Conley v. Finn

• Decision Date: 19 May 1898
• Citation: 50 N.E. 460,171 Mass. 70
• Parties: CONLEY et ux. v. FINN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

171 Mass. 70

50 N.E. 460

CONLEY et ux. v. FINN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 19, 1898

COUNSEL

Patten & Nichols, for plaintiffs.

D.C Delano, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

This is a bill to compel specific performance by the defendant of his contract to purchase a lot of land with a house upon it. The defense is that the plaintiffs do not offer to give a good title. They tendered to the defendant a warranty deed of the premises, subject to a mortgage, which by the terms of the contract, he was to assume and pay, as a part of the consideration. It is agreed that this deed gives a perfect title to the property, unless there is an incumbrance or a cloud upon the title, growing out of the fact that a deed from Nathan Conant to George Footman, under which the title is claimed, and which bears date February 11 1839, was not acknowledged until August 3, 1859, nor recorded until August 4th of the same year. George Footman, the grantee, died in March, 1859, leaving a will, which was duly proved and allowed. The house and land in question were included in the executor's inventory, as a part of his estate. The title of George Footman, if he had any, has passed by mesne conveyances to the plaintiff. Among these conveyances are two warranty deeds,--one from Edwin Rice to Henry T. Wheeler, dated April 23, 1868, and recorded April 28, 1868, and one from John H. Wheeler and others, being all the heirs of Henry T. Wheeler, to the plaintiff, dated June 20, 1889, and recorded June 26, 1889. It is agreed that there is testimony from credible witnesses, who were in a position to know the facts, which tends strongly to show that, from a time prior to 1872, Henry T. Wheeler, and after him his heirs, and after them the plaintiff, occupied the premises under a claim of ownership, living in the house, and maintained a continuous and undisturbed possession from that time until the present, and that none of them ever heard of any claim by Nathan Conant or his heirs, or any person representing them. Albert H. Conant testified he is a son of Nathan Conant; that his father resided in this commonwealth from 1832 to 1876, and died a resident thereof; that neither said Nathan nor his heirs were ever of unsound mind; and that he never heard of any claim being made by Nathan Conant or his heirs to the premises. It is not suggested that there is any evidence to contradict any of this testimony. The question is whether the fact that the deed from Conant to Footman was not acknowledged or recorded until after the death of Footman makes the plaintiffs' title so doubtful and uncertain that the defendant ought not to be compelled to take the property and pay for it. The general rule is that, in order to maintain a suit for specific performance against a purchaser of real estate, the plaintiff must show that the title is good, beyond a reasonable doubt. Sturtevant v. Jacques, 14 Allen, 523; Hayes v. Cemetery, 108 Mass. 400; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 187. But the mere possibility or suspicion of a defect is not enough to relieve a purchaser from liability under his contract. Hayes v. Cemetery, ubi supra; Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 1, 16 N.E. 722; Lowes v. Lush, 14 Ves. 547; Franklin v. Brownlow, Id. 550; Pyrke v. Waddingham, 10 Hare, 1. In Society v. Brown, 147 Mass. 296, 298, 17 N.E. 549, Mr. Justice Devens says, of the doubt which will relieve a purchaser of real estate from his obligation specifically to perform his contract, that it "must be reasonable, and such as would cause a prudent man to pause and hesitate before investing his money. It would be seldom that a case could occur where some state of facts might not be imagined which, if it existed, would defeat the title. When questions as to the validity of a title are settled beyond a reasonable doubt, although there may be still the possibility of a defect, such mere possibility will not exempt one from his liability to complete the purchase he has made. *** It would be often practically impossible for the party to negative all objections which might be imagined, and which, if they existed, would defeat his title." In the present case, if the deed from Conant was not executed and delivered in the lifetime of the grantee, Footman, no title passed under it. But the fact that it was not acknowledged or recorded until after the grantee's death does not indicate that it was not delivered on the day of its date. At most, it merely suggests a question in regard to it. The date of a deed is prima facie evidence of its delivery at that date, even though it was not acknowledged until a later day. Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray, ...