Commonwealth v. Watson

• Decision Date: 25 June 1891
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. WATSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

154 Mass. 135

27 N.E. 1003

COMMONWEALTH v. WATSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 25, 1891

COUNSEL

A.E. Pillsbury, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

T.J Morrison, for defendant.

OPINION

HOLMES J.

The motion to quash, and the exception to allowing the witness to refresh his memory from a memorandum made by him on the night of the transactions testified to, are disposed of by the foregoing case of Com. v. Clancy, 27 N.E. 1001. In the present case the defendant is indicted for being present in a room occupied, etc., and engaged in the business and employment of selling pools upon the result of a game of base-ball. It is unnecessary to state the evidence in detail. In the room were blackboards with rows of four names understood by the witnesses to be names or abbreviations of names of base-ball clubs, each row being different from the others, and the rows being numbered from 1 to 16. One witnesses asked the defendant for No. 10, which read "Brook., Pitts., Cleve., Phila.," paid some money, and received a ticket numbered 10,456 in print, with 10 upon it in pencil. Afterwards he saw the defendant, and asked him if combination 10 had won, to which the defendant answered, "No." The first exception is to allowing this witness to testify that combination 10 meant the four names in the row numbered 10, and that, as far as he knew, the names signified base-ball clubs. If the jury were not warranted in inferring as much without evidence, we are of opinion that the witness who bought the ticket, and who had been at the place a number of times, might be found by the judge to be qualified to testify to the meaning of the words used by himself and the defendant. Certainly, we are far from being able to say that the finding was clearly wrong. Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274, 276; Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 137.

A ruling was asked that there was no evidence warranting a conviction; also that certain specified transactions were wagers, not pools. These were refused, but the judge instructed the jury that he did not suppose all betting was selling pools; defined pools as in Com. v. Ferry, 146 Mass. 203, 208, 15 N.E. 484, with amplifications; and directed them that, unless they found that the defendant was thus engaged in the business of selling pools, they must acquit him. The natural inference from the form of the transaction--the witness selecting a number, and paying his money,...