Connecticut Rural Roads Improvement Ass'n v. Hurley

• Decision Date: 01 February 1938
• Citation: 124 Conn. 20,197 A. 90
• Parties: CONNECTICUT RURAL ROADS IMPROVEMENT ASS'N et al. v. HURLEY, Com'r of Public Works, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

197 A. 90

124 Conn. 20

CONNECTICUT RURAL ROADS IMPROVEMENT ASS'N et al. v. HURLEY, Com'r of Public Works, et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 1, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John A. Cornell, Judge.

Action by the Connecticut Rural Roads Improvement Association, a voluntary organization, and individual taxpayers of the state, for themselves and on behalf of all other taxpayers to enjoin Robert A. Hurley, Commissioner of Public Works, and the State Comptroller, from exercising jurisdiction in certain respects concerning highways and bridges, and to enjoin the State Highway Commissioner to exercise such jurisdiction, brought to the superior court, where a demurrer to the substituted complaint was overruled, and the defendants waiving their right to plead further, judgment for the plaintiffs was entered on the pleadings, and the defendants appealed.

No error.

Charles J. McLaughlin, Atty. Gen., and Dennis P O'Connor, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Ernest L. Averill and William P. Averill, both of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The issue upon the present appeal is the efficacy of the defendants' demurrer, which was overruled by the superior court. The allegations of the substituted complaint are in substance as follows: On and prior to April 28, 1937, the state highway commissioner, under the provisions of the General Statutes, had and now has the power to lay out, alter, construct or reconstruct, maintain or repair, widen or grade, any highway whenever in his opinion the interests of the state require, exclusive jurisdiction over all highways laid out, constructed, reconstructed, or maintained by him, and the power to expend all sums appropriated under the provisions of the statutes relating to state roads to be expended in the construction of state-aid roads and bridges, and is charged with the duty of expending, under his direction, all receipts of the commissioner of motor vehicles, exclusive of certain specified expenses, for the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of state roads and bridges, in addition to any sums appropriated by the General Assembly for such purposes. On April 28, 1937, the General Assembly enacted chapter 126 of the Public Acts of 1937 (1937 Supplement, § 540d) entitled ‘ An Act establishing a Department of Public Works,’ under which the defendant Hurley was duly appointed as commissioner of public works. As such commissioner he claims sole jurisdiction over the layout, construction, reconstruction, and improvement of all state and state-aid highways where the cost exceeds the sum of $1,000, and that the act creating the department of public works repealed all sections of the General Statutes relating to the powers and duties of the highway commissioner in so far as they relate to the layout, construction, reconstruction, and improvement of such highways and bridges, and pursuant to that claim has advertised for bids for the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of such highways and bridges, has awarded contracts therefor, and threatens to continue to do so, all without the approval or authority of the state highway commissioner. It is further alleged that said acts are illegal and ultra vires and this defendant is unjustifiably and without right interfering with the conduct of the state highway department and the highway commissioner and preventing the highway commissioner from performing the duties legally delegated to him by statute.

It is alleged that the defendant Swartz as comptroller of the state has issued and threatens to further issue his orders upon the treasurer of the state for the payment of bills and vouchers presented by contractors engaged in constructing, reconstructing, and improving state-aid and trunk line highways and bridges, which have been approved by the defendant Hurley as commissioner of public works and not by the defendant Macdonald as highway commissioner, ‘ all of which is illegal and contrary to the statutes providing that all moneys for such purposes shall be expended under the direction and with the approval of the highway commissioner.’ The prayers for relief are that the defendant commissioner of public works and comptroller be enjoined from doing any of the acts above mentioned, and that the defendant highway commissioner be enjoined to advertise for all bids for contracts relating to state or state-aid roads or bridges and award all contracts therefor, except bonds from contractors, and exercise sole and exclusive jurisdiction of all of said roads and bridges.

