Commonwealth v. Wynton W.

• Decision Date: 19 May 2011
• Docket Number: SJC–10805.
• Citation: 947 N.E.2d 561,267 Ed. Law Rep. 332,459 Mass. 745
• Parties: COMMONWEALTHv.WYNTON W., a juvenile.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

459 Mass. 745

947 N.E.2d 561

267 Ed. Law Rep. 332

COMMONWEALTH

v.WYNTON W., a juvenile.

SJC–10805.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 8, 2011.Decided May 19, 2011.

Amanda J. Rowan, Assistant District Attorney (Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.Viktor Theiss for the juvenile.Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, & DUFFLY, JJ.¹

SPINA, J.

In this matter we consider a question reported by a judge in the Juvenile Court: “Whether a knife that is not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( b ), may constitute a ‘dangerous weapon’ as that term is used in G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( j ), when that knife is not being used in a dangerous manner.” The matter came before the Juvenile Court on the juvenile's motion to dismiss and, on the oral motions of both the juvenile and the Commonwealth, was reported pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). We consider the matter on the stipulated facts and hold that the phrase “dangerous weapon” as used in G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( j ), should be given its common-law meaning. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Facts. The parties have stipulated that the police report attached to the application for criminal complaint constitutes an accurate and full statement of the facts. That report is summarized as follows:

On April 1, 2009, Officer Michael Gough of the Marlborough police department was dispatched to Assabet Valley Regional High School on a report that a student, the juvenile, had been found in possession of a knife. When Officer Gough met with the juvenile in the dean's office, the juvenile admitted that the knife in question was his and that his father had given it to him three days before on the occasion of his sixteenth birthday. The knife had fallen out of his pocket in shop class and had been seen on the floor by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. The knife was a small folding knife with a blade approximately two inches long with a black plastic and metal handle. The juvenile's father confirmed for Officer Gough that the knife had indeed been a recent birthday present.

The school suspended the juvenile pursuant to its own procedures. He was then charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( j ). The juvenile filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 13(c), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004), on the ground that the knife in question is not a dangerous weapon. The judge determined that the question of law presented in the motion is dispositive of the case and the parties both moved to report the above-quoted question to the Appeals Court. We granted the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review.

2. Analysis. The reported question hinges on the meaning of the phrase “dangerous weapon” in § 10 ( j ), which provides:

“Whoever, not being a law enforcement officer, and notwithstanding any license obtained by him under the provisions of [G.L. c. 140], carries on his person a firearm ... or other dangerous weapon in any building or on the grounds of any elementary or secondary school, college or university without the written authorization of the [school] shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.”

Possession of a dangerous weapon by a student or any other individual on the grounds of an educational institution is thus a misdemeanor.²

Id. However, the term “dangerous weapon” is not specifically defined in § 10, in the remainder of G.L. c. 269, or elsewhere in the General Laws. Interpretation of the term as used in § 10 ( j ) appears to be a question of first impression.

“We interpret a statute ‘according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed in the ordinary and approved usage of the language ... to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’ ” Commonwealth v. Deberry, 441 Mass. 211, 215, 804 N.E.2d 911 (2004) ( Deberry ), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). “Where the statutory language is not conclusive, we may ‘turn to extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our interpretation.’ ” Deberry, supra, quoting Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 435, 772 N.E.2d 578 (2002). “Where the Legislature does not define a term, we presume that its intent is to incorporate the common-law definition of that term, ‘unless the intent to alter it is clearly expressed.’ ” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 747, 802 N.E.2d 88 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 688, 690, 467 N.E.2d 846 (1984). “Where the Legislature uses the same words in several sections which concern the same subject matter, the words ‘must be presumed to have been used with the same meaning in each section.’ ” Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 188–189, 248 N.E.2d 500 (1969), quoting Liddell v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 283 Mass. 340, 346, 187 N.E. 39 (1933). Finally, “[i]f it is a criminal statute [that] we interpret, the rule of lenity requires that the defendant be given the benefit of the ambiguity.” Deberry, supra at 216, 804 N.E.2d 911.

A number of analytical approaches are suggested to us on appeal. The motion judge, through the phrasing of the reported question, posits that the proper definition for the phrase “dangerous weapon” may be the list of items prohibited pursuant to G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( b ). In contrast, the juvenile argues that the list of items prohibited under that statute is somewhat arbitrary and limited and that, as a result, § 10 ( j ) is better interpreted by giving the phrase “dangerous weapon” its ordinary meaning under the common law. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 825, 828, 798 N.E.2d 315 (2003). Finally, the Commonwealth argues that these approaches are incorrect, offers no alternative definition, but proposes that the absence of a firm definition does not require that the statute be held void for vagueness because a separate statute, G.L. c. 71, § 37H, provides that “[a]ny student who is found on school premises ... in possession of a dangerous weapon, including, but not limited to, a gun or a knife ... may be subject to expulsion.”

Considering these positions, we begin our analysis by noting the State's extraordinary responsibility to ensure the safety of students in the educational institutions of the Commonwealth. See Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 131, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995) (“the Legislature's and school officials' duty to provide children an adequate public education includes the duty to provide a safe and secure environment in which all children can learn”). This responsibility grants the Legislature authority to regulate conduct by students in schools that “would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult,” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), or that might be appropriate if occurring outside of the school setting. The case before us does not present a question of the Legislature's authority to protect students in schools, however, but rather a question of what the Legislature intended when enacting § 10 ( j ).

Section 10 ( j ) renders it a criminal offense to “carry[ ] on his person a firearm ... or other dangerous weapon in any building or on the grounds of any ... school.” Section 10 ( j ) makes carrying a dangerous weapon a criminal offense, and includes no specific intent requirement. Id. The crucial language of § 10 ( j ), exactly which objects are prohibited, is not defined and therefore we must look to extrinsic aids in interpreting the statute. Id. See Deberry, supra. We note that the phrase “dangerous weapon” has a defined meaning under the common law that is routinely applied to those statutory crimes that have a dangerous weapon element. See Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 529, 939 N.E.2d 1157 (2010). Under the common law of Massachusetts, dangerous weapons include those objects that are dangerous per se—“designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm” and “for the purpose of bodily assault or defense,” Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, 402 N.E.2d 1051 (1980)—as well as those objects that are dangerous as used—items that are not dangerous per se but “become dangerous weapons because they ‘are used in a dangerous fashion.’ ” Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 310, 741 N.E.2d 827 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, supra at 304, 402 N.E.2d 1051. “The interpretation of well-defined words and phrases in the common law carries over to statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter.” 2B N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambre Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50:3, at 176 (7th ed. 2008). We presume, therefore, that the Legislature's decision to use a term with a common-law meaning in § 10 ( j ) indicates an intention to adopt that common-law definition.

The application of this rule of construction is bolstered by the use of the phrase “dangerous weapon” in similar statutes and the general regulatory framework. See Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra. The most closely analogous provision, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( b ), is contained in the same statute as § 10 ( j ) and establishes the statutory crime of carrying a dangerous weapon. Section 10 ( b ) contains two parts, the first of which does not include the phrase “dangerous weapon” but prohibits the carrying of:

“any stiletto, dagger or device or case which enables a knife with a locking blade to be drawn at a locked position, any ballistic knife, or any knife with a detachable blade capable of being propelled by any mechanism, dirk knife, any knife having a double-edged blade, or a switch knife, or any...