Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene

• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Citation: 520 A.2d 173,202 Conn. 128
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JEFFERSON GARDEN ASSOCIATES v. Doris GREENE.

Page 173

520 A.2d 173

202 Conn. 128

JEFFERSON GARDEN ASSOCIATES v. Doris GREENE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 5, 1986.

Decided Jan. 27, 1987.

Frances S. Taylor, New London, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Wirzbicki, Noank, for appellant (defendant).

Glenn T. Terk, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was John P. Zanini, Law Student Intern, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and CALLAHAN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

This case concerns the legal sufficiency of various notices sent by a landlord in order to terminate the lease of a tenant occupying federally subsidized housing. The plaintiff, Jefferson Garden Associates, brought a summary process action pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47a-23 ¹ and 47a-15 ² against the defendant, Doris Greene, to recover possession of the leased premises because of the defendant's noncompliance with a no pets clause in her lease. The trial court ruled in the plaintiff's favor both on the plaintiff's own cause of action and on the defendant's five special defenses. The defendant has appealed.

The relevant facts are largely undisputed. On December 30, 1978, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written one year lease for the use and occupancy of an apartment at 87F Michael Road in New London. Despite the unequivocal prohibition of article 11(g) of the lease, in which the tenant agreed "to have no animals or pets of any kind on the premises unless expressly permitted in writing by the LANDLORD," the defendant continues, without permission, to keep a doberman pinscher in her apartment. The defendant claims that she needs a dog for security reasons. The 1978 lease containing the no pets clause has not been formally renewed by the parties. That lease, however, contained a provision for automatic renewal, entitled "Termination and Renewal," which stated: "Unless terminated or modified as provided herein, this Agreement shall be automatically renewed for successive terms of one month each at the foresaid rental, subject to adjustment as herein provided. The TENANT shall execute a new lease at the end of the initial term, if requested."

The plaintiff undertook to have the defendant either correct her violation of the no pets clause of her lease or vacate her apartment. To that end, the plaintiff sent the defendant three separate termination notices that specifically instructed the defendant that she risked eviction because of her material noncompliance with the no pets clause. These notices detailed timetables within which she might take remedial action or voice objections to the threatened eviction proceedings. When, despite her receipt of these notices, the defendant failed to reply to the warnings they contained, the plaintiff served her with a notice to quit possession and thereafter brought a summary process action seeking immediate possession of the leased premises.

In response to the plaintiff's summary process action, the defendant filed an answer and several special defenses. She questioned the enforceability of the no pets clause and claimed that the notices sent by the plaintiff did not comply with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations.

The trial court found all the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The court concluded that the no pets clause continued to be binding upon the defendant, even though her lease had not been renewed formally, because her original lease had automatically been renewed by its own terms. The court furthermore concluded that the defendant's concerns about security in the apartment complex did not suffice to permit her to keep a dog in violation of the explicit no pets clause in her lease. These conclusions, which are unchallenged in the defendant's appeal to this court, establish that the defendant was in material noncompliance with the terms of her lease and that the plaintiff therefore had good cause for termination of the lease.

The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff had sent the defendant the termination notices required by state and federal law. The applicable principles of Connecticut law are codified in General Statutes § 47a-23, and the procedures that are required for a valid eviction are set forth in General Statutes § 47a-15. In addition, a landlord who seeks to evict a tenant from the Michael Road apartment complex must comply with the applicable federal regulations. These regulations apply because the apartments are part of a low income housing project that was originally constructed with the assistance of a mortgage provided pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act; 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1, ³ and that currently receives rent subsidies under section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. ⁴ Under federal law, a landlord seeking to evict a tenant from federally subsidized apartments must send such a tenant a section 236 termination notice that complies with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 450.4(a) ⁵ (now § 247.4[a] and a section 8 eviction notice that complies with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. §§ 886.101 and 886.128. ⁶ The 1978 lease stipulated, in article 4(b), that the landlord's right to terminate would be governed by 24 C.F.R. § 450.

The trial court determined that the plaintiff had complied with these notice requirements by virtue of the three separate termination notices that were introduced into evidence at trial. The plaintiff, on April 12, 1983, sent the defendant a "notice of good cause" informing her that her violation of article 11(g) of the lease forbidding pets, unless remedied, constituted cause for termination of her occupancy of the premises. ⁷ That same date, ⁸ the plaintiff sent the defendant a second notice, denominated a notice pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-15, which again informed the defendant that, because of her dog, she was in material noncompliance with article 11(g) of her lease. That notice set May 12, 1983, as the date on which the defendant's rental agreement would terminate unless she remedied her breach within three weeks. ⁹ On the stipulated date, May 12, 1983, the plaintiff informed the defendant of its intention to terminate her tenancy on June 12, 1983, because of her violation of article 11(g). This third notice expressly invited the defendant to voice, either by telephone or in writing, any objections she had to the commencement of eviction proceedings. ¹⁰ The court found that "[a]ll of these notices were served by mailing one copy of each and hand delivering another copy to the defendant. The defendant admitted that she had received these notices by mail and a copy hand delivered." The court noted, finally, that the defendant had offered no evidence that the plaintiff had failed to comply "with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations set forth in her special defenses." These various factual findings and conclusions of law are the crux of the present appeal.

The defendant's appeal contests the validity of her eviction in three respects. She claims that the trial court erred, with respect to the relevant notices: (1) in finding that they had been properly delivered; (2) in allowing them to be introduced into evidence at trial; and (3) in concluding that their terms complied with the applicable requirements of state and federal law. We find no error in any of these rulings.

I

The trial court's findings with respect to the delivery of the notices required by federal and state statute were twofold. Although there was little direct evidence of the manner in which the deliveries had been accomplished, the court heard testimony from the plaintiff's property manager about the customary manner in which the landlord handled the delivery of such notices. The customary pattern consisted of having notices served "by both hand delivery and mail delivery." In addition, the plaintiff's agent testified, without objection that a notice to quit had been served on the defendant, and that this notice had been followed by the commencement of the summary process action against her. On the basis of this evidentiary record, the court determined that the termination notices had in fact been served "by mailing one copy of each and hand delivering another copy to the defendant." As previously noted, the court further found that the defendant had admitted, in her testimony at trial, "that she had received these notices by mail and a copy hand delivered."

The trial court's findings on delivery and receipt of the notices are findings of fact that must stand unless they are "clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record." Practice Book § 4061 (formerly § 3060D); Tucker v. Alleyne, 195 Conn. 399, 403, 488 A.2d 452 (1985); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The defendant challenges only the court's interpretation of the relevant evidence, not its admissibility. In these circumstances, the question resolves itself into one of credibility that falls within the province of the trial court. Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 14, 420 A.2d 1142 (1979); Hess v. Dumouchel Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 349, 225 A.2d 797 (1966). In weighing the testimony of the defendant concerning delivery of the termination notices to her, the court was entitled to find more persuasive her initial testimony acknowledging her receipt of each of the relevant notices than her subsequent statements casting doubt on which notices she had received. Barrila v. Blake, 190 Conn. 631, 639, 461 A.2d 1375 (1983); Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 422, 446 A.2d 799 (1982); Raia v. Topehius, 165 Conn. 231, 235, 332 A.2d 93 (1973). The defendant never denied having actual notice of the plaintiff's intention to terminate her lease because of her continued violation of its no pets clause. At trial, her testimony focused primarily on her alleged right to...