant had difficulty doing so, a detective read the form to the defendant, pausing to ask after each line whether the defendant understood. The defendant initialed each of the rights on the form as well as the word "YES" at the bottom of the form. He also agreed orally to waive his rights and to tell his side of the story.
During the first hour of questioning, the defendant maintained that he had not been present when the victim was shot, and that he had gotten into the green Honda only to "hang out" with a friend who was in the vehicle. When police officers told the defendant that they knew he had been at the scene and believed that he had been the shooter, the defendant said that he had nothing to add, and the interview was terminated.
On the way back to the holding cell, the defendant asked the detectives why they did not believe him. One of the detectives said, "I saw you." The defendant asked, "You were in the SUV?"
When the officer answered affirmatively, the defendant requested that the interview resume. He then told police that he had been present when the victim was shot, and that a man named "Triz" had been the shooter.
c. Proceedings. The defendant was charged with murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress his statements to police. The defendant argued, among other things, that his Miranda waiver had not been valid because he had not had a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult. After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion to suppress in a detailed written decision. The judge determined that the interested adult rule was not applicable because although, at seventeen years of age, the
defendant was a "minor," he was not a "juvenile" subject to that rule. Based on the evidence presented, including a recording of the interviews with the defendant, the judge found that "the circumstances surrounding the defendant's waiver of rights show[ ], beyond a reasonable doubt[,] that it was voluntarily and intelligently made."
At trial, the defendant testified that a friend, Terrence Young, had been the shooter. Young had died by the time of the trial. The defendant stated that he had made up the name "Triz" when he spoke to police in order to protect Young. The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, and the Appeals Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Smith, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 1116, 2013 WL 5776820 (2013). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review, limited to the issue of the application of the interested adult rule.
2. Discussion. a. Legal framework. The Commonwealth is subject to "a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination." Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 Mass. 31, 34, 570 N.E.2d 1004 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405 Mass. 497, 500, 541 N.E.2d 1006 (1989). This burden grows heavier still when the defendant is a juvenile, because studies have shown that "most juveniles do not understand the significance and protective function of the[ir] rights even when they are read the standard Miranda warnings." Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 131, 449 N.E.2d 654 (1983) (A Juvenile ). "Special caution" therefore must be exercised when police present juveniles with the option of waiving their Miranda rights, see Commonwealth v. Berry, supra at 34, 570 N.E.2d 1004, in order "to ensure that the juvenile defendant has understood his rights and the consequences of waiving them." Commonwealth v. McCra, 427 Mass. 564, 568, 694 N.E.2d 849 (1998) (citations omitted).
In A Juvenile, supra at 134, 449 N.E.2d 654, and subsequent cases, we sought to give shape to the caution appropriate in such...
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