Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v. Schaffer

• Decision Date: 16 June 1994
• Citation: 84 N.Y.2d 148,615 N.Y.S.2d 644,639 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: , 639 N.E.2d 1 COMMUNITY BOARD 7 OF the BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN, Respondent, v. Richard L. SCHAFFER, as Director of the New York City Department of City Planning, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 644

615 N.Y.S.2d 644

84 N.Y.2d 148, 639 N.E.2d 1

COMMUNITY BOARD 7 OF the BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN, Respondent, v. Richard L. SCHAFFER, as Director of the New York City Department of City Planning, et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Argued April 26, 1994.

Decided June 16, 1994.

[84 N.Y.2d 150] [639 N.E.2d 2]

Paul A. Crotty, Corpor. Counsel of New York City (Barry P. Schwartz and Leonard Koerner, of counsel), for appellants

[84 N.Y.2d 151] Sam Sue, New York City, and Robert M. Levy, for respondent.

Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York City (Jonathan I. Blackman and David S. Miller, of counsel), for Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger and others, amici [84 N.Y.2d 152] curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

Petitioner, a community board established by the New York City Charter (N.Y. City Charter § 2800), brought the present proceeding to challenge respondents' right to deny it access to certain documents under the New York State Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). The only issue on this appeal is whether petitioner, a legislatively created entity, has the capacity to maintain a proceeding such as this. In holding that it does not, we stress that the question of petitioner's capacity to sue is a matter allied with but conceptually distinct from the question of its standing and that, in this case, the standards for establishing the former were not satisfied.

Petitioner community board represents a district in Manhattan that encompasses the Penn Central railyards, a tract that runs between the Hudson River and West End Avenue and is bounded by West 59th and West 72nd Streets. Under the City Charter's Uniform Land Use Review Procedure ("ULURP"), petitioner's responsibilities include studying proposed changes in land use within its district and making recommendations to the Borough President and City Planning Commission regarding such proposals (N.Y. City Charter § 197-c[e].

In 1990, petitioner wrote to the Department of City Planning requesting certain material that had been prepared in connection with a proposal to erect "Trump City," a massive office, residential and commercial complex, on the Penn Central railyards tract. Because the proposal entailed zoning and land use changes, the project was subject to ULURP review (see, N.Y. City Charter § 197-c). In seeking the project's draft "restrictive declaration" and all correspondence relating to it, ¹ petitioner invoked the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law §§ 84-90), which requires government agencies to provide the public with access to their records except in certain enumerated circumstances.

The Planning Department's Records Access Officer denied petitioner's FOIL request, asserting that the documents sought were exempt "inter-agency" or "intra-agency" materials and that their disclosure would "impair present or imminent contract awards or collective bargaining negotiations" (see, Public Officers Law § 87[2][c], [g]. This determination was subsequently upheld by the Department's Appeals Officer (see, Public Officers Law § 89[4][a].

The Department's decision prompted petitioner to commence the present CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel respondents to disclose the requested material. In support of its position, petitioner cited the provisions of FOIL, as well as the provisions of ULURP and the City Charter that authorize its participation in land use decisions such as this one (N.Y. City Charter § 197-c[e]; § 2800[d][3], [17]; [e]. Respondents then moved for dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner did not have the " capacity" under the City Charter to bring a judicial challenge to the Planning Department's FOIL decision.

The Supreme Court rejected respondents' dismissal motion, concluding that petitioner had "standing" to sue. Noting that petitioner was seeking only the limited relief of document disclosure rather than "ultimate or complete relief," the court distinguished prior cases holding that community boards lack the requisite capacity to bring suit (150 Misc.2d 770, 774, 570 N.Y.S.2d 769). Reaching the merits, the Supreme Court granted the petition, concluding that petitioner was entitled to disclosure of the requested documents.

The Appellate Division upheld the Supreme Court's decision, reasoning that petitioner's request for relief was " 'within the zone of interest to be protected' by New York City Charter § 197-c(e)" and that "there [was] no clear legislative intent to negate review of respondents' denial of access to the records" (183 A.D.2d 422, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1010). Following judicial resolution of petitioners' outstanding request for attorney fees (see, Public Officers Law § 89[4][c], the Supreme Court rendered final judgment in favor of petitioner, and this Court granted respondents' motion for leave to appeal. ² The appeal brings up for review the Appellate Division's prior nonfinal order.

