Commonwealth v. Wiswesser
Decision Date | 17 December 1936 |
Docket Number | 279-1936 |
Citation | 124 Pa.Super. 251,188 A. 604 |
Parties | Commonwealth v. Wiswesser, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued September 30, 1936
Appeal by defendant, from judgment and sentence of Q. S. Berks Co March Sessions, 1936, No. 248, in case of Commonwealth v Louis E. Wiswesser.
Indictment for aiding and abetting county treasurer, in fraudulent conversion to his own name, fraudulent investment, and the defalcation, of public moneys entrusted to treasurer. Before Schaeffer, P. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Verdict of guilty and judgment and sentence thereon. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, were various rulings on evidence.
Judgment reversed and new trial awarded.
B. D. Oliensis, with him Wm. Abbott Witman, Jr., J. Howard Jacobs and Emanuel Weiss, for appellant.
Mark C. McQuillen, Assistant District Attorney, with him John A. Rieser, District Attorney, for appellee.
Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker, James and Rhodes, JJ.
The defendant was tried on an indictment containing three counts, which charged him with having aided and abetted Robert R. Gerhart, the county treasurer of Berks County, in (1) the fraudulent conversion to his own use, (2) the fraudulent investment, and (3) the defalcation, of public moneys entrusted to him as such treasurer. There was ample evidence to support the verdict. If this court possessed the broad powers committed to the judges of the English Court of Criminal Appeal by the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, and particularly the power to dismiss an appeal if they considered that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred, even though they were of opinion that the point raised by the appeal might be decided in favor of the appellant, we would dismiss this appeal. But by the long established practice in this commonwealth, which we are required to follow -- (Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 212, sec. 10, p. 220) -- the appeal must be sustained and a new trial granted if substantial error was committed in the court below, which may have influenced the verdict to the defendant's injury. (Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388; Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 141, 142, 160 A. 602; Com. v. Loomis, 270 Pa. 254, 261 to 263, 113 A. 428; Com. v. Mull, 316 Pa. 424, 427, 175 A. 418; Com. v. Croson, 243 Pa. 19, 89 A. 821; Com. v. Weiner, 101 Pa.Super. 295, 299). It is only harmless error, such as the appellate court is satisfied did no injury to the defendant, which may be disregarded on appeal. (Com. v. Varano, 258 Pa. 442, 102 A. 131; Com. v. Emery, 273 Pa. 517, 117 A. 338; Com. v. Martin, 302 Pa. 118, 153 A. 141; Com. v. Craig, 19 Pa.Super. 81, 96). A careful reading of the record in the case satisfies us that substantial error was committed by the learned trial judge in the allowance of questions asked the defendant on his cross-examination, and the answers to them (Com. v. Craig, supra), as well as in his own examination of the defendant, and that this error may have influenced the jury, to the defendant's injury, in arriving at their verdict. Hence we are obliged to order a new trial.
We shall not discuss in detail the nineteen assignments of error filed by the appellant. We have given them all due consideration and are of opinion that none of them, except those referred to above, -- assignments two and three -- requires a reversal of the judgment. A considerable part of the brief and argument was devoted by appellant's present counsel to a point not raised in the court below nor covered by an assignment of error: It is alleged that the time laid in the indictment for the commission of said offenses, -- February 21, 1936 -- was subsequent to the expiration of the county treasurer's term of office, which is said to have been, January 6, 1936. As before stated, the matter was not raised in the court below by motion to quash or demurrer, nor brought to the attention of that court by any motion filed before sentence was imposed. The defendant went to trial without objection to the alleged defect in the indictment, if it existed. The testimony in the case, which, by the Act of April 18, 1919, P. L. 72, is made part of the record on appeal, shows conclusively that all the acts constituting the offenses charged were done or committed while the county treasurer, Gerhart, was still in office. Had the point first argued in this court been raised in the court below the indictment could have been amended to conform to the facts proved. The Criminal Procedure Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, in sections 11, 12 and 13, makes liberal provision for the amendment of indictments. In Myers et al. v. Com. 79 Pa. 308, after the jury had been sworn, the court ordered the time laid in the indictment, wherever it occurred, to be changed from October 11, 1874 to November 11, 1874, and the Supreme Court held the amendment was within the Act of 1860. In Com. v. Tassone, 246 Pa. 543, 92 A. 713, after verdict of guilty in a murder case, the court permitted the date laid in the indictment, October 31, 1914, to be amended to October 31, 1913, as the former was a palpable error in that it charged that the offense had been committed more than six months after the date of trial. The Supreme Court, on appeal, sustained the action of the lower court, saying: See also Com. v. Lingle, 120 Pa.Super. 434, 182 A. 802; Com v. Schoen, 25 Pa.Super. 211; Com. v. Brennan, 193 Pa. 567, 44 A. 498. As it was amendable if the point had been raised on the trial, it is too late to raise it now. Furthermore, apart from the evidence which establishes that the acts complained of were committed during the county treasurer's term of office and within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations, there is nothing in the record to show that the treasurer's term of office expired before February 21, 1936, the date laid in the indictment. There are no facts in the record, apart from the evidence, which show any mistake or error whatever in the date laid in the indictment.
The relevant facts, as brought out in the trial, may be summarized from the opinion filed by the learned President Judge of the court below, as follows:
The evidence in the case, as we view it, was such as to leave one with an open mind no reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that Gerhart was cashing these checks out of county funds -- they were brought to the county treasurer's office and cashed there; that they were not intended to be presented to the bank or banks on which they were drawn for payment; that when defendant's checks and those of Deppen Manufacturing Company were drawn and cashed there was not sufficient funds in the drawer's account to meet them, and that the defendant knew this. The evidence was so convincing and overwhelming that the trial judge, in our opinion, committed no error in his charge to the jury in saying: Then after a full review...
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