Commonwealth v. Williams

• Decision Date: 16 January 1990
• Citation: 568 A.2d 1281,390 Pa.Super. 493
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tyrone Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

568 A.2d 1281

390 Pa.Super. 493

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Tyrone Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

January 16, 1990

Submitted May 23, 1989.

Neil J. Marcus, Monongahela, for appellant.

John C. Pettit, Dist. Atty., Washington, for Com appellee.

Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and KELLY, JJ.

KELLY, Judge:

In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether a police officer may formally arrest an individual whom the police officer has viewed committing a summary offense. The legality of the arrest is relevant to the derivative question of whether a search incident to the arrest was permitted under the circumstances. We find both the arrest and the search to have been lawful and affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history may be summarized as follows. In March of 1987, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer James Brice of the Borough of Donora Police Department encountered a car parked with two wheels on the street and two wheels on the sidewalk while on a routine patrol in his police cruiser. Officer Brice approached to investigate, and as he did, he observed appellant standing to the side of the illegally parked car, urinating on an adjacent building. Officer Brice then got out of the police vehicle and, not recognizing appellant, asked him for some identification. Appellant replied by offering a name and an address outside of the Borough of Donora, but conceded that he had no proof of his identity.

Based on these facts, Officer Brice informed appellant that he would be issued a citation for disorderly conduct (for public urination), and apprised appellant that he would have to accompany him back to the police station so that some form of positive identification could be made. In accordance with standard procedure of the Donora Police Department, Officer Brice then conducted a brief weapons search of appellant's person before allowing him to enter the police vehicle. While patting down appellant's pocket, Officer Brice felt a long object in the pocket of the jacket. Believing it could be a knife or another dangerous instrument, Officer Brice reached inside appellant's pocket and found eleven (11) packets of cocaine which had been lined up along the bottom of the jacket pocket. Appellant was then handcuffed and brought to the police station.

Subsequently appellant was charged with possession and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. ^[1] Appellant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. The motion was later denied. Following a bench trial appellant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Timely post-trial motions were filed and denied. Appellant was given a suspended sentence of 1-12 months. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal appellant raises two issues:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE?

II. DO THE POLICE HAVE A RIGHT TO SEARCH A DEFENDANT INCIDENT TO AN ARREST FOR A NON-VIOLENT SUMMARY OFFENSE?

(Appellant's brief at 2).

At the outset, we note that in reviewing a suppression order, our scope of review is limited primarily to questions of law. Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 516 A.2d 1211 (1986); Commonwealth v. Swint, 256 Pa.Super. 169, 389 A.2d 654 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chinea, 246 Pa.Super. 494, 371 A.2d 944 (1977). We must determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, as well as whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable. Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 377 Pa.Super. 317, 547 A.2d 387 (1988). This Court has previously stated that in measuring support for factual findings,

"... [W]e are to consider all the evidence of record which supports the finding, from whatever source, and only such evidence of record which negates the finding which, as taken in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Moreover, with respect to "uncontradicted" evidence, due regard would have to be given to the fact that a trial court may simply reject evidence offered as "not credible," even where direct contradiction is not present."

Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa.Super. 117, 130 n. 1, 546 A.2d 1185, 1191 n. 1 (1988), allocatur denied 521 Pa. 609, 557 A.2d 341 (1988) (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 387 Pa.Super. 271, ---- n. 2, 564 A.2d 174, 176 n. 2 (1989).

Instantly, appellant contends that police are powerless to conduct a search incident to a custodial arrest for a non-violent summary offense. In all such summary offense cases, appellant argues, the correct procedure for the investigating officer is to merely issue a citation. Appellant asserts that in the instant case, the police ignored the limits of their authority by arresting him for the non-violent summary offense of disorderly conduct, and by conducting a search incident to this arrest. Appellant submits, therefore, that any fruits of this search were unlawfully obtained, and therefore must be suppressed to comply with the exclusionary rule.

In response, the Commonwealth contends that appellant was lawfully arrested, and lawfully searched incident to arrest. The Commonwealth argues that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant may be arrested for a summary offense where there is a danger that the defendant will flee. The Commonwealth reasons that because appellant could not properly identify himself, and did not live in the area of the arrest, there existed the possibility that the appellant would flee without responding to any citations issued against him. Thus, the Commonwealth maintains that the arrest was both necessary and was proper, and that any evidence seized during the arrest was done so legally and properly admitted in trial against him.

In denying appellant's motion to suppress, and in denying appellant's post trial motions subsequently, the trial court embraced the position advanced by the Commonwealth. For the reasons which follow, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that appellant was lawfully arrested and the evidence obtained incident to appellant's arrest should not have been suppressed. Our reasoning is similar but not identical to that of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Allem, 367 Pa.Super. 173, 179, 532 A.2d 845, 848 (1987) (an appellate court may affirm on alternate grounds).

We begin our discussion with the observation that the exclusionary rule only bars the introduction of evidence derived from unreasonable searches or seizures. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985), citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); see generally Commonwealth v. Melson, 383 Pa.Super. 139, 556 A.2d 836 (1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). It is well established that a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable, and no justification other than that required for the arrest itself is necessary to conduct such a search. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 349 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-41 (1973); Commonwealth v. Long, 489 Pa. 369, 374, 414 A.2d 113, 115 (1980); Commonwealth v. Trenge, 305 Pa.Super. 386, 403, 451 A.2d 701, 710 (1982). Stated another way, in all cases of lawful arrests, police may fully search the person incident to the arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2036, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 689-90 (1969), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158, 45 S.Ct. 280, 287, 69 L.Ed. 543, 553 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, 655 (1914) (dicta ). Moreover, this doctrine encompasses all arrests, including those involving summary offenses. See United States v. Robinson, supra, and its companion, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). Consequently, any evidence seized as a result of a search incident to a lawful arrest is admissible in later proceedings. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947).

Applying these rulings instantly, we arrive at a simple proposition--if appellant's arrest for the summary offense was lawful, then the subsequent search of his person must have been reasonable, and therefore any evidence derived from the search was properly admitted against him. Both of appellant's contentions rest solely upon the alleged invalidity of the underlying arrest. Accordingly, we turn our discussion to an examination of the lawfulness of appellant's arrest for the non-violent summary offense of disorderly conduct.

A.

On appeal, appellant relies exclusively on Commonwealth v. Shillingford, 231 Pa.Super. 407, 332 A.2d 824 (1975), in support of his contentions. Reliance on Shillingford is severally misplaced.

Quoting a previous version of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding summary offenses, the Shillingford Court reasoned in dicta, that police may affect an arrest without a warrant for a non-traffic summary offense only when the summary offense "involves a breach of the peace, [or] endangers property or the safety of any person present." Commonwealth v. Shillingford, supra, 332 A.2d at 826, quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 102 (renumbered and amended Sept. 1, 1975). The dicta from Shillingford upon which appellant relies was based on a rule which has since been repealed and materially revised. The present version of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure contains no "breach of the peace" requirement, but instead includes only a mandate that the arrest be "specifically authorized by law." Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 51(...