Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12854,12854
• Citation: 202 Conn. 150,520 A.2d 186
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, et al.

Page 186

520 A.2d 186

202 Conn. 150

CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, et al.

No. 12854.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 14, 1986.

Decided Jan. 27, 1987.

Wesley W. Horton, Hartford, with whom was Dennis A. Lalli, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Robert A. Whitehead, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, were David M. Teed, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Lee Bezanson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Before ARTHUR A. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, SATTER and ALLEN, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

This appeal involves the dismissal by the Superior Court of the plaintiff Connecticut Bank and Trust Company's (CBT) appeal from an order of the commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO). The Superior Court dismissed CBT's administrative appeal on the ground that CBT had failed to comply with the service of process requirements of General Statutes § 4-183(b), ¹ by not serving the complainant, Dolores Mikos, with a copy of the appeal petition. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in finding that a complainant before the CHRO is a "party of record" under General Statutes § 4-183(b) who must be served with a copy of the appeal petition. Alternatively, the plaintiff claims that if the complainant is a "party of record," failure to serve her should not result in the automatic dismissal of its administrative appeal. We dismiss the appeal without addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claims because the order of the CHRO appealed from was not a final decision, thereby rendering CBT's appeal premature.

A review of the procedural background of this case is necessary to our discussion concerning the finality of the CHRO's order. The underlying action was commenced in July, 1981, by Dolores Mikos, a former employee of the plaintiff. Mikos filed a complaint with the CHRO, claiming that CBT had discriminated against her in employment because of her sex. The CHRO investigated Mikos's complaint, finding that reasonable cause existed to believe a violation had been committed by CBT. Public hearings were held, and on September 16, 1984, the CHRO issued its findings of fact and a memorandum of decision (September decision). The hearing officer found that CBT had discriminated against Mikos in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(4), and ordered that Mikos be awarded back pay in the full amount of the difference between her gross weekly salary at CBT on the date of her termination and the gross weekly pay she had earned at any time during the period from her discharge to the date of the agency's order. The hearing officer further ordered that this sum be reduced by any amount of income, including unemployment compensation, received or earned by Mikos during that time. Mikos was also awarded statutory interest on the full amount of this award, to the date of judgment. In addition, the tribunal directed CBT to develop a sexual harassment grievance procedure for its employees. Finally, it invited CBT to submit documentary evidence covering the current status of a personal loan of Mikos's on CBT's books. CBT appealed this order to the Superior Court on October 29, 1984.

Subsequently, on November 27, 1984, the hearing tribunal issued an "addendum" to the orders entered in its September decision. The hearing officer reiterated the measure of damages to be applied in computing Mikos's back pay. Further, it noted that Mikos's award should be mitigated by any amount documented by CBT as due and owing to CBT on a personal loan taken out by Mikos. CBT failed, however, to submit any documentation concerning the note, so the tribunal made no finding with regard to any sum due on it. The tribunal, however, went on to discuss another mitigating factor, the reasonable efforts of the complainant to obtain comparable, if not equal, employment. After concluding that the complainant had failed to make such reasonable efforts, the tribunal reduced the amount of the back pay award from $108,797.00 to $100,000 plus interest at 10 percent per annum to the date of payment. ² CBT then filed a second appeal to the Superior Court seeking review of both the addendum and the September decision.

On November 14, 1985, the CHRO moved to dismiss the appeals. The trial court consolidated both appeals for purposes of deciding the CHRO's motion to dismiss. As to CBT's appeal from the September decision, the trial court, concluding that Mikos was a party of record, granted the CHRO's motion to dismiss on the ground that Mikos had not been served with a copy of the appeal petition in accordance with General Statutes § 4-183(b). With regard to CBT's appeal from the November 27, 1984 "addendum" to the CHRO's September decision, the trial court dismissed that part of the appeal challenging the September decision. The trial court reasoned that the September decision was a final agency decision as to liability, and that that portion of CBT's second appeal challenging the September decision was filed and served beyond the time limitations contained in § 4-183(b). The trial court denied the CHRO's motion to dismiss the second appeal to the extent that CBT sought to challenge the calculation of back pay made by the hearing officer in the November addendum. The court concluded that since the addendum was based on additional evidence to calculate the amount of back pay, it was a final decision as to a different matter from the September decision and that it was filed and served within the time limitations of § 4-183(b). The administrative appeal from the hearing officer's calculation of damages in the addendum is pending in the trial court.

The threshold question in this case is whether the trial court should have asserted jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal from the CHRO's September decision. If the trial court improperly asserted jurisdiction, we cannot hear this appeal. State v. Best, 171 Conn. 487, 490-91, 370 A.2d 1035 (1976); Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 610, 219 A.2d 711 (1966); W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure § 273; see Bardes v. Zoning Board, 141 Conn. 317, 318-19, 106 A.2d 160 (1954). This court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, ³ any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear. Sasso v. Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87, 89, 495 A.2d 1066 (1985); L.G. DeFelice & Son, Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167 Conn. 509, 511, 356 A.2d 144 (1975).

Appeals from administrative agencies exist only under statutory authority. Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 503, 467 A.2d 674 (1983). A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created. Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 195 Conn. 276, 283, 487 A.2d 559 (1985). General Statutes § 4-183(a), ⁴ which governs appeals to the Superior Court from administrative agencies, provides in pertinent part: "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this chapter...." (Emphasis added.) Thus, only a party who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the agency decision. Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, supra. The doctrines of finality and exhaustion of administrative remedies are "designed to prevent piecemeal appeals of a litigant's claims before an administrative agency. Touche Ross & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 609 F.2d 570, 574-75 (2d Cir.1979); State of New York v. United States, 568 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir.1977)." Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. DPUC, 1 Conn.App. 1, 3, 467 A.2d 679 (1983); see generally 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §§ 26:1 through 26:10.

We must determine then, if the CHRO's September decision, which indicated that further evidence on damages would be received, constitutes a "final decision" for purposes of § 4-183(a). It is a well established rule of federal appellate jurisdiction that where liability has been decided, but the extent of damages remains undetermined, there is no final order. Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F.2d 903, 910-11 (3d Cir.1982); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Board, 535 F.2d 758, 760-61 (3d Cir.1976); cf. Hattersley v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209, 213-14 (3d Cir.1975); United States v. 1,431.80 Acres of Land, 466 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir.1972). We have similarly found no final order when summary judgments dispose of the liability issue,...