Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 05 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 34A05–1101–CR–66.,34A05–1101–CR–66. |
| Citation | 957 N.E.2d 1033 |
| Parties | Jason JONES, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Caroline B. Briggs, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Jason Jones appeals his conviction for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance. Having evaluated Jones' claims, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony and photographs in lieu of certain physical evidence that had been destroyed by law enforcement officers in accordance with Indiana Code section 35–5–5–5. Further, the trial court did not err by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify as a skilled witness regarding the one-pot reaction method of manufacturing methamphetamine. We affirm.
During the evening hours of February 23, 2010, law enforcement officers arrived at the residence of Buddy Mossholder to execute a search warrant. Multiple officers entered through the front door of the home while Officer Travis Williams remained at the rear of the residence.
Officers located Mossholder and another individual, Timothy Farr, in the garage. Inside the garage, officers found ingredients commonly associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine, including pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries, instant ice compresses, multiple brands of drain cleaner, a coffee grinder, foil, blister packs, and camp fuel. Officers also observed a one-pot reaction vessel.1 When Officer Williams, who was stationed outside at the rear of the home, observed Jones attempting to exit the residence, he arrested Jones.
The State charged Jones with Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class B misdemeanor visiting a common nuisance. Before trial, law enforcement officers utilized a Hazmat team to destroy some of the chemicals and chemically contaminated materials found in the Mossholder garage. At trial, Jones moved to exclude evidence of any item not received by him in discovery, claiming that law enforcement officers had failed to comply with Indiana Code section 35–33–5–5, which governs the disposition of property held as evidence and authorizes law enforcement to destroy chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment associated with the manufacture of drugs. As a result, Jones argued, testimony or photographs offered in lieu of the destroyed physical evidence should not be admitted. The evidence at issue—a photograph of the one-pot reaction vessel and testimony regarding that vessel, as well as numerous photos and testimony regarding chemicals and other materials found in the garage—was admitted over Jones' objections. Jones also objected to the testimony of Officer Jim Nielson regarding the one-pot reaction vessel found in the garage.
On November 16, 2010, a jury found Jones guilty of both counts. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and Jones' sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 22, 2010. On December 17, Jones filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing, stating that he preferred to have appellate counsel, rather than his trial counsel, represent him at the hearing. Jones' motion was denied. On December 22, the court sentenced Jones to fifteen years, with five years suspended, for dealing in methamphetamine and 180 days for visiting a common nuisance. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.
Jones filed a motion to correct errors, contending that the trial court erred by not continuing the sentencing hearing. Jones argued that had the sentencing hearing been continued, he would have called witnesses to testify to his good character, medical condition, and recent successful completion of an educational program. Jones' motion was denied. He now appeals.
Jones raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony and photographs depicting evidence that had been destroyed by law enforcement. Second, Jones argues that the trial court erred by allowing Officer Jim Nielson to testify as an expert regarding the one-pot reaction method of manufacturing methamphetamine. Third, Jones claims that trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance of his sentencing hearing and by subsequently denying his motion to correct errors.
Jones contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony and photographs depicting evidence that had been destroyed by law enforcement before trial. Jones argues that law enforcement violated statutory provisions governing the destruction of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment and thus, evidence offered in lieu of the destroyed items should not have been admitted. Specifically, Jones asserts that officers did not collect and preserve sufficient samples of the chemicals found in the Mossholder garage, did not adequately photograph the garage, and did not properly inventory the chemicals. He also claims that officers did not maintain certified records of the disposition of the evidence or satisfy the statute's requirement that two persons witness and attest to the destruction of evidence.
Our standard of review of a trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence is for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001). We will reverse only if a trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence and will consider any conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.
Criminal defendants have the right to examine physical evidence in the possession of the State under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 406 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. However, the State does not have “an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988)). In the context of hazardous chemicals and materials, tension arises between the practical need for destruction and the threat of prejudice to the substantial rights of a criminal defendant, which necessarily occurs when evidence is destroyed.
Indiana Code section 35–33–5–5 attempts to resolve this tension. 2 Specifically, Section 35–33–5–5(e) sets forth requirements that must be satisfied before evidence may be destroyed:
(e) A law enforcement agency may destroy or cause to be destroyed chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment (including drug paraphernalia as described in IC 35–48–4–8.5) associated with the illegal manufacture of drugs or controlled substances without a court order if all the following conditions are met:
(1) The law enforcement agency collects and preserves a sufficient quantity of the chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment to demonstrate that the chemicals, controlled substances, or chemically contaminated equipment was associated with the illegal manufacture of drugs or controlled substances.
(2) The law enforcement agency takes photographs of the illegal drug manufacturing site that accurately depict the presence and quantity of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment.
(3) The law enforcement agency completes a chemical inventory report that describes the type and quantities of chemicals, controlled substances, and chemically contaminated equipment present at the illegal manufacturing site.
The photographs and description of the property shall be admissible into evidence in place of the actual physical evidence. The statute sets forth additional provisions concerning the maintenance of certified records and two-witness attestation:
(f) for purposes of preserving the record of any conviction on appeal, a photograph demonstrating the nature of the property, and an adequate description of the property must be obtained before the disposition of the property. In the event of a retrial, the photograph and description of the property shall be admissible into evidence in place of the actual physical evidence. All other rules of law governing the admissibility of evidence shall apply to the photographs.
(g) the law enforcement agency disposing of property in any manner provided in subsection (b), (c), or (e) shall maintain certified records of any disposition under subsection (b), (c), or (e). Disposition by destruction of property shall be witnessed by two (2) persons who shall also attest to the destruction.
Ind.Code § 35–33–5–5(e), (g). Jones argues that certain photographic and testimonial evidence should not have been admitted into evidence because officers failed to comply with subsections (e), (f), and (g). He claims that the remedy for the officers' violation of these subsections is exclusion of the evidence.
As it relates to the clerical requirements set forth in subsections (f) and (g), we cannot agree.3 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Westbrook v. State, 770 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by the statute. Id. When construing a statute, “[i]t is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.” State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied.
As it is currently written, subsections (f) and (g) provide no remedy for law...
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