Commonwealth v. Stofchek

• Decision Date: 26 June 1936
• Docket Number: 39
• Citation: 185 A. 840,322 Pa. 513
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Stofchek, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

185 A. 840

322 Pa. 513

Commonwealth v. Stofchek, Appellant

No. 39

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 26, 1936

Argued April 6, 1936

Appeal, No. 39, March T., 1936, by defendant, from order of Superior Court, April T., 1936, No. 11, reversing order of Q.S. Greene Co., September Sessions, 1934, No. 33, in case of Commonwealth v. Joe Stofchek. Order affirmed.

Indictment for unlawful possession of liquor.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Indictment quashed, opinion by SAYERS, P.J. Commonwealth appealed. Order reversed by Superior Court. Appeal by defendant allowed to Supreme Court.

Error assigned was action of Superior Court in sustaining the assignment of error to the judgment of the court of quarter sessions.

Order affirmed.

W Robert Thompson, with him Ambrose Bradley, of Thompson & Bradley, for appellant.

Thomas I. Guerin, Special Deputy Attorney General, with him Charles J. Margiotti, Attorney General, and Frank Throckmorton, District Attorney, for appellee.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART:

Joe Stofchek was indicted for possession of liquor in violation of section 602 (b) of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act of November 29, 1933, P.L. 15 (Special Session). The indictment was quashed on two grounds, first, that the section involved is not clearly indicated in the title of the act, and, second, that it infringed guarantees contained in our Constitution. The Superior Court reversed and we allowed an appeal to this court.

Are the penal provisions of this section of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act ^[1] sufficiently expressed in the title to comply with article III, section 3, of the Constitution? The latter is worded: "No bill . . . shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."

The Commonwealth contends that section 602 (b) is embraced in that part of the title reading: "An act to regulate and restrain the sale, importation, and use of certain alcoholic beverages." Does the word "use" mean "possession"? It is urged it does not, and that the inference therefrom is not sufficient to graft thereon the penal provision. We have stated that a purpose is not clearly expressed in the title of an act if it can be ascertained only by a process of reasoning (Phillips's Estate, 295 Pa. 349; Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. 407; Investor's Realty Co. v. Harrisburg, 281 Pa. 200; Guppy v. Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343; see also, Commonwealth v. Barbono, 56 Pa.Super. 637). But the rule in the abstract is too general and a reference to these decisions shows a clear line of distinction from the case now before us.

Appellant places his principal reliance on Commonwealth v. Barbono, supra. That case arose under the Act of June 15, 1911, P.L. 975, entitled "An act providing for the registration of bottles . . . or other containers; and forbidding the refilling of, or dealing or trafficking in, such registered bottles. . . ." The defendant there urged that the provision making "unlawful possession" of such bottles a penal offense was not indicated by the title. The objection was sustained. The title of that act discloses two definite purposes; first, the registration of containers, and, second, the regulation of the refilling or dealing or trafficking in such containers. No provision for general use is indicated by the title. The words "dealing or trafficking in" are distinctly restricted to a commercial use. The title of the Liquor Control Act is more comprehensive. The word "use" employed in it includes "possession." It would be difficult to use liquor without having it in possession. Possession is clearly a step in use, and "use" is not necessarily confined in meaning to active service.

A second phrase from the title, ". . . prohibiting certain sales or practices in, connections with, and transactions in such beverages by licensees and others," is also sufficient to give notice that possession is dealt with. But, it is urged, these words apply only to licensees, the one group of persons specifically mentioned. Appellant thus invokes the familiar maxim that to expressly name one class is to exclude all others. The principle was fully discussed in Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, and has been frequently applied under this section of the Constitution. But, as the title here refers to "licensees and others," this rule has no application; the addition of "and others" is indicative of a clear intention to include all persons generally.

