Conley v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22A-CR-1748 |
| Parties | Lydia Theresa Conley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Lake Superior County The Honorable Jamise Y Perkins, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No 45G03-2006-MR-20
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Kristin A. Mulholland Office of the Lake County Public Defender Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Evan M. Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] This appeal arises from a complex murder trial. The appellant-Lydia Theresa Conley ("Conley")-however, asks us to answer only one question: whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the prior murder convictions of an alternative suspect. Even assuming error, we conclude that Conley's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was not contravened, and, accordingly, any error was harmless. We affirm.
[¶2] The facts specifically relevant to this appeal are as follows: in 2019, Conley was involved in a love triangle. She had been dating Delilah Martinez ("Martinez") since the previous year but was simultaneously involved in a long-term relationship with Madeline Mendoza ("Mendoza").[1] When Mendoza discovered the affair, she terminated her relationship with Conley. Then, in October 2019, Martinez terminated her relationship with Conley. On October 27, 2019, Martinez's daughter discovered Martinez outside their house on the ground, shot three times. Martinez died later that day.
[¶3] After an investigation, the State charged Conley with Martinez's murder on June 12, 2020.[2] Conley's jury trial began on May 30, 2022. At the conclusion of the first day of testimony, the trial court heard argument regarding several motions in limine. Among them were the State's motions pertaining to several alternative suspect defenses.[3] None of the motions appear to have centered on Mendoza specifically, but during an argument regarding a different alternative suspect, Conley's counsel asserted that: Tr. Vol. III p. 119. Conley suggested that excluding evidence pertaining to Mendoza would be detrimental to her defense, but no specific evidence regarding Mendoza was being considered by the trial court at that time.
[¶4] Evidence at trial subsequently revealed the tensions between Mendoza and Martinez. Then Mendoza took the stand. On cross-examination, Mendoza testified about discovering that Conley was having an affair with Martinez. She also described receiving a text message from Martinez depicting Conley and Martinez engaged in an act of oral sex. Finally, she denied having murdered Martinez. When cross-examining the detective ("Detective Webber") who conducted the murder investigation, Conley sought to make an offer of proof. Detective Webber had indicated that Mendoza was a person of interest in the investigation, and Conley wanted to explore the fact that Mendoza had twice previously been convicted of murder.[4] The State argued that any testimony related to Mendoza's criminal history was violative of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b).
[¶5] The trial court denied Conley's request to allow Detective Webber to testify about Mendoza's murder convictions. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the "prejudicial impact that the testimony would have" would outweigh "any probative value" of Mendoza's criminal convictions, an apparent reference to Indiana Evidence 403. Tr. Vol. VI p. 129.
[¶6] After more testimony from Detective Webber, Conley sought a second offer of proof, this time relying on Indiana Evidence Rule 609, and arguing that the prior convictions were probative of Mendoza's credibility because she had explicitly denied murdering Martinez. Additionally, some discrepancies in Mendoza's testimony with respect to when she had last been in contact with Martinez had already been revealed. The trial court again denied the request, apparently relying on Rule 403 once more.
[¶7] The jury convicted Conley, and the trial court sentenced her to an aggregate sentence of seventy years. Conley now appeals.
[¶8] Conley asks us to find that the exclusion of evidence of Mendoza's prior murder convictions violated her right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ordinarily, "[o]ur standard of review of a trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence is for an abuse of discretion." Jones v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1033 1037 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (citing Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)). "We will reverse only if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Id. "We will not reweigh the evidence and will consider any conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling." Id. (). "When we review a trial court's decision to determine if there was an abuse of discretion regarding the admission of evidence, 'we may affirm the trial court's decision to admit evidence seized as a result of a search based on any legal theory supported by the record.'" Whitenack v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1123, 1126 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (quoting Johnson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 658, 661 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015)). However, where, as here, an evidentiary claim raises constitutional issues, our standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied.
[¶9] It has long been settled law that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant's right to present a defense in order to secure a full and fair trial. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967); Bubb v. State, 434 N.E.2d 120 (Ind. App. 1982). The right encompasses, at a minimum, the right to call witnesses, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the right to confront witnesses against you, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), and in some instances, the right to a bifurcated trial. Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 2004).
[¶10] When it comes to the presentation of evidence, the potential for conflicts between this Sixth Amendment right and the restrictions enumerated in the Indiana Evidence Rules arises. "A criminal defendant does not enjoy an unlimited constitutional right to offer exculpatory evidence." Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind. 2001) (citing Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. 1998)). Rather:
Schermerhorn v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Additionally:
[W]hen the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense collides with the State's interest in promulgating rules of evidence to govern the conduct of its trials, the merits of the respective positions must be weighed, [and] the State's interest must give way to the defendant's rights if its rules are "mechanistically" applied to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Id. (quoting Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360, 375 (Ind. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds).
[¶11] Here, evidence of Mendoza's prior murder convictions would ordinarily be categorically inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) which provides that evidence of prior criminal convictions is not admissible as evidence of a person's character if its purpose is to show that the person acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion. We have little difficulty identifying that-at least initially-this is the primary aim that Conley had in mind.[5] So the thinking goes: Mendoza had committed murders in the past, and that, coupled with her motive in this case makes it more likely that she committed the murder of Martinez.[6] It would also make it more likely that Detective Webber conducted a faulty investigation.
[¶12] Here however, Conley offered a second, plausible basis for admitting evidence of the prior convictions during the second request for an offer of proof: an exception to the prohibition enshrined in Rule 404. Mendoza testified unequivocally that she did not murder Martinez. Thus, Conley asserted, the prior convictions were being submitted to refute or undermine that denial, thereby undercutting Mendoza's credibility. Because the convictions were for murder, Conley argues, they must be admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 609.[7] [¶13] We need not address the argument. Even assuming without deciding that the evidence should have been admitted,[8] we find that the exclusion of evidence of the convictions constituted harmless error. "An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the 'substantial rights' of a party." Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (citing Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 225 (Ind. 2009); Ind. Trial Rule 61.5). "While there are important...
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