Town of Old Saybrook v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 01 March 1924
• Citation: 100 Conn. 322,124 A. 33
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF OLD SAYBROOK v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION ET AL.

124 A. 33

100 Conn. 322

TOWN OF OLD SAYBROOK v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Frank D. Haines Judge.

Proceedings between the town of Old Saybrook and the Public Utilities Commission and others, instituted by the highway commissioner by petition filed pursuant to Gen. St. 1918, § § 1503-1508, to eliminate dangerous conditions on highways at railroad crossings. From that part of the order of the Public Utilities Commission authorizing the elimination of certain dangerous conditions, which apportioned part of the cost of proposed changes to be paid by the town, the latter appealed to the superior court, which reserved a question for advice of Supreme Court of Errors. Question answered.

Ralph O. Wells, of Hartford, for appellant.

Norman S. Buckingham, of New Haven, for appellee New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.

William E. Egan, of Hartford, and Frank E. Healy, Atty. Gen for appellees Public Utilities Commission and the State Highway Commissioner.

MALTBIE, J.

On March 19, 1923, the highway commissioner filed a petition with the Public Utilities Commission under chapter 223 of the Public Acts of 1915, re-enacted in sections 1503 to 1508 of the General Statutes, asking authority to eliminate certain dangerous conditions existing in the appellant town by reason of grade crossings of trunk line highways over the tracks of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. In pursuance of an order of notice issued by the Commission, the parties appeared before it on April 12, 1923, and the Commission then orally found and decreed that the safety of public travel along the highways required changes to be made at the crossings, but it disapproved the plans submitted by the highway commissioner. The matter was continued until May 3, 1923, and at that time the Commission approved plans for the changes. These involved the elimination of two grade crossings of trunk line highways by diverting the highways so that they intersected a third trunk line highway before they reached the railroad tracks, and of two grade crossings, one of a trunk line highway and one of a town highway, by removing a section of railroad track which formerly crossed them, and the construction of a bridge over the railroad tracks upon which was to be carried the trunk line highway which still crossed them. The matter was again continued by the Commission until May 31, 1923, when the estimated cost of the changes was apportioned, $10,000 to be paid by the appellant town and the balance, $158,000, to be equally divided between the state and the railroad company. The law under which the Commission acted, in so far as it is pertinent to the issues on the appeal, is stated in the footnote,^[1] and the question propounded for the advice of this court is: Did the Commission have legal authority to apportion any part of the cost of the elimination of those grade crossings against the appellant town?

Two questions preliminary to a consideration of the applicability of the specific provisions of the statute in question to the situation before us are presented in the record. The first of these arises out of the fact that the Legislature of 1923 amended the statute in certain particulars by an act, chapter 219 of the Public Acts of 1923, which provided that it should take effect from its passage, and which, as it was approved by the Governor on May 29, 1923, did take effect on that day. Gumpper v. Waterbury Traction Co., 68 Conn. 424, 426, 36 A. 806. As the terms of that act are not such as clearly to show a legislative intent to have it apply to pending proceedings, we may, however, at once dismiss it from consideration. Gen. Stat. § 6721; Neilson v. Perkins, 86 Conn. 425, 85 A. 686; Hartford v. Poindexter, 84 Conn. 121, 79 A. 79; Gumpper v. Waterbury Traction Co., supra, p. 427 (36 A. 807). The other question arises out of the provisions of section 1508, which was the concluding section of the act of 1915. This states that the preceding sections from the act of 1915 " shall not be construed to affect or conflict with the provisions of law concerning the removal of grade crossings." The changes now under consideration do involve the removal of grade crossings which might in certain circumstances come within the purview of other statutes dealing with such situations. An examination of the statute book discloses, however, that we have several varying procedures directed to that end. Thus, under section 3710 the directors of a railroad or the officers of a municipality may petition the Public Utilities Commission for the removal of a grade crossing, and the Commission, upon ordering it, may apportion the cost, the method varying according to the party making the application; under section 3711 a railroad company is permitted to petition the Commission where it desires to abolish a grade crossing by shifting the line of its road; under section 3712 the Commission may, upon its own initiative, institute proceedings for the removal of a crossing, and a new element in the apportionment of the cost is introduced by a provision that one-fourth of it shall be paid by the state; and, finally, under sections 3859 and 3860, where the tracks of a street railway are laid in the highway, it may itself petition for abolition of a grade crossing, or, in the event that others petition under any of the foregoing provisions, its presence may bring about an apportionment of the cost on still a different basis. Under none of these statutes can the highway commissioner, who has come so largely to represent the traveling public of the state, bring a petition, and, in so far as the law we are considering is concerned with the removal of grade crossings, it but adds one more process for accomplishing that end to those already in existence. Just as the other provisions may stand side by side, no one affecting or conflicting with the others, so this one may be added without in any way derogating from any of them.

In attempting to determine the applicability of the provisions of law in question to the situation before us, one must necessarily bear in mind its highly remedial character. Grade crossings, always dangerous, in these days when our highways are called upon to carry an almost unceasing stream of rapidly moving vehicles have increasingly become " a deadly menace to public safety." City of Middletown v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. Co., 62 Conn. 492, 497, 27 A. 119, 120. The change in the nature of that traffic from a matter of local convenience and necessity to one of state, national, and even international use has more and more placed the burden of the care of the traveling public upon state rather than municipal officials. Root v. Conn. Co., 94 Conn. 227, 236, 108 A. 506. A law which seeks to give the highway commissioner power to initiate proceedings for the elimination of conditions dangerous to the safety of the travelers upon our main highways ought to have the most favoring consideration. Clark v. Hoskins, 6 Conn. 106, 109; Richmondville Mfg. Co. v. Prall, 9 Conn. 487, 495; Richards v. Eno, 23 Conn. 413, 416; Sturges v. Raymond, 27 Conn. 473, 476. We may not, of course, attempt to give effect to an actual intent of the Legislature beyond that intent which is to be found in the words of the law. Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 438, 28 A. 540; Bayon v. Beckley, 89 Conn. 154, 159, 93 A. 139. But in considering such a law as the one before us, we ought not " to stick in the bark," and by too close adherence to its letter narrow its scope beyond the visible intent of the Legislature. Judson v. Blanchard, 4 Conn. 557, 566; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597, 604; Brown's Appeal, 72 Conn. 148, 150, 44 A. 22, 49 L.R.A. 144.

" The fundamental rule for the construction of statutes is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. This intention must be ascertained from the act itself, if the language is plain. But when the language used is doubtful in meaning, the true meaning may be ascertained by considering it in the light of all its provisions, the object to be accomplished by its passage, its title, pre-existing legislation upon the...