The real purpose of section 3, of article III, must be considered in answering the question raised by appellant. The provision was not intended to exercise a pedantic tyranny over the grammatical efforts of legislators, nor to place them between the horns of a constructional dilemma, namely, that the title of an act must be so general or so particularized as to include all of its subject-matter, and yet not so general as to give no indication of its purpose, nor so particular as to inferentially exclude from its scope any items inadvertently omitted. As stated in Soldiers and Saliors Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, citing Carr v. AEtna A. & L. Co., 64 Pa.Super. 343, at 349, the provision is not applicable "unless a substantive matter, entirely disconnected with the named legislation, is included within the folds of the bill." It is intended to operate to exclude from the measure that which is secret and unrelated: Beckert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. 191. The history of this section indicates that this is its true purpose. ^[2]

The title of the act before us indicates two cognate legislative objects; first, to regulate and restrain the sale, importation and use of certain alcoholic beverages and to impose penalties for practices or transactions prohibited by the regulations; second, to create as a means of carrying out and enforcing the regulatory provisions, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and the State Store system. The title of the act comprehends a complete system for liquor control within the Commonwealth. It need not be an index of the provisions, nor a synopsis of the contents: Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35; Carr v. AEtna A. & L. Co., supra. It is sufficient if it give notice of their tenor to interested persons of a reasonably inquiring state of mind: Reeves v. Phila. Suburban Water Co., 287 Pa. 376; Specktor v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 295 Pa. 390; Commonwealth v. Macelwee, 294 Pa. 569; Boock's Petition, 303 Pa. 363. So long as the title indicates a general subject to which the provision involved is germane or incidental, the provision itself is sufficiently contained: Sloan v. Longcope, 288 Pa. 196; Commonwealth v. Miller, 313 Pa. 140; Boock's Petition, supra; Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132. If these established principles are applied to this case it is obvious that the title of the act indicates the intention of the legislature to provide, as in section 602 (b), for punishment of the unlawful possession of liquor.

Has the legislature then power, under article I, section 1, of the Constitution, to make punishable the possession of liquor not acquired prior to January 1, 1934, nor purchased from a State Liquor Store? That constitutional section provides: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."

But, the State possesses inherently a broad police power which transcends all other powers of government. There is therefore no unqualified right to acquire, possess, and enjoy property if the exercise of the right is inimical to the fundamental precepts underlying the police power. This court said in Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311: "The police power is the greatest and most powerful attribute of government; upon it the very existence of the State depends. . . . If the exercise of the police power should be in irreconcilable opposition to a constitutional provision or right, the police power would prevail." It needs no constitutional reservation or declaration to support it: City of Scranton v. Public Service Commission, 268 Pa. 172. And see Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265, in which the Act of May 21, 1885, P.L. 22, making manufacture, sale, and possession with an intent to sell of oleomargarine unlawful, was upheld as a valid exercise of the power. One of its well known objects is the protection of public health, and laws prohibiting the import, export, sale or transfer of articles deleterious to the public, such as intoxicating liquors are valid under it: Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31; Commonwealth v. Gardner, 297 Pa. 498. What the State can prohibit entirely, it can regulate. See Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700; Commonwealth v. Vigliotti, 271 Pa. 10, affirmed Vigliotti v. Commonwealth, 258 U.S. 403; In re Hoover, 30 F. 51.

This State has adopted many acts aimed at the beneficial supervision of the traffic in intoxicating liquors. The Brooks High License Law of May, 1887, P.L. 108, restricted the trade in such liquors to licensed persons, and established certain rules for its conduct. Among the objections made to the Brooks Law was that regulation was thereby taken out of the defined scope of the police power in that the State by creating agencies for the sale of intoxicating liquors promoted rather than repressed a public evil. We dismissed this contention in Commonwealth v. Vigliotti, supra. See also Raudenbusch's Appeal, 120 Pa. 328; Boyle's License, 8 Pa.Super. 521; Gregg's License, 36 Pa.Super. 633...