Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 17011).
• Citation: 838 A.2d 993,267 Conn. 512
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NICHOLAS D. GALGANO v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

267 Conn. 512

838 A.2d 993

NICHOLAS D. GALGANO v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL.

(SC 17011).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 5, 2003.

Officially released January 27, 2004.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Robert J. Flanagan, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellee (defendant Patriot General Insurance Company).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The dispositive question in this reservation asks whether, under the underinsured motorist provision of the plaintiff's insurance policy, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, for bystander emotional distress arising from his having witnessed bodily injury to his son, to the extent of the "each person" bodily injury coverage limit applicable to the plaintiff, when the defendant already had paid to the plaintiff's son the full amount of the "each person" bodily injury limit available to the son and the policy provided that the maximum amount that the defendant was required to pay "for all claims by all persons for damages for bodily injury to any one person is the `each person' Uninsured Motorist Coverage limit...." We answer the question in the negative.

The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. On June 18, 1995, Nicholas A. Galgano was a passenger on a 1979 Honda motorcycle operated by his father, the plaintiff, Nicholas D. Galgano, when the motorcycle was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. The plaintiff's son sustained severe bodily injuries, and the plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and experienced severe emotional distress as a result of his having witnessed the bodily injuries to his son.

The plaintiff was insured by the defendant Patriot General Insurance Company (Patriot General) pursuant to a policy that provided uninsured motorist coverage limits of $20,000 for "each person" and $40,000 for "each accident." The policy further provided a motorcycle endorsement with the following language regarding limits of uninsured motorist insurance: "The maximum amount we'll pay for any one motorcycle accident for all claims by all persons for damages for bodily injury to any one person is the `each person' Uninsured Motorist Coverage limit shown in the declarations. Subject to the limit for `each person' the maximum amount we'll pay in damages for bodily injury to two or more persons, is the `each accident' Uninsured Motorist Coverage limits shown in the declarations." (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff also had an insurance policy with the named defendant, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Metropolitan), which provided $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff's son settled his claims with Metropolitan for the full amount of that policy. Additionally, Patriot General paid $20,000 to the plaintiff's son in compensation for his bodily injuries, thus exhausting the "each person" coverage limit applicable to him under the Patriot General policy.

Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action against Patriot General and Metropolitan seeking to recover for his physical injuries and for bystander emotional distress stemming from his having witnessed the accident that caused his son's injuries. Both Patriot General and Metropolitan moved for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress count claiming that, inter alia: (1) because the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress claim was derivative of his son's claim, it could not be asserted unless the plaintiff's son were a party to the action; and (2) the bystander emotional distress claim was barred because both insurers already had paid their respective "each person" uninsured motorist coverage limits applicable to the bodily injury to the plaintiff's son. In separate proceedings, the trial court, Hon. Walter M. Pickett, Jr., and Kocay, J., respectively, granted both motions, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment rendered thereon in favor of Patriot General and Metropolitan on his bystander emotional distress claim. The Appellate Court subsequently granted both insurers' motions to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no final judgment had been rendered on the plaintiff's personal injury claim. Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 64 Conn. App. 25, 30-31, 779 A.2d 229 (2001).

Thereafter, Patriot General and the plaintiff entered into a joint stipulation of facts and filed a motion requesting that the trial court reserve certain questions of law for the advice of the Appellate Court. In accordance with Practice Book § 73-1¹ and General Statutes § 52-235 (a),² the trial court granted the parties' joint motion for reservation of questions of law. We subsequently transferred the reserved questions to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).

The questions framed by the parties and reserved by the trial court for advice are: "(a) Where Patriot General... has paid the `each person' Uninsured Motorist Coverage limit applicable for bodily injury to [the plaintiff's son] and the insurance policy provides that the maximum amount the insurer must pay `for all claims by all persons for damages for bodily injury to any one person is the "each person" Uninsured Motorist Coverage limit,' is [the plaintiff] entitled to compensation for bystander emotional distress arising from witnessing the bodily injury to his son ... under the separate `each person' Uninsured Motorist Coverage limit available to [the plaintiff]?"³ and "(b) If the answer to [the first question] is in the affirmative, can [the plaintiff] have a legally viable claim for bystander emotional distress arising from the bodily injury to [his son] for uninsured motorist coverage against Patriot General... subsequent to the prior settlement of the uninsured motorist claim for bodily injury to [the plaintiff's son] and in the absence of [the son] as a party to this action?" Because we answer the first reserved question in the negative, we do not reach the second reserved question.

As part of the stipulated facts, Patriot General has agreed with the plaintiff to a value in an amount of less than $20,000 for the bodily injury that he had sustained. The parties further have agreed that, if the bystander emotional distress claim is recoverable through the "each person" uninsured motorist coverage limit of the plaintiff, the total value of his claim equals the limit of the $20,000 "each person" uninsured motorist coverage limit applicable to his claim for bodily injury.

Patriot General claims that damages for the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress are not recoverable under the $20,000 "each person" uninsured motorist coverage limit applicable to his own bodily injury, but, rather, that the exhaustion of the $20,000 "each person" uninsured motorist coverage limit by payment to the plaintiff's son bars any recovery in compensation for the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress. In other words, Patriot General contends that the plaintiff's bystander emotional distress is a consequence of the bodily injury to his son and not a bodily injury in itself that would allow coverage under a separate "each person" limit. Additionally, Patriot General claims that because the claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivative claim, the prior settlement with the plaintiff's son and the son's absence from this litigation precludes the plaintiff from recovering for his bystander emotional distress.

The plaintiff argues that all of his injuries, both physical and emotional, from whatever source, should be covered by his "each person" limit and not that of his son. Specifically, he claims that, pursuant to Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 675 A.2d 852 (1996), the emotional injuries suffered by family members who witness the severe injury or death of another family member are a separate and independent direct action entitling the emotionally injured bystander to liability coverage under his or her own coverage and not that of the physically injured family member.

Although we agree with the plaintiff that his bystander emotional distress, arising from his having witnessed the bodily injury to his son, is quite separate and distinct in nature from the injuries sustained by his son, the characterization of the plaintiff's injury is not dispositive of the first issue that we must decide, namely, whether the "each person" coverage limit applicable to the bodily injuries to the plaintiff's son also applies to the plaintiff's claim for bystander emotional distress. How the law defines particular claims does not control. Rather, we must look to the relevant policy language and apply the limits of liability as provided in the policy. In other words, whether we label the plaintiff's emotional injuries as discrete and independent or derivative; see Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 538 n. 3, 687 A.2d 1262 (1996) (treating bystander emotional distress as derivative cause of action); see also Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494, 408 A.2d 260 (1979) (treating loss of consortium as derivative cause of action); is not dispositive. At issue is how the Patriot General policy in effect treats those injuries.

"[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court which this court reviews de novo." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 37, 40, 801 A.2d 752 (2002). "[T]he terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction.... The determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the ... [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy.... If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and...