Connecticut Water Co. v. Beausoleil

• Decision Date: 09 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12969,12969
• Citation: 526 A.2d 1329,204 Conn. 38
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: The CONNECTICUT WATER COMPANY v. Roland BEAUSOLEIL.

Page 1329

526 A.2d 1329

204 Conn. 38

The CONNECTICUT WATER COMPANY v. Roland BEAUSOLEIL.

No. 12969.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 2, 1986.

Decided June 9, 1987.

Carla R. Walworth, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Dean M. Cordiano, for appellant (plaintiff).

Kevin T. Nixon, Naugatuck, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SANTANIELLO, DUPONT and HADDEN, JJ.

DUPONT, Associate Justice.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in rendering a summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the plaintiff's action for damages when the plaintiff had previously participated in an administrative action against the defendant. The resolution of two subsidiary issues are determinative of whether summary judgment should have been granted. The issues are: (1) whether the scope of the prior administrative enforcement action brought in the Superior Court permitted the plaintiff, as an intervening party, to seek the damages he now claims; and (2) whether a stipulated judgment rendered pursuant to a motion for stipulated judgment signed by the parties in the prior administrative enforcement action encompassed the damages the plaintiff now claims. We find error.

The action which is the subject of this appeal is one for damages in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant maintained a private nuisance and negligently and intentionally permitted the contamination of the plaintiff's reservoir which is part of a public water supply system. The plaintiff's complaint alleges that it owns and operates Moody Reservoir and that the defendant owns land being developed as a residential subdivision. The complaint further alleges that, in connection with the development, the defendant engaged in activities which caused extensive soil erosion and caused a brook on the defendant's land to contain a silt-laden run-off. The brook feeds Moody Reservoir and the run-off has caused elevated color and turbidity levels in the reservoir.

The prior administrative action involved an order of the commissioner of the department of environmental protection (commissioner) which was previously issued to the defendant pursuant to the Water Pollution Control Act, General Statutes § 22a-432. ¹ That order required the defendant to take necessary action to install and maintain erosion and siltation control measures on his land. The order contained a finding that the defendant was maintaining a facility "which reasonably can be expected to create a source of pollution of the waters of the state" and contained specific measures and programs to be undertaken by the defendant, including a timetable for their completion.

The order further required the defendant to verify to the commissioner that construction of long term erosion and siltation control measures were completed and being maintained in accordance with an engineering report to be reviewed and approved by the commissioner. The order referred only to the defendant and his land and did not refer to the plaintiff or its reservoir. The defendant could have, but did not, seek a hearing before the commissioner to contest or modify the order as provided in General Statutes §§ 22a-432 and 22a-436. ²

A suit for injunctive relief and compliance with the commissioner's order was brought against the defendant by the attorney general at the request of the commissioner as provided by General Statutes § 22a-435. ³ The complaint alleged that the commissioner had issued an order to the defendant requiring him to take specific measures to prevent pollution to Moody Reservoir, and that the defendant had failed to comply with the order. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 22a-432 and 22a-435, a permanent injunction was sought to restrain the defendant from maintaining a potential source of pollution to the waters of the state. An order was also sought to require the defendant to forfeit to the state a sum not to exceed ten thousand dollars, to be fixed by the court, for each offense. General Statutes § 22a-438.

The plaintiff's motion to intervene in the Superior Court action as a party plaintiff was granted by the trial court. The motion claimed "an interest that the judgment in [the] action will affect, and it [the plaintiff] is directly interested in and may be affected by the granting of a temporary or permanent injunction...."

The plaintiff filed no other pleading in the action, and sought no damages from the defendant for any damage to its reservoir. Judgment was rendered in accordance with a motion for stipulated judgment. The motion stated that the commissioner and the defendant stipulated to judgment, but was signed by the plaintiff as well as the defendant and an assistant attorney general for the commissioner, on October 3, 1984. In February, 1985, the defendant and the commissioner signed a consent decree. ⁴ The plaintiff, however, did not sign the decree.

The stipulation provided that certain measures be taken by the defendant to prevent pollution and erosion. The stipulation did not mention the plaintiff's reservoir, and required no approval by the plaintiff of any work to be done by the defendant. Instead, it specifically provided that the defendant take remedial action which, "in the opinion of the Department of Environmental Protection, is adequate to prevent further erosion."

In the plaintiff's present action for damages, the trial court found that there was no question of fact relating to the intent of the parties in signing the motion for stipulated judgment, and held that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff could have litigated the claim for relief of the present case in the prior case and not having done so, was barred from bringing a second action.

I

The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment serves as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving any claims relating to such cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Gagne v. Norton, 189 Conn. 29, 32, 453 A.2d 1162 (1983). "Our rules of res judicata are based on the public policy that 'a party should not be allowed to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.' " Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Ins. Co., 200 Conn. 360, 363-64, 511 A.2d 333 (1986), citing In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 190 Conn. 310, 318, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983). In order to resolve the question of whether the plaintiff, as an intervenor in the commissioner's administrative enforcement action against the defendant, could have sought monetary damages in that action, it is necessary to determine the scope of that action as provided by statute. See Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Ins. Co., supra, 200 Conn. at 364, 511 A.2d 333.

Title 22a of the General Statutes is entitled "Environmental Protection." It contains various acts, all relating to the general purpose of the entire title. Sections 22a-1 through 22a-13 provide for the general state policy, create a department of environmental protection, and establish the duties and powers of its commissioner. The Environmental Protection Act is contained in General Statutes §§ 22a-14 through 22a-20. Sections 22a-1 through 22a-20 are important to an understanding of the scope of judicial review to be accorded to the various other acts also contained within the same title.

The commissioner's order in this case was issued pursuant to the Water Pollution Control Act, one of the many acts contained in Title 22a. The plaintiff was permitted to intervene as a party in the action for an injunction brought by the commissioner solely because of the provisions of § 22a-19. That section provides that in any judicial review of an administrative proceeding, any person may intervene as a party on "the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the ... action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state."

The Environmental Protection Act authorizes only limited forms of relief and encompasses injunctive and declaratory relief but not a private claim for damages. Its purpose is to give private citizens a voice in ensuring that the air, water and other natural resources of the state remain protected, preserved and enhanced, and to provide them with "an adequate remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction." General Statutes § 22a-15. It, therefore, allows a member of the general public to intervene in an existing judicial review of an agency action or to initiate an independent declaratory or injunctive action. General Statutes § 22a-19. Although intervention is allowed, it is strictly limited to the raising of environmental issues. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 490, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). By permitting such intervention, the act confers standing to private persons to bring actions to protect the environment. Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 54, 364 A.2d 194 (1975). "Such standing, however, is conferred only to protect the natural resources of the state from pollution or destruction." (Emphasis added.) Id. The legislative history of the Environmental Protection Act makes it clear that the only relief available to the intervenor in such actions is an injunction or a declaratory judgment. There can be no award of damages to the intervenor. 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2, 1971 Sess., pp. 739-40. See also H. Johnson, "Environmental Protection Act of 1971," 46 Conn. B.J. 422, 435 (1972).

The action for an injunction pursuant to § 22a-432 and 22a-435 is part of a statutory scheme and follows an administrative decision that a defendant is a potential polluter of the waters of the state. The injunction is mandatory when, as here, the defendant...