Conde v. City of Schenectady

• Decision Date: 02 October 1900
• Citation: 164 N.Y. 258,58 N.E. 130
• Parties: CONDE v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

164 N.Y. 258

58 N.E. 130

CONDE

v.CITY OF SCHENECTADY et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 2, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Third department.

Action by Benjamin L. Conde against the city of Schenectady and others to vacate an assessment. From a judgment of the appellate division affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered on the decision of the court at special term (51 N. Y. Supp. 854), defendants appeal. Reversed.

S. W. Jackson, for appellants.

Robert J. Landon, for respondent.

CULLEN, J.

This action was brought to set aside an assessment imposed for the re-paving of State street, in the city of Schenectady, and to restrain a threatened sale for nonpayment of the assessment. By section 51 of the charter of the city (chapter 385, Laws 1862, as amended by chapter 294, Laws 1890; chapter 190, Laws 1893), it is provided that no ordinance shall be adopted directing the pavement of the carriagewayof a street with any other material than cobblestone, broken stone, or gravel, except upon a petition in writing, duly proved and acknowledged, by owners of lots abutting on the street constituting at least one-fourth of the frontage thereon. By sections 52 and 53 it is further provided that no ordinance shall be adopted until a hearing has been given all persons interested, after publication of the proposed ordinance. In July, 1894, a petition was presented to the common council, signed by the plaintiff and others, asking for the paving of State street with Trinidad sheet asphalt pavement, excepting the space occupied by the railroad tracks, which it was asked should be paved with granite blocks. Thereupon the common council adopted a proposed ordinance for paving the street with ‘asphalt sheet pavenment.’ After publication and a hearing, the common council, on July 31st, enacted the proposed ordinance. The common council then adopted specifications for the work by which it prescribed that the paving should be laid of ‘the best quality of refined lake asphalt [distinctly excepting land or overflow asphalt] and heavy petroleum oil, unmixed with any of the products of coal tar.’ Bids for the work were advertised for. The contract was awarded to the Metropolitan Paving & Construction Company of the city of New York, which was the lowest bidder. The street was repaved under this contract with Trinidad asphalt, and an assessment for the cost laid on the abutting property. No attack on the character of the work is made, and no proof was adduced showing any fraud in the award of the contract or in the charge made for the work thereunder. The assessment, however, is alleged to be void because of irregularities and illegalities committed by the common council in the proceedings to effect the improvement and in laying the assessment therefor, which invalidity, it is contended, will not appear on the face of the proceedings, since by the charter the resolution of the common council making the assessment is presumptive evidence in all courts that the assessment was legally imposed, and that all notices and proceedings required therefor were duly given and taken. The points of attack on the assessment are numerous, and it is necessary to consider them in detail.

The charter (section 59) requires the cost of the improvement to be apportioned upon the lots of land abutting on the street ‘according to the number of feet frontage upon the same.’ It is claimed that such a rule of assessment is determined by the supreme court of the United States (Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443) to be in contravention of the federal constitution as taking property without due process of law. We think that a plain distinction can be drawn between the Norwood Case and the one before us. In the former, the improvement was the opening of a street through the lands of the plaintiff, in which he was undoubtedly entitled to compensation for the land taken,-a right of which he could not be constitutionally deprived. The same statute authorized the local authorities to assess the cost of the improvement and the expense of the proceeding upon the remaining lands of the plaintiff according to frontage and regardless of benefit. The effect of this double proceeding of eminent domain and taxation was that the plaintiff lost his land without compensation, and was compelled to pay the expense of having the land taken away from him. These provisions of law were held to violate the federal constitution. In the present case no land is taken from the plaintiff. The proceeding is purely in the exercise of the power of taxation. That the land abutting on the street is benefited by the pavement or repavement of the street and should bear the expense seems very clear. Even where no provision is made by law for the apportionment of the expense according to the frontage of the land abutting on the street, the equity of the principle is so apparent that the rule has been almost universally adopted through the municipalities of this state. The case differs from the opening of a street or avenue, the main object of which improvement may, in special cases, be not to benefit the abutting land, but to afford access and communication between separate parts of the city or village, and thus inure to the advantage of the whole municipality. It seems to us that this distinction is justified by the previous decision of the supreme court in Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 18 Sup. Ct. 521, 42 L. Ed. 943, and Leominster v. Connant, 139 Mass. 384,12 N. E. 690, the latter of which is cited with approval in the Norwood and Parsons Cases. But, whether the distinction sought to be drawn is well or ill founded, there are two sufficient answers to the plaintiff's claim in this respect-First. If the statute is unconstitutional and void, the invalidity of the assessment is apparent, and an action in equity to set it aside as a cloud upon title cannot be maintained. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183. Second. The plaintiff was one of the petitioners for the improvement. The only power the city had in the premises was to do the work at the cost of the abutting owners, to be apportioned among them according to frontage. He necessarily asked that the work be done under that statutory rule, and thereby waived any...