State v. Pillsbury
| Decision Date | 06 February 1901 |
| Docket Number | 12,439 - (25) |
| Parties | STATE v. JOHN S. PILLSBURY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
In proceedings in the district court for Hennepin county to enforce payment of delinquent taxes on real estate, John S Pillsbury interposed an answer and defense so far as judgment was demanded for an instalment of an assessment levied against defendant's land for construction of a sewer in front thereof. The case was tried before Pond, J., who found in favor of defendant, and certified to the supreme court for its determination the following points:
1. Do the provisions of the charter under which the sewer was constructed, and the assessment levied therefor, contravene Const. art. 9, § 1, in that they create inequality of taxation?
2. Do said provisions contravene Const. art. 1, § 13, and Const. (U.S.) amend. 14, § 1, in that they authorize the taking of private property for public uses without just compensation therefor?
3. Do said provisions contravene Const. (U.S.) amend. 14, § 1 in that they deprive a person of his property without due process of law?
4. Are said provisions in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and illegal and void?
5. Is plaintiff entitled to recover any part of said local assessment?
Modified.
City of Minneapolis -- Local Improvement -- Notice.
In the charter of the city of Minneapolis (chapter 10, § 8), relating to special improvements and assessments therefor, it is provided that when the city council shall determine to make a certain improvement, and shall designate in a general way the character and extent thereof, and the material to be used, the city engineer shall make and report to the council an estimate of the cost, and various other matters, and that a brief minute of the reception of such report shall be made and published in the record of the proceedings of the city council, which publication shall be held to be sufficient notice to all persons concerned. Held, that the publication provided for is sufficient notice to the property owner of the instituting of the proceedings in question; and held, also, that under other provisions of the same section he is given an opportunity to be heard before the council in respect to all matters involved in the proposed improvements.
Assessment for Sewer -- "Second Plan."
The manner and method provided in the charter (chapter 10, § 8) for assessing and apportioning taxes upon abutting property where a sewer has been constructed in the street upon which such property fronts, known as the "Second Plan," cannot be sustained. The assessment and apportionment under this plan are arbitrary and unlawful. The basis which must govern in such cases, viz. that the abutting property is peculiarly and specially benefited by the improvement, and therefore benefits must be considered, is wholly ignored. These provisions are repugnant to article 1, § 13, and article 9, § 1, of the state constitution, and also to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.
Under the allegations of the answer and a stipulation of facts made by the parties, it is held that the court below was in error when it ordered, in effect, that a certain part of the assessment for the sewer in question, equal to the cost and also equal to the benefits to the property, should be excluded from the judgment.
Louis A. Reed, County Attorney, C. S. Jelley, J. M. Pulliam and L. A. Dunn, for plaintiff.
The provisions of the charter, under which the sewer was constructed and the assessment levied, do not contravene section 1, art. 9, of the state constitution in that they create inequality of taxation. Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 205 (219); Sanborn v. Commissioners of Rice Co., 9 Minn. 258 (273); Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45. Nor do the provisions of the charter contravene section 1, art. 9, of the state constitution, nor section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. It was competent for the legislature to provide the notice prescribed by the provisions of the charter. Such notice constitutes due process of law, and the notice, having been given in the manner required by the charter, was sufficient. It is sufficient to give defendant an opportunity to be heard under the general statutes in proceedings to enforce the collection of the assessment, and defendant has had the required opportunity to be heard upon all objections, and therefore has had his day in court. County of Hennepin v Bartleson, 37 Minn. 343; State v. Reis, 38 Minn. 371; Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494; Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232; State v. Board of Public Works, 27 Minn. 442.
Under the rule laid down by some of the authorities, all that is ever required in the way of notice to constitute due process of law is that the property owner have an opportunity at some time before some tribunal authorized to have a hearing with reference to the improvement and to make his objections. The weight of authority probably sustains this position, although there are well-considered cases which hold that no notice in case of assessments is required, either under the state or federal constitutions. Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 F. 385; Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. 546, note 548; Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429; Law v. Johnston, 118 Ind. 261; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Nevin v. Roach, 86 Ky. 492; Yeomans v. Riddle, 84 Iowa 147; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa 508; Stewart v. Board, 30 Iowa 9, 28; Nichols v. City, 23 Conn. 189.
Defendant, by defending under the provisions of the general law against the collection of the assessment, had in the trial court an opportunity to raise all objections that could have been raised at any stage of the proceedings, and to receive full consideration from the court on all such objections. This is especially true in this case, as the objections raised go to the validity of the law itself, and not to the regularity of any of the proceedings of the city in ordering the improvement or the levying of the assessment or of any of the proceedings with reference thereto. Such being the case, defendant cannot claim that he has been deprived of any of his constitutional rights. If that be true, he cannot be heard at this time to question the legality of the notice prescribed or of any of the proceedings with reference to making the improvement or assessments. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345; McEneney v. Town, 125 Ind. 407; Walker v. Boston, 3 Cush. 1; City v. Eastern, 98 Mass. 431; Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa 261; In matter of Village of Middletown, 82 N.Y. 196; Barber v. Edgerton, 125 Ind. 455; Scott v. City of Toledo, supra; Adams v. Fisher, 63 Tex. 651; City v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420, 429; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 803; Finnell v. Kates, 19 Oh. St. 405; Highland v. City, 54 Tex. 527, 534. By weight of authority, it seems to be fairly well settled that some notice at some stage of the proceedings must be given and an opportunity at some time must be afforded to the owner to be heard and to defend; also that where notice is required by the law by express terms, such notice must be given. There are numerous well-settled cases, however, where it is held that no notice is necessary in levying special assessments for public improvements under either the state or federal constitution, more than is given by the proceedings and the provisions of the law itself authorizing such assessments to be made in the manner prescribed. Davis v. City, 84 Va. 861; Finnell v. Kates, supra; Inhabitants v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R.I. 50; In matter of De Peyster, 80 N.Y. 565; Dunning v. Township, 44 Mich. 518. See Kelly v. Minneapolis City, 57 Minn. 294.
Judgment should have been rendered for at least the actual cost per front foot of the sewer in front of defendant's premises. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, is distinguishable. Cass Farm v. City, 124 Mich. 433; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Webster v. City, 9 N.D. 208; State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 293.
Fred B. Snyder, for defendant.
The assessment is void for the want of equality. Benefits should be the basis of assessment. While under the 1869 amendment of Const. art. 9, § 1, it is possible for the legislature to provide for apportionment of the tax on the property fronting or the property benefited, or both, the general rule that taxes shall be as nearly equal as may be is not abrogated or changed. Noonan v. City of Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 202; State v. District Court of Hennepin Co., 33 Minn. 235, 245; State v. District Court of Ramsey Co., 33 Minn. 295, 306. See Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 326 (366). The amendment does not empower the legislature to authorize an assessment wholly disregarding the fundamental rule of benefits. A distinction in this respect should not be made between the power to make an assessment on property fronting on the improvement from the power to place it upon the property benefited. State v. District Court of Hennepin Co., supra; Noonan v. City of Stillwater, supra; State v. District Court of Ramsey Co., supra; City v. Reis, 38 Minn. 371, 373.
The limitations placed on the legislature by the foregoing provision are that it may authorize municipal corporations to make an assessment, so long as it does not violate the rules of uniformity and equality for local improvements by the front foot or on the property benefited, or both, in such a manner as it may prescribe. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 761; State v. District Court of Hennepin Co., supra. In carrying out its power, the legislature in its discretion may, having regard to benefits, determine what amount should be raised and for what purpose, and mark out the boundaries of the...
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