The grounds of demurrer are that it appears from the allegations of the complaint that state highways and bridges and stateaid highways and truck lines are ‘ real assets' within the meaning of section 540d of the 1937 Supplement, and that state highways and trunk lines are part of a state ‘ service system’ within the meaning of that section ‘ and the commissioner of public works is, therefore, acting in accordance with the authority therein vested in him with relation to the supervision, planning, construction, erection, alteration or repair of said highways and letting contracts therefor and in certifying and approving for payment to the state comptroller all work, labor and materials furnished in such contracts.’

Section 540d, General Statutes, 1937 Supplement (Public Acts, c. 126), provides, in subsection (a), ‘ There is established a department of public works,’ and in (b) for the appointment of a commissioner of public works who shall be the administrative head of the department. The further provisions of the act which are pertinent to the present inquiry are quoted in the footnote. ^[1] The succeeding sections make detailed provisions concerning the preparation of such plans and specifications, subject to approval of the agency involved, reception of bids and award and enforcement of contracts by the commissioner of public works, it being provided (w) that: ‘ If any appropriation for the construction, erection, alteration or enlargement of a real asset involving an expenditure of more than one thousand dollars shall be made to an agency other than the department of public works, the commissioner of public works shall award and enter into the contract as agent for such other agency.’ It is also provided (u) that: ‘ The commissioner of public works shall examine all bills on account of the contracts entered into under the provisions of this section, and, if they shall be found to be correct, he shall certify that the materials have been furnished and that the work or labor has been performed in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with the contract and shall approve the bills and issue his requisition upon the comptroller therefor or forward his certificate to the proper agency, as the case may be.’

The demurrer, for the purposes pertaining to it, must be taken as admitting the allegations of the complaint that the commissioner of public works claims ‘ sole jurisdiction’ over the layout, construction, and improvement of the highways maintained, and is exercising the same to the extent and in the manner alleged, and as advancing, as justification therefor, the proposition that such highways are ‘ real assets' and that the state highways and trunk lines are part of a state ‘ service system’ within the scope of the definition of ‘ real assets' in subsection (c)(2) and so within subsection (h) giving the commissioner of public works ‘ charge and supervision of the planning, construction, erection, remodeling, alteration, repair or enlargement of any real asset involving an expenditure in excess of one thousand dollars.’ In consequence the predominant issue upon the demurrer is as to whether or not these highways are ‘ real assets' within the meaning and intent of that term as employed in the statute. Such ambiguity as exists as to this, while consideration is confined to the term itself, its technical or lexicologic definition or to the statute in which it is employed, is resolved when resort is made to such recognized aids as examination of ‘ the history and derivation of the act,’ ‘ the circumstances * * * known to the Legislature at the time of its enactment,’ the object sought to be accomplished by its passage, and other relevant circumstances. Kelly v. Dewey, 111 Conn. 281, 287, 149 A. 840; Quinebaug Bank v. Tarbox, 20 Conn. 510, 518; Old Saybrook v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 Conn. 322, 327, 124 A. 33; Savings Bank of Rockville v. Wilcox, 117 Conn. 188, 193, 167 A. 709.

The parties stipulated that several specified exhibits might be used by the court for the purpose of assisting it ‘ in ascertaining the factual and historical background in connection with the enactment of chapter 126 of the Public Acts of 1937.’ Included in these are the report of the commission concerning reorganization of the state departments and the bill concerning public works proposed by that commission. It is entirely apparent that the act under examination is a pro tanto response to recommendations of the commission, and that the bill reported to and passed by the General Assembly is intimately related to and based upon the bill proposed by the commission; they are therefore legitimate aids to the construction of the act. Lenox Realty Co. v. Hackett, 122 Conn. 143, 148, 187 A. 895, 107 A.L.R. 1306; Kelly v. Dewey, supra, 111 Conn. 281, 288, 149 A. 840. We find a study of them illuminating as to the intended scope of the act adopted, including that of the term ‘ real assets' as employed therein, and largely determinative of the present issue.

The commission was raised by an act, No. 242, 22 Special Laws 1935 (p. 137), which provided that it ‘ shall...