Initially, we note that we do not deem it appropriate to dismiss the proceeding for mootness, despite the facts that the Trump City proposal has been scaled down to the less ambitious Riverside South project, petitioner has completed its review of the project and submitted its recommendations and the FOIL request for documents has been withdrawn. The issue presented here--whether a community board has the capacity to bring an article 78 proceeding to enforce its ostensible FOIL rights--is one that is likely to recur, particularly in view of the community boards' responsibilities under ULURP. Moreover, the issue is one that will typically evade review because of the relatively short time frame in which those responsibilities must be carried out (see, N.Y. City Charter § 197-c). Finally, the issue is both novel and substantial, since it has not yet been considered by this Court and has unquestionable significance for the way in which land use decisions are made within New York City. Thus, the exception to the mootness doctrine that was delineated in Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714-715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 is applicable.

Having concluded that the proceeding need not be dismissed for mootness, we turn now to the question presented by the parties for our review: whether petitioner has capacity to bring this proceeding. We note at the outset that the concept of capacity is often confused with the concept of standing, but the two legal doctrines are not interchangeable (see, Matter of Pooler v. Public Serv. Commn., 58 A.D.2d 940, 397 N.Y.S.2d 425, affd. on mem. below 43 N.Y.2d 750, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797; see also, Matter of Association of Bds. of Visitors of N.Y. State Facilities for Mentally Disabled v. Prevost, 98 A.D.2d 260, 471 N.Y.S.2d 342). "Standing" is an element of the larger question of "justiciability" (see, Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 769, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034; Matter of Dairylea Coop. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 9, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451, 339 N.E.2d 865). The various tests that have been devised to determine standing are designed to ensure that the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome so as to "cast[ ] the dispute 'in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution' " (Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, supra, 77 N.Y.2d at 772-773, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034, quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-221, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2932, 41 L.Ed.2d 706; see, Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530, 106 N.E. 675). Often informed by considerations of public policy (Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, supra, 77 N.Y.2d at 769, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034), the standing analysis is, at its foundation, aimed at advancing the judiciary's self-imposed policy of restraint, which precludes the issuance of advisory opinions (see generally, Cuomo v. Long Is. Light. Co., 71 N.Y.2d 349, 354, 525 N.Y.S.2d 828, 520 N.E.2d 546).

"Capacity," in contrast, concerns a litigant's power to appear and bring its grievance before the court. The concept of a lack of capacity, which has also occasionally been intermingled with the analytically distinct concept of a failure to state a cause of action, does not admit of precise or comprehensive definition (see, Ward v. Petrie, 157 N.Y. 301, 51 N.E. 1002; 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac. p 3211.17). Capacity, or the lack thereof, sometimes depends purely upon a litigant's status. A natural person's status as an infant, an adjudicated incompetent or, formerly, a felony prisoner, for example, could disqualify that individual from seeking relief in court (see, Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 239 App.Div. 253, 267 N.Y.S. 719; Garner v. Garner, 59 Misc.2d 29, 297 N.Y.S.2d 463; CPLR 1201; but see, Civil Rights Law § 79[2]; § 79-a[2] [removing disqualification of felony prisoners to sue in court]. Additionally, the capacity question has often arisen in connection with controversies involving trustees (see, Siegel, N.Y.Prac. § 261 [2d ed].

Another category of capacity problems--the category at issue here--arises in the context of suits brought by artificial entities. Business corporations, for example, are creatures of statute and, as such, require statutory authority to sue and be sued (see, Business Corporation Law § 202[a][2]; see also, § 1005[a][1]; § 1006[a][4] [dissolved corporations]; § 1312 [foreign corporations doing business in New York]. Similarly, unincorporated associations, which are voluntary congregate entities, are accorded the capacity to bring suit through their presidents or treasurers by statute (General Association Law § 12); see, Ayew v. Hawes & Co., 250 App.Div. 596, 295 N.Y.S. 49.

Governmental entities created by legislative enactment present similar capacity problems. Being artificial creatures of statute, such entities have neither an inherent nor a common- right to sue. Rather, their right to sue, if it exists at all, must be derived...