Connecticut Medical Ins. v. Kulikowski
Decision Date | 18 March 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 17930.,17930. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | CONNECTICUT MEDICAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. John KULIKOWSKI. |
Richard A. Silver, with whom were Amanda R. Whitman and, on the brief, Angelo A. Ziotas, Stamford, for the appellant (substitute defendant Marion P. Kulikowski).
Louis B. Blumenfeld, with whom was Lorinda S. Coon, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.
In this action for a declaratory judgment, the substitute defendant, Marion P. Kulikowski,1 appeals from the summary judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Connecticut Medical Insurance Company. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded as a matter of law that a nurse practitioner referenced by job title, but not listed as a named insured, in the declarations page of a physician's medical malpractice insurance policy, was not a separately insured individual under the policy. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the subject policy was unambiguous and that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the nurse practitioner, Ann Ciambriello, was a named insured under the policy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed relevant facts. John Kulikowski, the original defendant in the present case; see footnote 1 of this opinion; had brought the underlying medical malpractice action against James Ralabate, a physician, and Ciambriello, Ralabate's employee, making separate and individual allegations of medical negligence against each of them in connection with his claim that they had failed to diagnose and treat him for a central nervous system infection.2 The plaintiff had issued a professional liability insurance policy to Ralabate that provided individual professional liability coverage limits of $1 million per medical incident with a $4 million aggregate limit. In accordance with the policy terms, the plaintiff provided a defense for both Ralabate and Ciambriello in the underlying action. In partial settlement of the underlying action, the plaintiff paid Kulikowski $1 million.3
The plaintiff instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Ciambriello is not a separately insured individual under the policy entitled to a separate $1 million limit of professional liability coverage separate from and additional to the $1 million limit of individual professional liability coverage provided to Ralabate. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Ciambriello was a separately insured individual under the terms of the policy. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal followed.4
The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that as a matter of law, Ciambriello was not a separately insured individual under the policy. Specifically, the defendant contends that the declarations page — which referenced by job title two nurse practitioners employed by Ralabate, and listed "[p]aramedical [e]mployee [c]overage," a term not defined anywhere in the policy, as one type of coverage provided under the policy — rendered the policy ambiguous as to whether Ciambriello was a named insured, or, at least, a separately insured individual, under the policy. We are not persuaded.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court. . . . Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193, 198-99, 931 A.2d 916 (2007).
"[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519, 838 A.2d 993 (2004). "An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Enviro Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 194, 199, 901 A.2d 666 (2006). In accordance with those principles, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 267, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). Under those circumstances, the policy "is to be given effect according to its terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kitmirides v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 65 Conn.App. 729, 733, 783 A.2d 1079 (2001), aff'd, 260 Conn. 336, 796 A.2d 1185 (2002). "When interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 462, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005).
In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) HLO Land Ownership Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Hartford, 248 Conn. 350, 357, 727 A.2d 1260 (1999). "As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 255 Conn. 295, 305, 765 A.2d 891 (2001). Under those circumstances, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Enviro Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., supra, 279 Conn. at 199, 901 A.2d 666.
Because this appeal comes to us from a grant of summary judgment, and because of the standards for interpreting insurance contracts, the dispositive question is whether the policy language is ambiguous as to whether the parties intended Ciambriello to be a separately insured individual under the policy. We previously addressed a similar issue in an appeal involving nearly analogous policy language. In Kitmirides v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 260 Conn. at 336, 796 A.2d 1185, the issue presented was the scope of the coverage "afforded by an insurance policy that list[ed] a person as a driver of a covered vehicle on the declarations page, but [did] not list that person as a named insured." Kitmirides v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 65 Conn.App. at 730, 783 A.2d 1079.5 The plaintiff in Kitmirides argued that, because she was listed as an additional driver on the declarations page of her father-in-law's automobile insurance policy, and because the policy did not define the term driver, the policy was ambiguous as to whether she was an insured individual entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the policy. Id., at 733, 783 A.2d 1079. In concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded the plaintiff from underinsured motorist coverage under the policy, despite the inconsistencies between the declarations page and the policy provisions, we adopted the Appellate Court's reasoning, which relied on the definition of "[c]overed person" in the policy as (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 732-33, 783 A.2d 1079. The policy defined the term "you" as "[t]he [n]amed [i]nsured shown in the [d]eclarations. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 733, 783 A.2d 1079. We affirmed the Appellate Court's conclusion that the term "named insured" was unambiguous, despite the apparent conflict between the declarations page and the policy provisions, because the policy was not "reasonably susceptible to more than one reading with regard to a listed driver's right to underinsured motorist coverage." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 734, 783 A.2d 1079. We agreed with the Appellate Court's analysis leading to that conclusion, which relied on the fact that the policy provisions clearly and unambiguously...
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